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In Spite of Yourself: The Asignifying Force of Humor and Laughter calls upon the 
interruptive moments of uncontrollable laughter to challenge rhetoric’s historical treatment of 
humor and laughter.  Anyone who has ever suffered a fit of hysterical laughter at precisely 
the wrong moment, or has begun to laugh spontaneously at an inappropriate joke before 
stopping short, can attest to laughter’s uniquely uncontrollable force.  Beyond all reason and 
control, laughter interrupts us and reminds us of the limits of the human subject.  Because 
laughter does not signify meaning in the traditional communicative sense, it exerts an 
asignifying force irreducible to the questions of truth, understanding, and presence.  While 
rhetoricians like Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian attempt to confine laughter’s force to 
calculated aspects of persuasion, their approaches simultaneously reveal an understanding 
that laughter’s effects lie beyond the rational control of the orator.  By tracing the often-
unintended effects of humor through a range of comedic performances including stand-up 
comedy, radio, and film, this project ultimately argues that laughter’s rhetorical power 
resides not in what it means, but in what it does.  Ultimately, because laughter is not a 
signifying language, yet it still produces rhetorical effects, taking up laughter’s asignifying 
force provides a chance to expand the field of rhetoric in ways beyond the reason, beyond 









A fiery crash leaves three people dead.  Police in Nebraska say a rental truck [voice 
starts to quiver] carrying two people lost control, crossed the median, and collided 
head on with a semi truck.  Both trucks burst into flames, and witnesses say there 
were [voice quivers again] several explosions.  Two … [uncontrollable laughter, 
three seconds] … Excuse me.  The two people in the roo … [uncontrollable laughter, 
four seconds] … The two people in the rental truck and the … [uncontrollable 
laughter, two seconds] … driver of the semi [spoken while laughing] … This is a sad 
story, excuse me [spoken while co-anchor laughs uncontrollably off camera] … were 
killed.  Crews say they had fires contained in about ten minutes [spoken while 
laughing, co-anchor continues to laugh uncontrollably off camera]. 
 
- TV News anchor Jay Warren, WSLS News 10, reporting live on air 
Consider the following scenario: You find yourself in a formal meeting at work 
concerning an issue of extreme import to your job.  Maybe you are on a committee that is 
deciding which department will be dissolved due to impending budget cuts, or you are called 
in to help brainstorm a new direction for the company after extremely disappointing sales 
reports, or you are at a contentious union meeting listening to impassioned speeches arguing 
both sides of whether or not a strike should be called.  Obviously, the details of such an issue 
will vary widely depending on your line of work, but, suffice it to say, one constant will 
remain no matter the particulars: this is no time or place for joking around.  Certain contexts 
demand from us a seriousness that calls upon us to put our most rational face forward, and to 
maintain a logical, professional, controlled manner that can help all those involved get the 
task at hand accomplished in the most productive and efficient manner possible.  Even if you 
are more slacker than go-getter in such a circumstance and have no intention of getting your 
hands dirty, preferring instead to lay low until the present tempest blows over, your tactic 
will still take some form of quiet thoughtfulness: you need to demonstrate that you know 
things are serious by projecting an ethos that accurately reflects the grave tenor of the 
moment.  Regardless of your style of engagement – whether you want to play a role in 
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shaping the scenario’s outcome or simply want it to go the hell away without bearing the 
trace of your fingerprints – you will undoubtedly enter into the situation with every intention 
of appropriately controlling yourself and your actions.   
But yet, as all of us know from personal experience, this doesn’t always happen. This 
seemingly logical approach – to set your rational mind to controlling yourself in a context – 
can fail.  In the scenario described above, a nervous errand boy could enter the room and 
promptly spill half-a-dozen coffees all over the conference table.  A distinguished older 
gentleman presenting an urgent speech to the group could utter an accidental phrase that 
conjures up a sexually tinged “That’s what s/he said!” double entendre in your mind.  A 
superior who views herself – rather exhaustingly – as the exemplar of stoic, professional 
conduct could forcefully break wind just as the tension in the room reaches an apex.  The 
catalyst that sets you off in these situations is largely incidental; what matters are the 
unintentional, uncontrollable, and, in this instance, wholly unfortunate effects of that catalyst: 
laughter.  It strikes in an instant with a sucker punch to your stomach.  Direct and 
unforgiving, laughter seizes control of your chest and the very air you breath before it surges 
up your body, where it contorts your face into a grimacing smile visible to anyone who can 
see you, the last physiological warning before your sense of self-control is completely 
betrayed in a full blown, eruptive laughter that overwhelms your rational being.  Sometimes, 
however, in the brief moment between a simmering laughter and a laughter that boils over, 
you can consciously catch yourself.  The initial jolt that slipped past your logical self-
defenses may have gone un-checked, but sometimes you are able to temporarily regain a 
modicum of composure, desperately aware that an all hands on deck, code red rational 
response is required to avert a disaster.  Sometimes you can hold your breath, bite your lip, 
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and clench every muscle in your body as tightly as you can until something else comes to 
mind – parking tickets, genocide, academic discourse, the fact that you’re about to make an 
ass of yourself in front of people who have a significant stake in your material existence – 
anything that can help force the feeling away and reinstate you again as the rightful liege to 
your self control.  Sometimes this works, and your reasonable side – thank god – wins out.  
Yet, regrettably, at other moments, no matter how hard you try, no matter how hard you want 
to resist, your rational side isn’t enough.  Perched at the tipping point, you fall over the cliff, 
surrendering all control of your being in an uncontrollable release of rollicking, euphoric 
spasms.  It breeches your levees, seizes the moment for its own, shattering the presupposed 
notion that a complete and stable presence resides at the origin of the experiences collected 
under your name.  You are laughing your ass off, and there’s nothing you can do about it. As 
much as we might wish it were the case, where you are and whom you are with does not 
always create a strong enough boundary to keep you firmly contained in your own 
wheelhouse, the unconditional captain of your own subjective ship.  Sometimes – no matter 
how seriously you intend to carry yourself, no matter the solemnity you may rationally feel 
toward the context you find yourself in, no matter how much the stakes of your future are 
connected to your personal behavior at that moment – sometimes … you just crack up.   
Laughter does not always obey our rational intentions, and anyone who has ever 
laughed uncontrollably has experienced a loss of self.   Like paroxysms of coughing, 
uncontrollable laughter is the experience of being overtaken by what Héléne Cixous 
describes as “the rhythm that laughs you”; in other words, you laugh uncontrollably, in spite 
of yourself (“Medusa” 885).  In a scenario such as the one explained above, laughter 
interrupts the notion of who we believe we are in the eyes of other people, and, more 
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significantly, in the eyes of ourselves.  That is, we typically operate under the assumption 
that the script we perform for the world around us is written and directed by ourselves, and, 
therefore, it can accurately present who we believe we are, or at least who we want people to 
think we are.  But laughter can come along and crash the performance, revealing ourselves to 
others in a way that is not a part of the official script.  When the dust settles and we regain 
control in these situations, the feelings typically felt are shame and embarrassment.  We 
cannot believe we “let ourselves go” like that in front of other people.  Much like when 
someone shows up unexpectedly at your house when it is in a particularly dismal state of 
disarray, so much so that you find yourself continually apologizing for it while they are there  
– “I’m sorry, I’ve been so busy lately, I’m usually not this messy!” – uncontrollable laughter 
can expose the more intimate areas of ourselves to others when we are least expecting it.   
But just as it can expose the more intimate areas of ourselves to others, laughter can 
also expose the more intimate areas of ourselves to ourselves.  For example, you might be at 
home late at night having a beer and watching television, and an off-color joke that 
pejoratively depicts a particular group of people in a stereotypical way or makes a rude 
inference about a value generally held to be sacred might cause you to burst out laughing 
before your rational mind steps in and asserts, “I don’t laugh at these kinds of things.”  
Laughter can sneak in when we least expect it and interrupt our sense of who we think is 
sitting on our couch, watching our TV, and drinking our beer.  In these moments, it is not 
how others see us that gets interrupted, but rather it is our notion of our selves – who “I” 
think “I” am – that becomes shattered.  You may believe you embody a certain set of traits 
you hold dear – for example, tolerance, patience, rationality, compassion, justice – and you 
might spend the majority of your life consciously working to behave in ways that reflect 
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those values.  And you might be extremely successful at doing so.  But in that moment when 
laughter bursts forth, these values are placed at risk in an instant.  This is not to infer that by 
laughing in these moments, you somehow purge or surrender or renounce the values that you 
hold dear, revealing yourself to be a fraud and a hypocrite.  Yet what laughter does in these 
moments is remind us that we are not as in control of ourselves as we think.  Confronting this 
fact is often a shocking and somewhat frightening experience. We do not want to believe that 
we are capable of finding humor where we sometimes find it.  And while cracking up in an 
inappropriate situation generally turns into a funny story at some point down the road, the 
moments when our laughter betrays ourselves to ourselves are very rarely retold to others as 
a funny story.  We tend to keep those laughing moments private.  They cut too close to the 
bone for comfort, as they place the innermost notion of who we think we are at stake.   
When laughter laughs us, we are rationally betrayed, in a sense, because in that 
moment, how others see us and how we see ourselves is out of our control.  Because laughter 
places our rational control at risk, it simultaneously places one of rhetoric’s foundational 
beliefs at risk as well: that a stable, human subject occupies the center of the rhetorical 
situation and uses language to produce effects of her design.  The rhetorical tradition has long 
asserted that by understanding an audience’s attitudes, expectations, and needs, a rhetor can 
tailor her message accordingly, making the most effective use of her available means of 
persuasion, to achieve a given purpose.  Lloyd Bitzer suggests as much when he identifies 
the rhetor as wielding discourse to produce her intended effects and control her own reality: 
[A] work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of 
something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in 
the world; it performs some task.  In short, rhetoric is a mode of altering 
reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of 
discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action.  
The rhetor alters reality by bringing into existence a discourse of such 
 
 6 
character that the audience, in thought and action, is so engaged that it 
becomes mediator of change.  In this sense rhetoric is always persuasive. 
(“Rhetorical Situation” 3-4) 
 
It is the rhetor who “alters reality” by choosing how to create her argument, or, in 
Aristotelian terms, by deriving her artistic proofs from whichever appeals she feels are the 
most appropriate for the given situation.  So when the context calls for a reasoned argument, 
the rhetor leans on logos, when the audience is more whimsical and looking to feel the 
argument in their hearts more so than hear it in their heads, a more pathetic appeal is dialed 
up, and when the rhetor has personal charms and qualities that an audience will likely 
respond positively to, she, in a way, sells herself, putting her own ethos front and center, 
conveying a sense of, “You like me, so do what I say.”  The subject at the center of this 
traditional view of the rhetorical situation is essentially human.  In order to presume a rhetor 
can produce desired effects in any given situation, a view of the subject that is stable and 
complete is required.  Again, Bitzer writes: 
Let us regard rhetorical situation as a natural context of persons, events, 
objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance; this 
invited utterance participates naturally in the situation, is in many instances 
necessary to the completion of situational activity, and by means of its 
participation with situation obtains its meaning and its rhetorical character. (5, 
my emphases) 
 
The rhetorical situation here is a natural occurrence, one that is organically participated in by 
a rhetor who responds in kind; “The situation dictates the sorts of observations to be made” 
(5).  In the case of a rhetor interested in the production of laughter, for example, the rhetor 
wants to conjure up this response because she thinks it will help sway the audience in her 
favor, so she takes into account her context and attempts to incite laughter accordingly, in a 
way that “participates naturally in the situation.”  In this way rhetorical handbooks, from the 
many composed in antiquity to the countless readers marketed for use in contemporary 
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composition classrooms, are all grounded in some version of this fundamental belief: a stable 
human subject resides at the center of the rhetorical situation pulling the levers of persuasion 
and controlling language’s effects.  By learning how to dress to fit the occasion, so to speak, 
a rhetor can be trained to lead an audience wherever she wants, including making them 
laugh.  These rhetorical handbooks attempt to help the rhetor produce the response of 
laughter in the same way they help the rhetor produce any other persuasive aim: by 
suggesting approaches for how to construct appeals to laughter so they produce desirous 
effects in just the right way at just the right time.  In Cicero’s On Oratory, Caesar offers 
numerous, specific suggestions for how an orator could construct a particular joke for 
particular occasions.  For example, he identifies “Ironical dissimulation” as having “an 
agreeable effect, when you say something different from what you think,” and these appeals 
are “not more appropriate to law-pleadings in the forum, than to any other kind of discourse,” 
suggesting ironical dissimulation is a form of humorous appeal that is useful in many 
contexts. (II.LXVII).  Other jokes, however, have far more restrictive uses, such as those 
created “when he who has uttered a sarcasm is jested upon in the same strain in which he has 
attacked another,” suggesting this joke is more useful in situations when the orator requires a 
humorous appeal that is more aggressive, or, perhaps, aggressively defensive (II.LXVIII). 
Cicero’s approaches to humor and laughter survey a range of humorous appeals, making 
formal and stylistic suggestions for how each joke should be structured, as well as offering 
situational clues for which audiences and which occasions are the most likely to respond 
favorably to each humorous appeal.  These suggestions, ultimately, are an effort to apply 
rational approaches to controlling laughter’s effects. 
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But because laughter is ultimately not controllable, it has occupied a bit of a 
paradoxical position within the rhetorical tradition.  On the one hand, the production of 
laughter is clearly a powerful means of persuasion in the hands of a gifted and capable rhetor, 
and reasons to conjure it are many.  For example, any university Intro to Public Speaking 
course will undoubtedly cover how starting off with a joke is an effective way to settle down 
both the audience and the speaker at the beginning of a speech. Certain controversial topics 
are also rendered more approachable if they are presented in a more lighthearted fashion 
where personal biases and prejudices can be gently disarmed and softened before the difficult 
aspects of the material is confronted.  And a hearty laugh can do wonders to refresh and 
replenish the spirits of an audience that has grown weary from a long presentation.  The 
audience’s laughter, when considered from the perspective of what it can do productively for 
an orator, has nearly limitless positive applications, and, therefore, a rhetor’s ability to 
generate this powerfully favorable feeling in an audience can pay dividends with a higher 
rate of return than almost any other means of persuasion.  On the other hand, laughter’s 
power carries with it significant risks.  Laughter as a tool is only valuable to the one trying to 
induce it in an audience if its effects can be controlled, but this is not always the case.  And 
therein lies the rub.  Laughter’s effects harbor profound persuasive potentials, yet those very 
same effects often lie beyond our rational control.  The question for rhetoric becomes, “What 
do we do with this stuff?”  Because of its unrivaled persuasive potential, laughter could not 
simply be left out of the rhetorical toolbox. But because of its volatility every effort must be 
taken to wield this force as carefully as possible.   
This project will explore this interruptive power of laughter and its effects on the 
rhetorical subject.  To believe we can control laughter is to believe that laughter is a human 
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phenomenon, but in fact, what laughter shows us when we are in its powerful throes is that 
all the things that make us “human” – reason, language, meaning – are interrupted.  
Therefore, to appeal to laughter is not to master the available means of persuasion in any 
rhetorical situation. It is not an endeavor that emboldens the stability of the human subject, 
but one that requires us to surrender to what is beyond the human.  For while appealing to 
laughter starts out as a rational move – it seeks to structure humorous appeals in the right 
way so they produce the right effect at the right time – humorous appeals ultimately bring 
reason and control to their limits.  In short, laughter does not show us how we are human, it 
shows us the limit of the human.   Laughter, therefore, gives us an opportunity to question 
who – or what – is at the center of the rhetorical situation.  If what is at the center is no 
longer a stable subject, then laughter transforms the basis – almost – for what has historically 
constituted the whole field of rhetoric.  In this way, laughter causes us to rethink something 
rhetoric has long taken for granted.  The history of rhetoric has played a bit of a dangerous, 
risky game in its relationship with humor and laughter, in that it offers advice on how a 
rhetor can learn to use appeals to laughter appropriately in a way that makes us think we are 
the ones in control.   Yet at the same time, the same approaches to humor and laughter have 
seemed to intimate, on some level, that humor and laughter are risky appeals because 
laughter uses us as well.  Rhetoric traditionally believes that a human subject rationally 
employs language to produce effects, but because laughter shows us the limits of the human 
subject, it also reveals the limits of rhetoric as an art.  As such, laughter leads to a rhetoric 





The Question of Terminology 
Humor and laughter are a challenge to theorize because of laughter’s uncontrollable 
effects on the human subject, but they are also difficult to write about because the two terms 
– and the phenomena associated with them – function by means of a symbiotic relationship: 
the effect insinuates the object.  When we talk about laughter as an effect, there is the 
implication that some sort of catalyst, or object, is responsible for conjuring the laughter.  
Something always “makes” us laugh, and that something we generally call humor.  Even if 
sometimes it may seem that we break out laughing spontaneously at nothing, closer 
inspection usually reveals that something set us off, even if the something is only a loosely 
identifiable abstraction of life’s absurdity.  You might not always be able to put your finger 
on precisely what it is that you are laughing at, but it can be reasonably assumed that it is 
some form of humor.  As Matthew Hurley, Daniel Dennett, and Reginald Adams describe in 
Inside Jokes, a recent project that argues for and seeks out an evolutionary purpose for humor 
and laughter, the dictionary definitions of humor and laughter in use today are somewhat 
circuitous: 
There is a tight little circle of definitions that go from humor to funny and 
amusing, and then to that which causes laughter – and when you look up 
laughter you find that it is the expression made when something is funny, 
amusing, or humorous.  From this, and from our daily lives, two important 
truisms emerge: humor causes laughter, and humor is a quality of the things 
that we laugh at. (16) 
 
While a theoretical distinction between the humorous object and laughter itself exists, the 
boundary separating these concepts is inherently fluid, because any discussion of laughter 
always presupposes a humorous object, and any discussion of a humorous object implies a 




But beyond the difficulty of separating these two phenomena on a conceptual level, 
the past efforts of those who have tried to theorize these two terms further complicate the 
challenge in writing about humor and laughter.  These efforts have left us with significant 
epistemological concerns and questions surrounding what we really mean when we talk 
about humor and laughter.  For example, the term “humor” as referring to the object that 
inspires laughter is hardly a stable and agreed upon definition, and depending on the 
individual theorists and the particular historical moments of their work, humor has drifted 
across a porous continuum, mingling, entwining, and sometimes even colliding with a range 
of other terms – wit, comic, mirth, absurd, ridiculous, and ludicrous, to name a few – that 
have referred to myriad aspects of the overall humorous experience.  Some of these terms 
have been used synonymously with humor at certain times in history.  But at other times, 
they have been used relationally, referring to experiences and phenomena that range from the 
broader, more macro humorous experience to more micro depictions of specific forms.  For 
example, Freud’s delineation between wit, the comic, and humor, that “the pleasure of wit 
originates from an economy of expenditure in inhibition, of the comic from an economy of 
expenditure in thought, and of humor from an economy of expenditure in feeling,” (Wit 384) 
places the term comic in a much narrower sense than Bergson, who paints his definition of 
comic in much broader, more general strokes as simply “something mechanical encrusted on 
something living” (Laughter 28).  Conversely, Jerry Aline Flieger settles on a different 
definition of comic as “the most inclusive term” for her study:  
[T]he comic may be a mode of writing which is not necessarily funny (and 
which may even seem frightening or poignant) but which can nonetheless be 
associated with the kind of clowning or gaming so prevalent in late twentieth 
century writing.  Indeed, I use the term comic as a performing metaphor that 




Paul McGhee, rather than define humor, first chooses to state what humor is not: “humor is 
not a characteristic of certain events […] not an emotion […] [and] not a kind of behavior,” 
before embarking of a detailed, and somewhat hysterical (although perhaps not purposefully 
so) glossary of “related terms” (Humor 6).  These include the absurd (“illogical or 
inconsistent with what is either known or strongly believed to be true”), the ridiculous 
(“often used synonymously with ‘absurd,’ although it also refers to events that are laughable 
and not to be taken seriously”), ludicrousness (“This is a higher-order concept, referring to 
any event that produces laughter because of incongruity, absurdity, exaggeration, or 
ridiculousness”), funny (“used more than any other to mean ‘humorous’ […] also refers to 
unusual events that are puzzling, but not humorous.  The use of the word ‘funny’ in referring 
to something puzzling is puzzling in itself, because the word ‘funny’ is derived from ‘fun,’ 
which does not have a comparable meaning”); amusing (“This term is sometimes used 
interchangeably with ‘funny,’ although it seems to describe a milder form of experience”), 
and mirthful (“The term ‘mirth’ is often used as if it were synonymous with humor.  This is 
an inappropriate usage, and it will not be adopted in this book”) (6-8).  The term humor has 
even been used to suggest that there exists some kind of a gender divide to the experience of 
humor, as Martin Grotjahn alluded to in the mid-1960s when he said, “wit is his; humor is 
hers” (Beyond Laughter 59).1 Terminology is clearly a significant issue here, and any theorist 
                                                
1 While there is much research on gender in comedy – is there a male sense of humor and a 
female sense of humor? – that discussion comes after the presubjective determinations this 
project makes.  In other words, this project argues that the very notion of subjectivity, of 
identity, is divided in advance by the otherness of laughter.  In doing so, it features and 
demonstrates the untenability of subject positions: they are non-essential and incomplete.  So 
the political intervention here is prior to determinations of gender or, as will be seen, even 





who has attempted to theorize humor in any capacity has run up against the challenge of 
defining what it is that humor actually is.  This difficulty is reflected in the complex and, 
sometimes, contradictory responses to this challenge.  Because humor is inextricably linked 
to laughter, a force that operates beyond our rational control, attempts to theorize it show us 
the limits of theory itself. 
This difficulty is complicated by the fact that the problem of terminology is not 
limited to the discussion of whatever we refer to when we refer to humor.  Articulating what 
laughter is has proven just as difficult for theorists.  For example, consider what some 
theorists define as the two “physiologically distinct” varieties of laughter: Duchenne and 
non-Duchenne (Hurley, et al 19).  In Duchenne laughter, or the spontaneous, explosive kind, 
the body reacts by “laughing with the brow furrowed and the corners of the mouth turned up 
strongly by pull from the orbicularis oculi” (19).  In non-Duchenne laughter, the form that 
generally occurs when we find ourselves laughing at something we don’t really find funny 
such as the nervous giggling that accompanies awkward party conversation, “the orbicular 
muscle plays little or no part” in laughter’s physiological manifestation” (19).  Beyond the 
physiological distinction made between Duchenne and non-Duchenne laughter, Hurley et al 
also make a more qualitative differentiation between the two: “It has been shown that true 
enjoyment only occurs with Duchenne laughter, whereas non-Duchenne laughter usually 
implies some ulterior purpose in laughing other than as an expression of enjoyment” (20). 
Further distinctions include the phenomenon of laughing on the inside that produces “the 
feeling of mirth or humor” (23) without the physical manifestation that accompanies either 
Duchenne or non-Duchenne laughter, the smile (declared as “the essence of humour” and 
“the highest laugh” by Critchley) (On Humour 111), and the laughter that accompanies 
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tickling and play, a physiologically expressed form of laughter, but one that is produced by 
bodily stimuli rather than by some sort of conceptual/linguistic catalyst.  Taking all this into 
account, it quickly becomes clear that all laughter is not the same: it doesn’t produce singular 
physiological responses, doesn’t produce singular emotional responses, and isn’t trigger by 
singular impulses.   
Given the opaqueness that encompasses discussions of the terms humor and laughter, 
this project will attempt a different approach.  Because I am interested in how appealing to 
laughter starts out as a rational move, but ends up bringing control and reason to their limits, 
my primary interest is in the effects of humor rather than the humorous object.  So while we 
rationally try to create humorous appeals in order to produce laughter in an audience, an 
effect that, in theory, helps persuade the audience to go along with whatever we are trying to 
get them to go along with, this project’s ultimate intervention is to show that these rational 
attempts are always haunted by laughter’s excess.  But to talk about the effect of laughter 
without talking about humor is to ignore that laughter does not exist without something 
resembling humor to inspire it.  Humor, likewise, is not humor if there is no laughing 
response.  So on the one hand, one purpose of this project is to shift rhetoric’s focus from 
what the humorous object is to what the humorous objects’ effect – laughter – does.  But on 
the other hand, maintaining a theoretical distinction between humor and laughter remains 
useful and, ultimately, necessary.  Even though both humor and laughter necessarily affect 
each other, and the boundary between the two terms is fluid enough to make distinctions 
incomplete and imprecise, the notions of object and effect are necessary in order to discuss 
humor and laughter as aspects of the rhetorical situation.  Since rhetorical treatises are trying 
to help orators construct appeals by using the right humorous object at the right time in order 
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to produce laughter, some kind of conceptual autonomy has to be preserved in order for a 
discussion of humor and laughter in the rhetorical situation to play out.  In other words, the 
challenge in using the terms humor and laughter is how to maintain enough of a theoretical 
distinction in order to talk about how they both produce different effects – humor produces 
the effect of laughter, ideally, and laughter produces the effect of interrupting the human 
subject – while at the same time not limiting either of these terms by suggesting their 
definitions are in some way stable or complete. In seeking a response to this challenge, I 
sought a different approach: rather then entering the epistemological debates surrounding 
what humor and laughter mean by trying to control the usage of these terms in a way that 
either sequesters humor from laughter or argues that their fluidity makes distinction 
impossible, this project will instead shift the emphasis toward what humor and laughter do by 
taking a performative approach.  As such, the terms humor and laughter will be used 
throughout this project in a way that attempts to both honor the distinctness of each term’s 
effects, while, at the same time, demonstrates that this distinction is never complete.  Since 
laughter never emerges without some sort of catalyst, no matter what that catalyst itself 
might be, humor and laughter are never completely dissociable from one another; any 
attempts to bracket one from the other leaves both terms incomplete.  Rather then create a 
new term or seek a new metaphor – acts that would only further complicate the already 
cluttered taxonomy of terminology surrounding these terms – this project will continue using 
humor and laughter in the spirit of their historic relationship of object and effect within the 
rhetorical situation, but will attempt to do so in a way that demonstrates their fluidity and 
their symbiotic relationship, while, at the same time, also observes the discrete productive 
possibilities of their rhetorical effects.  In total, this project will approach humor and laughter 
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as concepts with discrete roles within the traditional view of the rhetorical situation and as 
fluid forces that call that traditional view into question.  
This performance will unfold across the project’s two parts, which are designed to 
work both independently and recursively.  Part One, comprised of Chapters One and Two, 
will trace humor and laughter’s historical treatment within the rhetorical tradition.  Chapter 
One will explore how rhetoric, as the art of using language to create persuasive appeals, tries 
to advise rhetors on how to construct an object, humorous appeals, to create her desired 
effect, laughter.  The fundamental aspect of this traditional rhetorical situation is that an 
essentially human subject is at its center.   Rhetoric has long been viewed as a civilizing art 
that separates humans from other animals.  When humans came out of the wilderness and 
moved into the city, they were not armed, as Nietzsche puts it, “with horns or with the sharp 
teeth of beasts of prey,” but with language and the ability to use it rhetorically (“On Truth 
and Lies” 1172).  In other words, civilized humans no longer needed to (exclusively) resort 
to physical force and violence to persuade each other; they could use their abilities to 
rationally control language to get things done.  Similarly, human and laughter have long been 
treated as uniquely human attributes.  In the early nineteenth-century, philosopher William 
Hazlitt famously argued “Man is the only animal that laughs,” and humor and laughter 
theorists from Henri Bergson to Sigmund Freud have consistently sustained this view in 
various forms (Lectures 2).  However, Chapter One’s primary intervention will be to 
challenge these traditional views that rhetoric and humor and laughter are essentially human.  
This chapter will align humor and laughter with Jacques Derrida’s discussion of language’s 
force as the future possibility that is essentially stitched into any writing, any act of speech, 
and even human consciousness – at the structural level.  For Derrida, in order for any writing, 
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speech, or experience of being to “be” in the first place is to be always already interrupted or 
retroactively divided by the possibility of its future instantiations, by this force of 
signification.  However, because laughter is not a signifying language, this chapter will argue 
that laughter produces effects by means of an asignifying force that is irreducible to reason 
and human control.  Ultimately, Chapter One will show how humor and laughter, long 
considered the keystones of what it means to be human and not animal, are, in fact, the very 
things that make us question the category of the human.  As such, humor and laughter can 
lead us to a rhetoric that his beyond reason, beyond signification, and beyond the human. 
Chapter Two will bring this discussion of humor and laughter’s asignifying force to 
bear on the rhetorical tradition’s treatment of humor and laughter.  This chapter will trace the 
approaches to humor and laughter in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and 
Castiglione, and will argue that these texts take great care to advise rhetors how to rationally 
use humorous appeals to control laughter.  But, simultaneously, these texts also reveal an 
understanding that the effects of laughter’s asignifying force are ultimately uncontrollable.  
For example, while Plato might want to ban certain forms of humorous writing from his Ideal 
Republic because laughter has the power to lead the subject away from the rational part of 
her soul, and Quintilian might want to offer an expansive, theoretical approach on the many 
ways an orator can construct humorous appeals to best accomplish her persuasive aims, and 
Cicero might want to actually perform examples of humorous appeals to demonstrate 
laughter’s powerful effects, all of these thinkers are cognizant – on some level – that laughter 
has within it an asignifying force that exceeds the rational control of a human subject.  The 
task, therefore, has always been to account for as many of laughter’s potential effects as 
possible, while, at the same time, acknowledging that to appeal to laughter is to appeal to the 
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uncontrollable.  Chapter Two will argue that these historical approaches all demonstrate an 
awareness of laughter’s asignifying force that anticipates later poststructuralist questions of 
language’s force, because these approaches do more than they say when it comes to their 
discussions of humor and laughter.  These earlier approaches to humor and laughter are much 
more dynamic, much more fluid, and have a much more developed understanding of 
laughter’s asignifying force than the history of rhetoric has previously acknowledged.   
Following Part One will be short Interchapter, which performs this discrete yet fluid 
relationship between the humorous appeal as on object and the effect of laughter as an 
asignifying force.  While Part One concentrates on how thinkers across the rhetorical 
tradition have tried to exert rational control over what they acknowledge is an uncontrollable 
force, Part Two will shift the focus from the rhetorical situation that creates humorous 
appeals to the interruptive effects of laughter’s asignifying force, effects that dramatize the 
limits of an orator’s abilities to exert rational control over humorous appeals.  As its own 
section, then, the Interchapter honors the historical distinction between object (humor) and 
effect (laughter) as individual components of the rhetorical situation, while simultaneously 
leaving an opening for ongoing recursive movements between the two concepts. In other 
words, the Interchapter – as the pivot point in the project’s formal center  – performs the 
discrete yet simultaneously interrelated relationship between both humor and laughter and, 
respectively, between Parts One and Two: the individual concepts, humor and laughter, are 
both incomplete and imprecise without the other. 
Part Two will situate laughter’s asignifying force in three different humorous 
locations where its interruptive effect on the human subject can be observed.  The three 
locations engage with Derrida’s theories of performativity, Plato and Baudrillard’s theories 
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of the image, and the Levinasean ethics of alterity.  Chapter Three draws on Derrida’s 
theories of performativity to explore how a performance by Lenny Bruce dramatizes the 
positive productive potentials of language’s breaking force.  In this performance, recorded 
after Bruce had already been arrested multiple times on obscenity charges, blacklisted, and 
banned from working anywhere in America outside of San Francisco, Bruce carries with him 
on stage the court transcripts from one of his ongoing obscenity cases.  The premise of 
Bruce’s act in this performance is that the court transcripts made by police officers stationed 
in the audience of his earlier shows are not accurate and, therefore, cannot convey the 
intended meaning of his performance to the courts.  Bruce’s claim throughout the comedic 
performance hinges on how the inaccuracies in the court transcripts differ from their more 
“accurate” form, and he argues that if he were allowed to perform his act in person before the 
courts, they would receive the full performative effect of his act, understand his intentions, 
and, ultimately, find him innocent of obscenity.  Because this performance dramatizes how 
Bruce’s comedy act gets reinscribed and reinvented in multiple contexts that produce a wide 
array of effects, some of the most significant of which are clearly unintentional and 
uncontrollable by Bruce himself, it provides a way to look at how language, in this case, 
humorous appeals in the form of jokes, is always already interrupted by its future 
instantiations and can never fully be contained in a given context, not even the context of the 
intentions of the human consciousness.  As such, this performance shows us that humorous 
appeals – or any other persuasive appeals – don’t emerge from a fully realized self-present 
subject and, therefore, gives us reason to question who or what is at the center of the 
rhetorical situation if it is no longer a stable human subject.   
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Chapter Four will then turn to traditional and postmodern forms of slapstick humor 
and will draw on Plato and Baudrillard’s theories of the simulacrum to explore how these 
forms help us reimagine the image.  Traditional humor theories generally view slapstick, 
whether it’s found in Shakespeare, the Three Stooges, or Tom and Jerry, as funny because 
the audience understands that the performers aren’t actually in pain.  Because we know that 
Curly isn’t really getting poked in the eye and Jerry is a cartoon cat, we can allow ourselves 
to take pleasure in these “fake” representations of pain and suffering.  Forms of postmodern 
slapstick, such as those seen in the film Jackass 3D, complicate this historic view of slapstick 
comedy, because in Jackass 3D, the humorous appeal is not derived from a representation of 
fake pain and suffering, but from a celebration of real pain and suffering. This chapter will 
argue, however, that Jackass 3D doesn’t capture a more authentic, real, form of slapstick 
comedy, but creates a sense of the real by means of enhanced images produced by cinematic 
techniques like 3D technology and high-definition film resolution and, as such, it functions 
as its own simulacrum, as an image without any relation to reality or a referent. This film 
shows us how the traditional distinction between an authentic original and a denigrated copy 
is upended in the era of the “hyperreal,” when images are only exchanged for each other in a 
“real without origin or reality” (Simulacra 1).  
Finally, Chapter Five explores a technique called soundboarding used to create prank 
phone calls used in radio broadcasts and explores how this technique provides a new way to 
imagine the ethics of alterity, or the Otherness of Levinasean ethics.  Alterity is important to 
rhetoric because it offers a way to think about a poststructuralist ethics that is an alternative 
to the always-appropriative humanist or Enlightenment view of the subject.  Traditional 
humanist ethical systems view the subject as one who goes out into the world and contacts 
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otherness, but those encounters are always in service of absorbing the other into the subject’s 
own horizon and enriching the self.   An ethics of alterity, however, offers a way to respond 
to the other not as something to be mastered and returned to the subject’s own horizon, but 
rather as a radically unapproachable, absolute “Other,” one that the subject is always moving 
toward and can never reach.  Chapter Five will explore how these non-human, non-
representation soundboard prank phone calls can help us to imagine such a non-appropriating 
encounter with a wholly non-present, non-human Other.  In soundboarding, someone’s 
recorded voice is chopped up into short clips, or citations, which are then assigned to buttons 
in a computer soundboard program where they can be triggered and grafted together to create 
the appearance of a real human interlocutor.  The prank caller can then make a phone call to 
an unsuspecting victim and place the caller into conversation with this non-human Other.  
The resulting exchange typically breaks down in a variety of humorous ways, because the 
victim struggles to interpret the meaning of the soundboard-created other’s utterances.  
Because the subject at the center of a soundboard created prank phone call is not human, 
these pranks offer a glimpse at an alternative to the traditional humanist view of the subject 
who, as Diane Davis writes, “is at the center of language, the master of his own speech, and 
that speech is an expression of man’s consciousness” (Breaking 69).  As rhetorical gestures 
that address the other as Other, these prank calls precede and exceed interpretation, and 
operate with an asignifying force that deals not in signified meaning, but in the address itself.  
In doing so, they provide us with an opening in which to imagine a different way to respond 
to the Other, a new way to think about an ethics of alterity, and a posthuman horizon for 
rhetoric.   
 
 22 
Taken as a whole, the two parts of this project are recursive, and show us how the 
effects of laughter’s asignifying force do more than they mean.  Part One takes up rhetoric’s 
traditionally rational approaches toward humor and laughter and argues that these approaches 
reveal an awareness that laughter’s asignifying force threatens the very control the 
approaches seek.  The uncontrollable effects of this asignifying force are then dramatized in 
Part Two’s examples, which, in turn, let us reimagine the aims of the traditional approaches; 
the theoretical foundation laid in Part One is retroactively revisited by means of Part Two’s 
demonstrations of laughter’s asignifying force.  Ultimately, because laughter is not language 
per se (not a signifying language, anyway, in the traditional conception of what constitutes a 
language), yet it still produces rhetorical effects, taking up laughter’s asignifying force gives 
us a chance to expand the field of rhetoric in ways that further exceed reason, signification, 














Part One: Loss of Control 
Chapter One 
Nonrational Seizures: Beyond Reason, Signification, and the Human 
 
What is laughable is the submission to the self-evidence of meaning, to the 
force of this imperative: that there must be meaning. 
- Jacques Derrida 
 
Since its earliest origins, the discipline of rhetoric has defined itself as an essentially 
human art.  In A New History of Classical Rhetoric, George Kennedy suggests that rhetoric, 
as “a specific cultural subset of a more general concept of the power of words and their 
potential to affect a situation in which they are used and received,” is a foundational attribute 
of what it means to be human (3): 
Ultimately, what we call ‘rhetoric’ can be traced back to the natural instinct to 
survive and to control our environment and influence the actions of others in 
what seems the best interests of ourselves, our families, our social and 
political groups, and our descendants.  This can be done by direct action – 
force, threats, bribes, for example – or it can be done by the use of ‘signs,’ of 
which the most important are words in speech and writing. (3) 
 
In this origin of rhetoric story, Kennedy suggests that humans’ abilities to use systems of 
signs such as speech and writing – as opposed to being limited to using violent acts like force 
and threats – is what separates the human from the animal and, also, from our more primitive 
selves.  In other words, rhetoric is how man civilizes himself.  Friedrich Nietzsche speaks of 
this human/animal divide in terms of how the human intellect exhibits a capacity for illusions 
and dissimulation that sets it apart from other creatures in the animal kingdom: 
As a means for the preserving of the individual, the intellect unfolds its 
principle powers in dissimulation, which is the means by which weaker, less 
robust individuals preserve themselves – since they have been denied the 
chance to wage the battle for existence with horns or with the sharp teeth of 
beasts of prey.  This art of dissimulation reaches its peak in man.  Deception, 
flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back, putting up a false from, 
living in borrowed splendor, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, 
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playing a role for others and for oneself – in short, a continuous fluttering 
around the solitary flame of vanity. (“On Truth” 1172) 
 
Since humans are “weaker, less robust” beings than animals (weaker and less robust than the 
more primitive, “animalistic” versions of ourselves, as well), the human struggle for survival 
must take a different form.  When man came out of the wild, out of the fields, and moved 
into the city, he came armed not only with the primitive weapons of fight-or-flight survival, 
but with persuasive discourse, an exclusively human weapon for use in an exclusively human 
form of warfare.  In other words, rhetoric in the civilized human society takes the place of 
violent action in the uncivilized animal kingdom.  Not only did humans receive language, but 
we have learned to use it rhetorically to persuade each other to do things in ways that are not 
limited to simply imposing our will through force and violence. Even though we still often do 
so, we don’t have to kill one another to get things done. It is not just our language that makes 
us human, but also our ability to rationally control this language using rhetoric, that separates 
the human from the animal.   
One way rhetoric delineates itself as essentially human is that it is a rational discourse 
used by humans, which are the rational animal.  However, another way rhetoric is strongly 
tied to the human is through the concept of character, or ethos.  Aristotle defines the art of 
rhetoric as simply “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of 
persuasion,” and he identifies three species of pisteis, or appeals, which are available to the 
speaker: those “in the argument” themselves (logos), those “in disposing the listener in some 
way” (pathos), and those “in the character of the speaker” (ethos) (On Rhetoric 1.2.1-3).   Of 
the three appeals, Aristotle clearly privileges ethos, because, “we believe fair-minded people 
to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and 
completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt” (1.2.4).  This 
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conception of ethos as grounded in moral character is essential to persuasion, because the 
ability to reproduce facts is not, on its own, enough to persuade an audience:  
Even if we had the most exact knowledge, it would not be very easy for us in 
speaking to use it to persuade some audiences.  Speech based on knowledge is 
teaching, but teaching is impossible [with some audiences]; rather, it is 
necessary for pisteis and speeches [as a whole] to be formed on the bases of 
common [beliefs]. (On Rhetoric 1.1.12) 
 
Because audiences are comprised of humans, and humans are feeling, emotional creatures 
who will not be persuaded by facts alone, audiences need to also feel a connection with the 
speaker to be moved to action.  In other words, sometimes the truth needs a little help.  
Aristotle suggests ethos is primarily responsible for nudging the truth along:2   
But since rhetoric is concerned with making a judgment (people judge what is 
said in deliberation, and judicial proceedings are also a judgment), it is 
necessary not only to look to the argument, that it may be demonstrative and 
persuasive, but also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a 
certain kind of person and to prepare the judge.  For it makes much difference 
in regard to persuasion (especially in deliberations but also in trials) that the 
speaker seem to be a certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him 
to be a certain kind of person and that his hearers suppose him to be disposed 
toward them in a certain way and in addition if they, too, happen to be 
disposed in a certain way [favorably or unfavorably to him]. (2.1.2-3) 
 
As such, Aristotle dismisses the idea that the technical speaker who merely exhibits an 
objective sort of “fair-mindedness” can achieve persuasion with those appeals alone; rather, 
he suggests that “character is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion” (1.2.4, 
my emphases).   Later, the Roman orator Cicero speaks with similar definitiveness of ethos’ 
importance to persuasion in On Oratory:  
                                                
2 One way to think about the importance of ethos to the history of rhetoric is to consider how 
Greek juries dealt with factual evidence in trials.  Rather than privileging direct data – the 
cold, hard facts that dominate the outcomes of many popular crime shows today – Greek 
juries actually distrusted direct evidence because there was a suspicion that this kind of 
evidence might be the product of a bribe or faked in some way.  Instead, confidence was 
placed in what the jury believed the individuals involved in the situation would have been 
likely to do given the reputation of their character, or their ethos (Kennedy in On Rhetoric 9). 
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For there is nothing […] of more importance in speaking than that the hearer 
should be favorable to the speaker, and be himself so strongly moved that he 
may be influenced more by impulse and excitement of mind than by judgment 
or reflection.  For mankind make far more determinations through hatred, or 
love, or desire, or anger, or grief, or joy, or hope, or fear, or error, or some 
other affection of mind, than from regard to truth, or any settled maxim, or 
principle of right, or judicial form, or adherence to the laws. (XLII) 
 
For both Aristotle and Cicero, developing this strong sense of character – an essentially 
human trait – in the speaker is absolutely required for persuasion.  Developing ethos plays a 
vital role for any speaker in any situation, because, we are inclined to go along with people 
we like more than people we do not.  The traditional view of the rhetorical situation suggests 
that a stable human subject who presents a favorable ethos and can understand an audience 
comprised of other stable human subjects can learn to employ the right means of persuasion 
to produce her desired results.  The essential component of this model is the “humanness” of 
the subjects participating: that they are essentially stable, determinable, and complete, and 
thus, they possess the capacity to control – and be controlled – by language. 
Much as rhetoric has posited itself as a human art, theorists who have written about 
humor and laughter have likewise treated the capacity to both create humor and experience 
laughter as uniquely human attributes.  In Beyond Laughter: Humor and the Subconscious, 
humor theorist Martin Grotjahn claims that laughter is something “essentially and 
exclusively human” (ix).  While writing in the field of psychology, Grotjahn’s argument 
about laughter – that “Everything done with laughter helps us be human” – shares with 
rhetoric a similar foundational belief about what it means to be human (ix).   From the 
nineteenth century humanist William Hazlitt, who argues, “Man is the only animal that 
laughs and weeps” (Lectures 2), to the contemporary poststructuralist philosopher and humor 
theorist Simon Critchley, who remarks, “Apparently there have never been cultures without 
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laughter,” (On Humour 66) most discussions on laughter have historically begun from the 
premise that laughter is some sort of a universal, human experience.  For example, in 
“Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic,” Henri Bergson positions laughter firmly 
within the realm of human experience: 
The first point to which attention should be called is that the comic does not 
exist outside the pale of what is strictly human.  A landscape may be beautiful, 
charming and sublime, or insignificant and ugly; it will never be laughable.  
You may laugh at an animal, but only because you have detected in it some 
human attitude or expression […] Several have defined man as ‘an animal 
which laughs.’  The might equally well have defined him as an animal which 
is laughed at; for if any other animal, or some lifeless object, produces the 
same effect, it is always because of some resemblance to man, of the stamp he 
gives it or the use he puts it to. (2) 
 
In Humor: Its Origin and Development, Paul McGhee makes a similarly explicit connection 
between humor and human nature: 
It is impossible to determine when human beings first began to puzzle over 
the nature and functions of humor.  It is likely, though, that they have 
pondered over humor for as long as they have sought to understand their own 
nature.  One longstanding approach to defining ‘human nature’ has been to 
contrast human behavior and capacities with those of animals.  For example, 
human beings have always been thought to be unique because they possess 
language abilities, highly developed thought capacities, and a sense  
of humor. (1) 
 
In Comedy: Meaning and Form, Robert Corrigan’s explanation of what he calls, “the comic 
view of life,” invokes the spiritual side of the human experience.  Here, the comic is posited 
as a celebration of what is heroic in the nature of the human spirit, as it suggests that no 
animal endures like the human: 
All comedy celebrates humankind’s capacity to endure […] The spirit of 
comedy is the spirit of resurrection, and the joy that attends our experience of 
the comic is the joy that comes from the realization that despite all our 




And finally, in Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious, Sigmund Freud identifies the use of 
wit as a way for humans to circumvent the psychic repression brought on by the restrictions 
of civilization: 
We acknowledge to culture and higher civilization an important influence in 
the development of repressions […] in consequence of it, what was once 
accepted as pleasurable is now counted unacceptable and is rejected by means 
of all the psychic forces.  Owing to the repression brought about by 
civilization many primary pleasures are now disapproved by the censor and 
lost.  But the human psyche finds renunciation very difficult; hence we 
discover that tendency-wit furnishes us with a means to make the renunciation 
retrogressive and thus to regain what has been lost. (147) 
 
Through the human telling of jokes, or “wit-work,” taboo topics can be addressed in a 
socially acceptable manner.  The energy previously used to repress the taboo thoughts is 
released by means of laughter (an “economy of psychic expenditure”), which helps us 
navigate our way around the repressive apparatus and, ultimately, “regain what has been 
lost” (180).  Although for Freud, many human responses to repression call into question the 
limits of rational human control – the unconscious manifestations of dream-work and the 
conscious manifestations of neuroses, for example – yet there remains a decidedly “human” 
aspect to repression as it is born out of civilization’s requirements for humans to rationally 
control their desires, to resist following their id and acting on their more primitive, 
animalistic impulses. 
In all of these accounts, humor and laughter are treated in the same fundamental 
manner: man is the animal that laughs, and only humans understand humor.  In other words, 
humor and laughter define what it is to be human.  However, these definitive claims, while 
having displayed lasting theoretical resolve, have recently started to be called into question 
from different disciplinary perspectives.   For example, researchers Marina Davila-Ross, 
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Bethan Allcock, Chris Thomas, and Kim Bard have discovered that chimpanzees produce 
identifiable laugh types when responding to other laughing chimps: 
The results of Part 1 and Part 2 of this study indicated that chimpanzees 
produce laugh-elicited laughter and that this vocalization differs in acoustic 
form and occurrence from their spontaneous laughter.  The present work 
therefore provides empirical evidence that nonhuman primates replicate the 
expressions of their social partners by producing expressions that are distinct 
in their underlying emotions and their social implications. […] The laugh 
responses of chimpanzees in this study furthermore show a striking similarity 
to conversational laughter of humans.  (“Aping Expressions?” 1018) 
 
Our closest relatives in the animal kingdom share our familiar experience that laughter can 
sometimes be “contagious.”  Further research, however, suggests that examples of nonhuman 
laughter are not limited to great apes.  For example, in “Beyond a Joke: From Animal to 
Human Joy?” Psychologist Jaak Panksepp suggests that a certain form of laughter in rats is 
connected to the development of emotional and social bonds: 
When rats play, their rambunctious shenanigans are accompanied by a 
cacophony of 50-khz chirps that reflect positive emotional feelings.  
Sonographic analysis suggests that some chirps, like human laughter, are more 
joyous than others […] We have shown that if rats are tickled in a playful 
way, they readily emit these 50-khz chirps.  The rats we tickled became 
socially bonded to us and were rapidly conditioned to seek tickles.  They 
preferred spending time with other animals that chirped a lot rather than those 
who did not. (62) 
 
By being drawn to frequent chirpers more readily than infrequent chirpers, rats appear to 
exhibit, on some level, Aristotle’s sense of how we are drawn us to others from whom we 
receive a “friendly” feeling from their ethos: “[we are friendly to people like] those who are 
ready to make or receive a joke; for in both cases they are intent on the same thing as their 
neighbor, able to be kidded and kidding in good sport” (On Rhetoric 2.4.13).  These studies 
pose a fundamental challenge to the traditional view of humor and laughter as being 
essentially human traits.  The belief that man is the animal that laughs can no longer be 
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assumed with such black and white certainty.  Rather, what these studies appear to suggest is 
that instead of making us human, laughter shows us that that the line that separates the 
human from the animal is not as distinct as we would like to think that it is.  As Critchley 
states, this boundary is much more fluid than we have previously imagined:  
If humour is human, then it also, curiously, marks the limit of the human.  Or, 
better, humour explores what it means to be human by moving back and forth 
across the frontier that separates humanity from animality, thereby making it 
unstable […] Humour is precisely the exploration of the break between nature 
and culture, which reveals the human to be not so much a category by itself as 
a negotiation between categories.  We might even define the human as a 
dynamic process produced by a series of identifications and misidentifications 
with animality. (29) 
 
When we are laughing, we are not demonstrating some sort of essential humanness.  Quite 
the contrary; we are at our most animal when we are in the throes of uncontrollable laughter, 
because laughter interrupts the human subject and shows us the limits of our rational control.  
We cannot stop laughter using reason alone; sometimes, laughter is in control.  Though 
attempts to conjure laughter begin as rational pursuits – a rhetor tries to choose and construct 
the most appropriate appeals in order to control the appeals’ effects – when laughter results, 
it interrupts human control and reason, showing us the limits of any rational pursuit designed 
to control it.   
These interruptive moments of uncontrollable laughter make us question the category 
of the human itself.  Because laughter makes us explore, as Critchley says, the break 
“between nature and culture,” it also makes us question the category of rhetoric.  Rhetoric 
pitches itself, classically and modernly, as a rational discourse that humans have access to 
and animals do not.   However, challenges to this model are beginning to surface as well.  
Perhaps the earliest rhetorician to engage with the concept of a non-human rhetoric in a 
sustained manner is George Kennedy.  Kennedy’s discussion of “animal rhetorics” helps us 
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explore how laughter calls into question the category of rhetoric because, for Kennedy, 
before rhetoric can even take place, a prior, already existent “energy, has to exist in the 
speaker,” since, “speech cannot take place without some force or motivation to articulate an 
utterance” (“Hoot” 4).  This pre-rhetorical energy, however, is not restricted to human forms 
of communication: “rhetoric is manifest in all animal life and existed long before the 
evolution of human beings.  Nature has favored the development of communication skills; 
although they have some energy cost, they are less costly than physical motion, such as fight 
or flight” (4).  For Kennedy, the ability to use rhetoric is not something humans developed 
vis-à-vis the civilization process, but something that the animal kingdom utilizes as well, as a 
more energy efficient means of getting things done.  In other words, Kennedy questions the 
proprietary claim humans have long made on the art of rhetoric; animals do these things, too.  
Diane Davis later picks up this thread and continues challenging the lingering belief in 
rhetorical studies that, “rhetoric, at the very least, requires an engagement with the symbolic. 
This engagement, while it defines the human (‘the symbol using animal’), is what nonhuman 
animals purportedly lack” (“Creaturely” 88).  Davis furthers the discussion of non-human 
rhetorics toward a view that rhetoric’s fundamental possibility resides in the “always prior 
rhetoricity” that is stitched into any creature’s general, corporeal existence (89): 
‘[R]hetoric’ is itself dependent on an always prior rhetoricity, an affectability 
or persuadability that is due not to any creature’s specific genetic makeup but 
to corporality more generally, to the exposedness of corporeal existence.  To 
be affectable, persuadable, is to be always already affected, persuaded, which 
means: always already responsive.  Rhetoric is not first of all an essence or 
property ‘in the speaker’ (a natural function of biology) but an underivable 
obligation to respond that issues from an irreducible relationality. (89) 
 
For Davis, rhetoric begins at the level of corporeal existence itself, where to exist is to be 
always already affected with the ability to be persuaded, by future persuasive and 
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persuadable possibilities.  The ability to respond rhetorically, to be exposed to persuadability, 
occurs prior to any distinction of genetic makeup, prior to questions of human and/or animal.   
So it’s not as simple as noticing that some nonhuman animals display rhetorical abilities that 
many have long believed to be essentially human rhetorical abilities.  In other words, the 
questions should not be limited to, “How can we discover how animals have rhetorical 
capacities that we thought were exclusively human, and what would those discoveries 
mean?”  Davis turns this line of questioning back on the human itself: “It’s at least as 
important for rhetorical studies to ask whether it’s certain that humans display these 
capacities – or at least if we display them in all the purity that contemporary theories of 
rhetoric presume” (92).  The questions these animal rhetorics raise are leading us toward a 
rhetoric that is less essentially human. 
But if we challenge the traditionally human-centric concept of rhetoric, what happens 
to both the human and to rhetoric?  In “Toward a Bestial Rhetoric,” an article that also 
revisits Kennedy’s concept of animal rhetorics, Debra Hawhee continues to explore the 
implications of non-human rhetorics for the human and for rhetoric.  Hawhee identifies 
additional challenges animal rhetorics pose to traditional, anthropocentric views of rhetoric: 
Kennedy’s attention to animals yields three crucial challenges to rhetorical 
theory: first, it shifts attention from ‘wordy’ language to language rendered 
with calls, tones, facial expressions, and bodies.  Second, it posits rhetoric as 
energetic intensity, a movement, or an urge to move others.  And finally, the 
speaker or author takes a back seat to the audience.  Or better said, the speaker 
is kicked to the curb. (82)  
 
The parallels between laughter and animal rhetorics in Hawhee’s account are striking, as they 
both pose similar challenges to rhetorical theory.  First and foremost, the idea of a non-
human, animal rhetor at the center of the rhetorical situation explicitly removes the human 
from the equation, replacing him or her with another creature entirely.  But getting kicked to 
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the curb is precisely what happens to the human subject when it is in the throes of 
uncontrollable laughter.  While the rhetor at the center of a humorous rhetorical situation 
might still be a human being and not some other, non-human creature, the human’s sense of 
rationality and control is precisely what uncontrollable laughter interrupts.  So while laughter 
kicks the human to the curb in a less literal way than an animal subject kicks the human to 
the curb, the same traits that have traditionally defined the human as human – reason, 
language, rhetoric, laughter – are precisely what uncontrollable laughter places at risk.  
Furthermore, because laughter is not, as Hawhee puts it, a “wordy” language, or is not a 
signifying language in the traditional sense, laughter shares more with non-human, animal 
languages expressed through “calls, tones, facial expressions, and bodies” than it does with 
“human” forms of linguistic expression.  And because laughter has this non-linguistic 
rhetorical capacity to function as “energetic intensity,” the limits of laughter’s rhetorical 
effects can never be fully contained in approaches that concentrate primarily on signification, 
such as those found throughout the rhetorical tradition.  While early rhetoricians demonstrate 
remarkable dedication when accounting for as many different kinds of humorous appeals and 
their potential effects as possible, the energetic intensity of laughter will always exceed 
attempts to contain it within language alone, because laughter is not language operating in 
the traditional sense.  In other words, just because you can’t transcribe a laugh doesn’t mean 
a laugh can still do things.  It can become contagious and cause others to laugh, or it can take 
over the human subject, exceeding the subject’s ability to maintain rational control over 
itself, or, if the laugh is coming at someone’s expense, it can even insult or hurt someone.  
Laughter’s “energetic intensity” might not be reducible to signification, but it is still capable 
of producing persuasive, rhetorical effects.  The effects of which are immediately observable 
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the moment we lose ourselves in the throes of uncontrollable laughter and our essential 
humanness gets “kicked to the curb” by a laughter that laughs us.  
Put simply, what these accounts all suggest is that laughter can lead us to a rhetoric 
that is beyond reason, beyond signification, and beyond the human.  Laughter challenges 
rhetoric’s ability to define itself as a uniquely human art form, because laughter challenges 
what it means to be human.  Laughter does this by exerting, in Kennedy’s term, an “energetic 
intensity,” or, to put it differently, by means of a certain force.   
The Question of Force(s) 
The question of force is especially apropos to the discussion of laughter.  Much in the 
same way laughter can exceed the subject’s ability to maintain rational control of herself, 
Jacques Derrida envisions a certain force within the structure of language that likewise 
interrupts the self.  However, there are many types of forces that produce many different 
effects.  Derrida engages with one example of force by means of his intervention with J.L. 
Austin’s speech act theory.  Austin’s use of the term force refers to the way in which some 
performative utterances actually produce effects that do things (Austin’s examples include 
utterances that name a ship, marry two people, or place a bet) while other constative 
utterances state facts and represent meaning (the sky is blue, for example), but his efforts to 
distinguish performatives from constatives ultimately rely on a stable delineation between 
“serious” contexts and “nonserious” contexts that proves impossible to maintain.  Derrida’s 
intervention in this conversation is to demonstrate that the impossibility Austin struggles with 
results from the fact that writing and speech both contain – at the structural level, at the 
moment of their inscription or their utterance – a breaking force that can always be lifted 
from one context and placed in another, a chain of citing and grafting that can go on 
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infinitely and always produce new and different meanings.  For Derrida, the always-iterable 
breaking force of “the mark in general” (written or spoken) is what allows for the possibility 
of writing or speech to exist in the first place: 
If one admits that writing (and the mark in general) must be able to function in 
the absence of the sender, the receiver, the context of production, etc., that 
implies that this power, this being able, this possibility, is always inscribed, 
hence necessarily inscribed as possibility in the functioning or the functional 
structure of the mark.  Once the mark is able to function, once it is possible 
for it to function, once it is possible for it to function in case of absence, etc., 
it follows that this possibility is a necessary part of its structure, that the latter 
must necessarily be such that this functioning is possible […] Such iterability 
is inseparable from the structural possibility in which it is necessarily 
inscribed. (“Limited inc” 48) 
 
For writing to be what it is, it must be iterable – i.e. it must be already interrupted – at the 
very moment of its inscription by its future instantiations, its future possibilities of attaching 
somewhere else in a different context.  To dramatize this breaking force, consider the case of 
an actor in a play telling an offensive joke on stage.  Even though that person acting as a 
character in a play is pretending to be someone else, and speaking made up lines for a made 
up person in a nonserious context, all that “nonseriousness” still cannot guarantee that the 
effects of that utterance will be contained within the nonserious context of the play.  Just 
because you say “I was kidding!” after you insult someone with an offensive joke, the 
performative effects of your insult – what the joke does – can always exceed context and the 
speaker’s rational intentions.   
However, Derrida’s interest in force becomes something different than it is for 
Austin.  Even though he keeps Austin’s term, his refinement of the term brings him to a kind 
of force that is more closely in line with the “energetic intensity” of laughter.  Derrida is not 
only interested in how language’s breaking force interrupts context, but in how force can also 
interrupt the context of the self as well, of presence, of the experience of being.  This 
 
 36 
conception of an interruptive force is another word for the future possibility that is – at the 
structural level – essentially stitched into the experience of human consciousness, just as it is 
with writing and speech.  Presence and the experience of human consciousness are also 
interrupted by the same possibility for future instantiations that pierce writing and speech – at 
the moment of their being marked or uttered – at the structural level.  Consider Derrida’s 
following example of what happens to a human subject when she makes a shopping list for 
herself: 
At the very moment “I” make a shopping list, I know […] that it will only be a 
list if it implies my absence, if it already detaches itself from me in order to 
function beyond my ‘present’ act and if it is utilizable at another time, in the 
absence of my-being-present-now, even if this absence is the simple ‘absence 
of memory’ that the list is meant to make up for, shortly, in a moment, but one 
which is already the following moment, the absence of the now of writing, of 
the writer maintaining, grasping with one hand his ballpoint pen.  Yet no 
matter how fine this point may be, it is like the stigmé of every mark,  
already split. (49) 
 
The experience of “being,” of having a sense of self, is not to be fully stable and complete.  
Rather, to “be” means to always already be interrupted by future possibilities, to always be 
able to be reinscribed into different contexts where what it means to be “you” can always 
become something different.  In this way, to be “you” is to function like a language, to 
always already be broken free from where you are by the limitless possibilities of where you 
could always go.  Derrida’s conception of this force that interrupts the self calls into question 
the same notion of a stable human subject that laughter challenges: just as we might believe 
that we are in control of laughter when laughter is really in control of us, the belief that we 
“are” who we think we are is only possible because we are always already exceeded – 
interrupted – by our future instantiations.  So from this perspective, laughter’s capacity to 
interrupt the human subject does not reveal some incompleteness in the human subject or a 
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failure of human reason.  Instead, laughter’s interruptive effect on the human subject 
demonstrates that what it means to be human, what it means to “be,” is to be always already 
interrupted from the very first instance of your being by future instantiations of yourself.  
Derrida’s notion of presence, therefore, is not a continual unfolding of one unified 
experience, but rather a series of continually differing interruptions, always breaking from 
each other, never stabilizing into a wholly present now, and laughter dramatizes the effects of 
this interruptive kind of force.  
Laughter functions with an interruptive force that interrupts subjectivity and makes us 
question what it means to be human and to use rhetoric, but laughter is yet another example 
of force.  Since laughter does not exclusively use a system of signs to communicate meaning, 
it does not function in the same way as a signifying language.  Diane Davis identifies 
laughter’s force as residing not so much in what it signifies, or what it means, but in what it 
does.  Laughter is not something we can control with reason, but rather something that 
interrupts rationality:  
To engage in a laughter that has no stake in control is to set one’s feet upon 
momentary lines of flight from the tyranny of meaning and from the violence 
of a community held together by that tyranny […] it is about, in a flash, 
experiencing the flow, the excess beyond our control, beyond our (violent) 
grasp. (Breaking 68)  
 
To experience laughter is to experience a certain loss of control, to surrender to effects that 
are beyond reason. Because of this, rather than signifying meaning, laughter functions with a 
sort of asignifying force, one that exceeds signification and rational control.  To surrender to 
laughter is to let go of the traditional idea that being human “demands a self-identified agent 
who has the freedom to effect change and the reason to determine what needs to be done” 
(40).  This posthumanist position of the subject, “that human beings are always already 
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functions of other functions,” poses fundamental risks to humanist perspectives that rely on a 
human controlling what needs to be done using reason (23).  The asignifying force of 
laughter produces effects that interrupt human reason, showing us that the humanist subject 
can no longer be relied on to exert rational, intentional control on the rhetorical situation.  
With this, a new question arises: “Who, or what, becomes the author of language?”  Davis 
suggests that to respond to this question is to encounter what she calls the “posthuman 
paradox”:  
Human agency is problematic indeed in the face of this realization: if human 
beings are routinely and unceremoniously possessed by outside forces or 
‘rhythms’ that have little to do with social norms (nomos), they can hardly 
fancy themselves in control either of their lives or the course of human events.  
This is the posthuman paradox: that we both make and/but are also (more so) 
made by History. (23) 
 
Much as we “both make and/but are also (more so) made by History,” we also make and/but 
are also (more so) made by laughter.  The rhetorical tradition, for example, has sought to 
design approaches to help orators use laughter for persuasive aims, but their efforts have 
been complicated by the fact that laughter uses us, too.  Laughter is such a risky rhetorical 
appeal precisely because a rhetor can never fully control its effects.  Consider, for example, 
Davis’ personal anecdote from her childhood when she tried, unsuccessfully, to fight back a 
laugh while in church:  
My whole being wants desperately not to laugh, and yet it’s clear to me that 
my will is not in control; something else has hold of me – I wonder if it’s God.  
Despite my willpower, despite my squirming and my clenched teeth, I hear 
mySelf beginning to lose it; ‘I’ am beginning to ‘crack up,’ both literally (the 
stability of the ‘I’ is challenged when it becomes the object of this laughter’s 
force) and figuratively […] My body has been possessed by the force of 
laughter: Despite my reason and my will, laughter bursts out.  The battle is 




What this anecdote shows us is when the human subject is being laughed by laughter, the 
effects experienced are beyond the human; it is impossible for us to rationally rein in a 
laughter that is laughing us. Similarly, it is impossible for us to communicate the effects of 
the experience of being overcome by laughter using language. Sometimes, we don’t even 
know why we are laughing and are often surprised when our laughter reaches such an 
uncontrollable intensity.  People who have just “come down” from a fit of uncontrollable 
laughter often make comments such as, “I don’t even know why I found that so funny!” or 
“I’m sorry, I don’t know what came over me, I just couldn’t stop laughing!”  We typically 
don’t rationally set out to discover and create the experience of uncontrollable laughter 
within ourselves.  Instead, laughter often finds us, and takes us over when we least expect it 
to, and, sometimes this happens when we really do not want it to happen.  Davis mentions, 
while we are historically appreciable of the “stability of the knowing smile and/or the 
controlled chuckle […] [t]he instability of irrepressible laughter is an affront to our humanist 
sensibilities: we do not want to crack up.  And we don’t want to deal with a world that is 
cracking up and that cracks us up – often without our consent” (3).  We want to believe that 
we are in control of our selves, but the asignifying force of laughter produces effects that 
show us that the control we want to have – that we have been historically conditioned to 
believe that we do have – is not essential.  It is always capable of being interrupted by forces 
that show us that we are functions of other functions.  As such, the experience of laughing 
uncontrollability is something that one must experience, that one must feel.  Laughter’s 
effects are not the results of signification alone and, therefore, cannot be communicated using 
signification alone; you can’t explain to someone else what it feels like to laugh 
uncontrollably.  Or, as Davis puts it, to experience the asignifying force of laughter (let alone 
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to take some enjoyment from this loss of control) “requires not only that one recognize that 
the universe will forever overflow our superimposed categories and distinctions but also that 
one celebrate the unstructurable excess” (57).  All this cracking up, then, allows us to 
question what it means to be human and what it means to use rhetoric in a world where the 
human is no longer exclusively in control.  The effects of laughter’s asignifying force 
provide us with “an invitation to break up with the force that breaks us up, to laugh with the 
Laughter that laughs language and technology and human beings, to explore another 
sensibility, another way or thinking (writing, reading) […] to leap into the sweep … and to 
say YES” (2).  Laughter gives us reason to question the basis for how rhetoric, classically 
and modernly, conceives of persuasion: that a stable human subject controls language to 
produce effects of her own design. 
Laughter’s asignifying force is irreducible to reason, interrupts the human subject, 
and operates beyond signification, such that it creates effects that challenge – or shake – 
structures which are founded upon reason and meaning.  One way to think about the 
implication of this shaking is through the metaphor of a keystone.  In architectural terms, a 
keystone is the last stone placed in the construction of an archway or a vault that serves the 
vital functions of locking all the other stones in place and allowing the archway or vault to 
bear weigh.  Functionally, the archway or vault cannot bear any weight – cannot function as 
the structure it is intended to be – until the keystone is set in place.  Therefore, the keystone 
is what gives the archway or the vault its stability.  It is what holds the structure in place and 
allows it to maintain itself as an archway or a vault.  Laughter has always been used as a 
keystone to define what it means to be human; man is the only animal that laughs.  But what 
happens if this keystone itself is not as stable as we think?  What happens to the structure if 
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the keystone is already shaking?  In “Force and Signification,” Derrida uses the metaphor of 
the keystone to call into question another structure that has traditionally been perceived as 
stable: the perceived stability of philosophical structures founded on reason. Derrida suggests 
that because the keystone is of such fundamental necessity to any structure, including the 
reason-centered structure of Western philosophy, were the keystone itself to prove unstable, 
the structure as a whole would reveal itself as much more precarious than it appears: 
Structure is perceived through the incidence of menace, at the moment when 
imminent danger concentrates our vision on the keystone of an institution, the 
stone which encapsulates both the possibility and the fragility of its existence.  
Structure then can be methodically threatened in order to be comprehended 
more clearly and to reveal not only its supports but also that secret place in 
which it is neither construction nor ruin but lability. (6) 
 
We rely on the keystone to maintain stability and structure, yet because this one stone is so 
important to the whole structure’s stability, if something were to destabilize this keystone the 
entire structure would be at risk.  Much as laughter has been perceived as the keystone to the 
human, reason has been perceived as the keystone to philosophy, the foundational element 
that internally defines what philosophy is and externally excludes what philosophy is not.  
But Derrida sees laughter as a keystone that shakes philosophy’s obsessive adherence to 
reason.   In “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve,” he 
describes the obsessiveness of this adherence by invoking the metaphor of “slumber” (252): 
To bear the self-evidence of Hegel, today, would mean this: one must, in 
every sense, go through the ‘slumber of reason,’ the slumber that engenders 
monsters and then puts them to sleep; this slumber must be effectively 
traversed so that awakening will not be a ruse of dream.  That is to say, again, 
a ruse of reason.  The slumber of reason is not, perhaps, reason put to sleep, 
but slumber in the form of reason, the vigilance of the Hegelian logos.  





In this metaphor, we see an example of Derrida playing with the form of writing itself to 
perform what is beyond the “sayable” in this theory.  In other words, to speak of what is 
beyond reason is to exceed the reasonable designs of a signifying language itself, meaning 
language must be employed in such a way that it does more than it is able to simply say and 
mean.  Or, as Davis puts it, “Our finitude is tied to our emeshedness in language – we may 
not leave language to study it or ourselves from some other place, some metalinguistic spot” 
(Breaking 77).  Derrida’s repetitious use of the image of slumber in this instance lulls the 
reader toward the feeling of the monotonous state of slumber by breaking every first year 
composition instructor’s advice to always vary your word choice. As the prose repetitively 
slumbers, slumbers, slumbers along toward the numbing, languid, sleepy slumber, Derrida’s 
point – that philosophy’s blind adherence to reason has created a sort of intellectual 
hibernation that we can’t wake from – is delivered through a sort of force that produces the 
feeling of “the slumber of reason” rather than by simply defining what the slumber of reason 
means.  In doing so, he performs his critique of philosophy in general, and, more specifically, 
the Hegelian dialectic, as an indolent and uncritical darkness which lulls thought to sleep 
through the opiated anodyne of reason.   
But in this performance, we also begin to see the foreshadowing of what forces can 
awaken us from this repetitive slumber.  One path to an awakening comes from nothing other 
than the shaking, asignifying force of laughter.  Derrida sees laughter as a weapon of 
potential resistance and a means of escape from philosophy’s blind adherence to reason and 
from Hegelianism’s consumptive power, a power so strong that it “extends its historical 
domination, finally unfolding its immense enveloping resources without obstacle” (251).  
Hegelianism’s negative dialectic is akin to a black hole that draws all forces, both interior 
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and exterior, both those that accept the constraints of philosophy and those that resist it, into 
its orbit.  However, because laughter is an asignifying force that neither accepts nor denies 
reason, but moves within and, simultaneously, beyond it, Derrida suggests laughter may 
provide momentary flashes of escape from the gravitational pull of Hegelianism: 
[I]t is necessary, in order to open our eyes […] to have spent the night with 
reason, to have kept watch and to have slept with her […] For at the far 
reaches of this night something was contrived, blindly, I mean in a discourse, 
by means of which philosophy, in completing itself, could both include within 
itself and anticipate all the figures of its beyond, all the forms and resources of 
its exterior; and could do so in order to keep these forms and resources close 
to itself by simply taking hold of the enunciation.  Except, perhaps, for a 
certain laughter” (252, my emphasis). 
 
To put it another way, what philosophy is able to do is to “complete itself” by not only 
identifying all that constitutes its inside, the figures that lie unchallenged “within itself,” but 
by also laying claim to “the figures of its beyond” in a way that allows philosophy to take 
hold of those as well, even if they are only to be peripherally and eternally banished as 
outliers.  This divide is maintained in the movement of the dialectic where negation is 
“sucked in by Hegel’s discourse,” an effect of such power that almost nothing can escape: 
“Except, perhaps, for a certain laughter” (252).  Derrida identifies, “privileged moments that 
are less moments than the always rapidly sketched movements of experience,” when 
laughter’s instantaneous eruption flashes forth like an exploding camera bulb, triggered from 
within the depths of the slumbering philosophical night, illuminating a path of escape: 
“quickly, furtively, and unforeseeably breaking with it, as betrayal or as detachment, drily, 
laughter breaks out” (252).  When the asignifying force of laughter breaks out, the dialectic is 
temporarily compromised, and absolute meaning is rendered fallible: “Laughter alone 
exceeds dialectics and the dialectician; it bursts out only on the basis of an absolute 
renunciation of meaning” (256).  In its furtive flashes and flickering instants, laughter doesn’t 
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appear in order to negate the dialectic, because “in doing so [the dialectic] would start to 
work again,” but rather to overflow the structure of negation itself in the form of a “laughter 
that literally never appears, because it exceeds phenomenality in general, the absolute 
possibility of meaning” (256).  In these instants, “the burst of laughter is the almost-nothing 
into which meaning sinks, absolutely,” (256).  If Hegelianism, then, is a discourse 
accompanied by a “complicity without reserve,” that “‘takes it seriously’ up to the end, 
without objection in philosophical form,” Derrida celebrates “a certain burst of laughter 
[which] exceeds it and destroys its sense, or signals, in any event, the extreme point of 
‘experience’ which makes Hegelian discourse dislocate itself” (253).   Just as laughter has 
long been a keystone that defines what it means to be human (the human is the only animal 
that laughs), it is also a keystone that defines philosophy’s strict adherence to reason and 
meaning (philosophy is that which does not laugh).  In other words, laughter cannot be a part 
of the strictly rational philosophical discourse, so philosophy defines itself by excluding 
laughter.  This is why Derrida argues that laughter is, and must be, absent from Hegelianism, 
because “‘[i]n the system’ poetry, laughter, ecstasy are nothing.  Hegel hastily gets rid of 
them: he knows no other aim than knowledge’” (256).  This absence of laughter, Hegel’s “no 
other aim but knowledge,” is what Derrida ultimately finds humorous:  “What is laughable is 
the submission to the self-evidence of meaning, to the force of this imperative: that there 
must be meaning” (256).  Even though philosophy has long privileged meaning as if it were 
the only effect, meaning is just one effect of language, one possible effect among many 
others.  And what asignifying forces like laughter demonstrate, by producing effects that 
exceed reason and meaning, is that these excesses are conditions of possibility for anything 
resembling meaning to ever be possible in the first place.  
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Laughter has long been the keystone that has essentially defined what it means to be 
human; humans are the animals that laugh and the animals that can use rhetoric.  But laughter 
is a shaking keystone; it produces effects by means of an asignifying force that is irreducible 
to reason and meaning and shows us the limits of the human and the limits of rhetoric.  The 
effects of laughter’s asignifying force shakes the foundation between the human and the 
animal and kicks the human subject’s longing for rational control to the curb.  When we are 
laughing uncontrollably, we share more with the asignifying communication of animal 
rhetorics than we do with signifying “human” forms of communication.  The keystone that 
the human has been built upon is on shaky ground, showing us how laughter can lead us 
toward a rhetoric that is beyond signification, beyond reason, and beyond the human. 
In Chapter Two I will bring this discussion of laughter’s asignifying force and its 
implications for a rhetoric beyond the human to bear on the rhetorical tradition and show 
how these earlier rhetoricians had a much more developed understanding of laughter’s 
asignifying force than history has acknowledged.  Rhetorical treatises across the tradition of 
rhetoric might appear to maintain a belief that human subjects can control the effects of 
laughter.  After all, these approaches offer countless suggestions to this end, suggestions that 
rhetors should follow to best construct the right humorous appeal for the right audience in the 
right situation.  But what these approaches also reveal is an understanding, through their 
fluid, dynamic, performative approaches to humor and laughter, of laughter’s asignifying 
force, of the unknowableness of laughter’s origins, and of the impossibility of ever actually 
being able to pin down what a speaking subject can expect laughter to do at any given time.  
These historical approaches all demonstrate an awareness of laughter’s asignifying force that 
anticipates later poststructuralist questions of language’s interruptive force, because these 
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approaches do more than they say when it comes to their discussions of laughter.  In this 
spirit, I hope to begin rhetoric’s discussion of humor and laughter again – from rhetoric’s 




























Hang on to Your Ethos: Humor and Laughter in the Rhetorical Tradition 
 
As for rhetoricians, though they do indeed put up a false front by their 
specious alliance with the philosophers, nevertheless it is clear that they too 
belong to our party, as is shown by many indications, but especially this one: 
besides many other trivial topics, they have written so much and so 
meticulously about how to make jokes […] they think so highly of folly as to 
hold that oftentimes an argument which cannot be refuted in any other way 
should be glossed over with laughter – unless someone imagines that it is not 
the prerogative of Folly to provoke horselaughs with funny sayings, and to do 
it by the book at that. 
 
- Desiderius Erasmus, In Praise of Folly 
 
Plato: The Soul Out of Control 
Today, rhetoric’s interest in Plato and his dialogues stems from how they do more 
than they say; they often perform the philosophical paradoxes Plato is interested in.  We can 
join in a dialogue with the texts themselves in a way that models the dialogues that are 
occurring within the texts.  In other words, the very form of Plato’s texts, how they are 
constructed to do what they do, challenges the historical understanding of what they mean.  
Plato’s treatment of humor and laughter across his oeuvre dramatizes this ability of his texts 
to do more than they say.  While we clearly see the most extreme negative reaction to certain 
approaches to humor and laughter in Plato, the drastic steps he suggests to contain and 
control laughter reveal Plato’s deep appreciation for the effects of laughter’s asignifying 
force as something that interrupts the human subject and, as such, is a threat to the rational 
soul.   
Plato distrusts laughter because he believes it functions in excess of reason and truth 
by intoxicating the listener, turning her soul away from its rational part and toward its less 
virtuous part ruled by appetites and desires.  Plato believes that logos should be the essential 
persuasive appeal because only logic can root out its enemies: the emotional types of 
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persuasion that place rational control at risk.  Plato’s suspicion of laughter is a species of his 
larger suspicion of the corruptible power of the persuasive arts in general, because these 
practices all function like drugs that can negatively interfere with the virtuous soul’s drive 
toward the truth.  Such an example is persuasive oration, which negatively effects the soul by 
causing disorienting emotions to well up within the listener.  For example, in the Phaedrus, 
Socrates compares the effect of hearing Phaedrus recite Lysias’ speech to the bewildering, 
drug-like effects of desire.  In sensual language, he writes, the effect is “enough to make me 
beside myself,” noting, “Phaedrus […] you seemed to me to be positively beaming with 
delight at the speech as you read it […] and I joined in the ecstasy with your inspired self” 
(234d1-d7).  While Plato admits there is a noble type of desire that leads “us by reason 
towards the best and is in control, its control over us has the name of restraint,” he fears the 
type of irrational desire that “drags us irrationally towards pleasures and has established rule 
within us, its rule is called by the name of excess” (227e3-238a3).  Persuasion becomes 
excessive when the speaker is not using reason as the organizing principle in her speech, but 
is instead appealing through other, less rational means.  In those instances, speech acts like an 
affliction similar to love in both the speaker and the audience that cannot be controlled: “For 
the ones who suffer it agree themselves that they are sick rather than in their right mind, and 
that they know they are out of their mind but cannot control themselves” (231d1-d4).  Given 
the importance Platonic philosophy places on moderation, temperance, and self-control, any 
form of excess is “neither an admirable one nor one worth the acquisition,” and therefore 
should be systematically marginalized (238a6-8).  
Laughter is an example of such an excess, because a soul in the throes of laughter is a 
soul overwhelmed by non-rational forces.  It is not surprising that when Plato takes up 
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laughter in several of his dialogues, he does so in a cautionary manner, although his actual 
engagements with laughter are sometimes explicit and other times more abstract.  For 
example, in the Philebus, Plato addresses laughter directly in the context of his discussion of 
psychic pleasures.  The psychic pleasures, including “anger, fear, longing, grief, sexual 
desire, spite and so on,” are unique in that they derive more from feelings of pain than of 
pleasure (47d).  For example, in the case of spite, which Plato associates with laughter, the 
soul is clearly in pain, yet in certain malicious circumstances, “it’s demonstrable that the 
spiteful man is pleased at his neighbor’s misfortunes” (48b).  To fully understand why “the 
nature of what we find comical” is malicious, the pleasure we take from spite must also be 
considered along with self-ignorance and weakness (48b).  Because even though most people 
are self-ignorant and believe they are more virtuous and wise than they really are, laughter 
only comes at the expense of those who are weak, not those who are strong.  As such, there is 
an amoral exploitive sense to this malicious kind of laughter:  
[I]f you describe as comical those who are not only deluded but are also weak 
and unable to retaliate when mocked, you will be right.  As for those who are 
able to retaliate, however, and are strong, if you call them frightening or 
dangerous, you couldn’t describe them more accurately.  You see, self-
ignorance accompanied by strength is not just disgraceful, it’s dangerous too: 
anyone who comes into contact with it, or anything like it, is threatened.  But 
the nature of ignorance in weak men made us classify it as comical. (49b-c) 
 
In other words, we might find it funny to kick someone, to tell a joke at someone’s expense 
when they are down, but only if we know they are so weak we could still kick them if they 
stood back up.  If they weren’t weak, however, the joke wouldn’t be funny, because the 
person on the receiving end of the joke might get half a notion to retaliate, and they might be 
strong enough to make the situation not funny for anyone.  Because laughter in these kinds of 
situations only occurs at the expense of the weak, Plato sees this use of the comic as morally 
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suspect and spiteful.  Thus, for Plato, the effect of laughter’s asignifying force, its ability to 
interrupt the rational part of the soul, is a signal, an ethical tipping of the hand if you will, 
that the one who laughs with this edge of cruelty has allowed the irrational side of her soul to 
take precedent over the rational side in an unjust pursuit of pleasure over knowledge.  
Laughter is therefore part cause and part effect, in the sense that it takes a soul lacking a 
particular kind of self-control to make the unjust decision to seek out less than ethical 
pleasures such as laughter, and once those pleasures are realized and the soul laughs 
uncontrollably, the soul’s loss of rational control is exposed for all to see.  Therefore laughter 
both causes the soul to seek out unjust pleasures and then becomes the effect of those 
overwhelming pleasures once they are realized and the soul reveals its unjustness  
through laughter.   
At other moments in the Philebus, however, Plato makes more opaque references to 
how laughter hinders the rational side of man and negatively impacts the pursuit of the good 
life.3  He writes of pleasures in general: 
There’s no end to the trouble they make for us: with their frenzied irrationality 
they disturb the souls we inhabit; they prevent the conception of our kind and, 
if a child of ours is born, they invariably spoil him utterly by making him lazy 
and hence forgetful. (63d1-e2). 
 
It should not be assumed, however, that Plato is so extreme that he is somehow anti-pleasure 
across the board.  There are positive forms of pleasure, but they must always be enjoyed as a 
                                                
3 Seeking “the good life” here can be thought of in context with the Greek term eudaimonia, 
which is often translated as happiness.  This is not happiness in the sort of joyful, celebratory 
sense that we imbue the word with, but rather a sense of contentment that arises when what is 
worth striving for is satisfied.  For Plato, this is achieved through the pursuit of reason.  
Because man is the only animal with the potential for reason and the capacity for 
philosophical knowledge (animals are purely sensual, and gods, while not mortal, are purely 
rational yet lie beyond human potential), the human being will be most fulfilled by 
maximizing this potential for philosophical knowledge.   
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small part of the larger, rational pursuit of knowledge.  For example, the pure pleasures, or 
pleasures that are unaccompanied by pain, are ideal for Plato because they do not produce 
any negative effects.  However, with the exception of the acquisition of knowledge – Plato’s 
pleasure par excellence – these pure pleasures are extremely rare.  Almost all other pleasures 
comprise some combination of pleasure and pain, and since pain can never be desirable, 
Plato rules out most of these “mixed” pleasures because they are in some way corrupt and 
tainted.  However, he does find mixed pleasures important enough to create a taxonomy that 
seeks to determine which mixed pleasures are the least detrimental to the pursuit of the good 
life and which should be categorically avoided.  His analysis reveals that mixed pleasures 
differ in kind and also in intensity, and the intensity experienced is relationally linked to the 
corresponding pain that the pleasure satisfies, a point Plato underscored by means of an 
analogy to physical sickness: “don’t those who are gripped by fever and so on suffer more 
from thirst, cold and all the usual physical complaints?  Aren’t they more familiar with lack?  
Don’t they get greater pleasures from replenishment?” (45b5-9).  The more intense the 
pleasure, the more it has the potential to place the pursuit of the good life at risk, and the 
greater threat Plato sees in it, because such an overwhelming experience of pleasurable 
satisfaction interrupts the rational mind’s quest for knowledge by creating an ongoing desire 
for that feeling.  Consider the following depiction of a pleasure so intense that it completely 
overwhelms the person under its effects: 
[H]e is stirred up by the far greater pleasant element, sometimes even to the 
extent of leaping about!  His face goes all sorts of colours, his body adopts all 
sorts of postures, his breathing is just as variable; the pleasure drives him 
completely wild and makes him cry out in his frenzy! […] [T]hanks to these 
pleasures he is described by himself and others, as ‘almost dying with 
delight’; and the more uncontrolled he is, the more wholeheartedly he devotes 
himself to continuous pursuit of them. He calls them the greatest of pleasures, 
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and he counts that man most fulfilled who spends his whole life with as many 
of them as possible” (47a3-9, my emphases). 
 
Plato does not explicitly state that the experience described above is the experience of a 
human subject overcome with laughter.  Rather, he provides this example to describe what 
generally happens when pleasure greatly outweighs its corresponding pain in a mixed 
pleasure.  However, it appears clear that whatever stimulus triggers the reaction described 
above, the resulting effect is most certainly uncontrollable laughter: the depiction of the body 
contorting, the irregular breathing, and the crying out in frenzy could not be mistaken for 
anything else.  In this section of the dialogue, the a priori ethical decisions a soul makes to 
seek either pleasure or knowledge is Plato’s pressing concern, but when the soul chooses 
incorrectly, the resulting effect – uncontrollable laughter – can be read as a “tell,” so to 
speak, or the bodily reveal that the soul has chosen the path that leads away from the pursuit 
of the good life.  What is important here is that Plato’s focus expresses a rhetorical concern, 
meaning that he is not concentrating exclusively on what caused this excessive pleasurable 
state to occur – what the object of the pleasure means – but on the effects of certain types of 
pleasure – which in this case, is a soul experiencing uncontrollable laughter – and what those 
effects themselves do.  Uncontrollable laughter here is clearly doing something outside of the 
realm of rational control: it is betraying the soul’s sense of subjective control by operating 
outside of that soul’s rational grasp, which is precisely why Plato fears it and seeks to devise 
means to more completely control it. 
A final note helps us shed light on how deeply laughter is intertwined with the issues 
of self-control and moderation in Platonic thought and why he proposes ways to moderate 
and regulate its effects in the idealized society he theorizes in the Republic.  Plato is clearly 
very skeptical of pleasure, yet he concedes that the topic needs to be taken up seriously 
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because it is an essential part of the human experience.  As he states in the Laws, “human 
nature involves, above all, pleasures, pains and desires, and no mortal animal can help being 
[…] in total dependence on these powerful influences” (732e3-5).  Plato accepts a certain 
amount of pleasure because to deny humans their sensual side is to deny them their complete 
nature.  But he wants to find the best way to properly subordinate the irrational side that 
seeks pleasure to the rational side that pursues knowledge.  As a result, he makes a brief 
statement, only one-sentence, that appears to allow for a few mixed pleasures of a particular 
sort: “In addition to these [pure pleasures] you should include in the mixture the pleasures 
which a healthy, self-controlled man has, and in general all those pleasures which accompany 
every kind of virtue” (Philebus 63e3-6).  The idea here seems to be that a certain allotment of 
mixed pleasures is required if the good life is to be possible, and while he does not define 
what these acceptable mixed pleasures are specifically, we can guess that things like eating 
and drinking and the pleasures derived from necessary daily activities are what Plato might 
have in mind here.  And again, while he does not call it by name, it can also be surmised that 
this exception would cover a certain form of polite laughter, assuming that it was undertaken 
with self-control and every other kind of virtue that is consistent with the pursuit of the good 
life.  These exceptional pleasures might be thought of as negligibly mixed in that they allow 
for pleasure, but the pleasure actually results from acts of self-control; I can enjoy one beer 
provided I don’t have six more and lose control, or I can enjoy a chuckle at a joke provided I 
don’t allow myself to succumb to frenzied, irrational laughter.  Again, Plato’s approach to 
pleasures in general and laughter in particular is not entirely anti-pleasure and anti-laughter.  
Plato’s focus, however, is that living the good life is the most pleasurable pleasure a human 
can experience, and the lower, irrational pleasures only interrupt the soul’s assent toward this 
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higher, virtuous life.  It must be underscored that Plato does not fear pleasures and laughter; 
he fears uncontrollable pleasures and uncontrollable laughter. 
 In Plato’s discussion of the kallipolis, or the ideal city he seeks to create in the 
Republic, he offers approaches to control these uncontrollable forces that risk overwhelming 
the rational side of the soul and, therefore, pose a risk to society at large.4  In particular, Plato 
is especially concerned about laughter’s negative effects on the educational system because 
its pleasurable effects could teach students to follow the less virtuous parts of their souls.  
Because of this, Plato believes that laughter must be regulated, and even censored in some 
circumstances, as part of his overall educational reform.  Such a reformation seeks to ensure 
that the city’s “best natures” (Republic 519c) are turned toward a life of self-control and not 
away from it, and citizens are best trained to appreciate “the virtue of reason” (518d).   
Plato’s most controversial legacy in rhetoric’s historical conversation of humor and laughter 
is his infamous call to censor certain humorous writings.  Because education in music and 
poetry begins with the stories children are told when they are young and impressionable, 
Plato looks to these stories to find the earliest examples of writing that could corrupt innocent 
souls.  What he finds are that many of the stories told to young people are rife with tales of 
gods and heroes acting in ways that are less that virtuous, such as being overcome by 
uncontrollable laughter.  Plato’s solution to this problem is to censor certain stories to ensure 
                                                
4 Rational control is at the heart of Plato’s argument in the Republic. He argues that the just 
life will lead to the greatest human happiness rather than the unjust life and determines that 
the just soul requires cultivation through a closely monitored educational system.  Cultivating 
just souls requires providing the polis access to the form of the good, because the “form of 
the good is the most important thing to learn about […] the majority believe that pleasure is 
the good, [but] the more sophisticated believe that it is knowledge” (505a6-b2).  Therefore, 
being able to control pleasures in a rational way is essential to living the just life. 
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that they do not make such improper inferences to gods and heroes losing their rational 
selves.  For example, he writes:  
Then, if someone represents worthwhile people as overcome by laughter, we 
won’t approve, and we’ll approve even less if they represent gods that way 
[…] Then we won’t approve of Homer saying things like this about the gods:  
 And unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods 
 As the saw Hephaestus limping through the hall. (388e9-389a4) 
 
These references to gods or heroes laughing uncontrollably imply that gods and heroes are 
susceptible to behavior that lacks virtue, a representation that Plato finds unacceptable. Plato 
also warns that young people “mustn’t be lovers of laughter either, for whenever anyone 
indulges in violent laughter, a violent change of mood is likely to follow,” (388e5-7).  In 
other words, young people are impressionable, so they must be shielded from depictions of 
gods and heroes behaving unjustly because those depictions might turn the young toward the 
non-rational path.  Plato offers censorship as a solution: “Whenever anyone says such things 
about a god, we’ll be angry with him, refuse him a chorus, and not allow his poetry to be 
used in the education of the young” (383b9-c1).  In other words, in Plato’s idealized city, the 
rulers will “supervise the storytellers” and “select their stories when they are fine and 
beautiful and reject them when they aren’t […] many of the stories they tell now, however, 
must be thrown out” (377b8-c3).  Because laughter can take a person out of her capacity to 
behave moderately and reasonably, laughter poses a serious threat to Plato’s theoretical city, 
which relies on the rational control of behavior at all levels.   
Because laughter can overwhelm reason to such a powerful degree, interrupting the 
rational part of the soul by leading it toward the less just parts ruled by appetites and desires, 
laughter places Plato’s entire philosophical approach at risk.  As such, he takes drastic efforts 
to cast laughter out of his Ideal Republic.  Therefore, Plato does not offer suggestions for 
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how to control appeals to laughter in the same way later rhetoricians will, because rhetoric, 
like laughter, is more interested in appealing to unreason, to passions and emotions in a way 
that Plato finds unacceptable.  However, Plato’s extreme efforts to censor appeals to laughter 
reveal his appreciation for the interruptive effects of laughter’s asignifying force and its 
never completely controllable effects, and later rhetoricians, even in their more practical, 
persuasive efforts, will not completely overlook his objections.   
Aristotle: Between the Buffoon and the Boor 
Aristotle’s differences with Plato on persuasion in general and laughter as a specific 
persuasive tool are in many ways reminiscent of the larger differences between Aristotelian 
and Platonic thought. More so than Plato, Aristotle is interested in rhetoric as an art because 
he sees persuasion’s ability to exert practical influence as something with positive potential 
for society. Aristotle places emphasis on the speaking subject’s presentation of a favorable 
character, or ethos, before the audience as a crucial aspect of persuasion, and he sees the 
ability to conjure laughter as a useful tool in constructing the positive ethos he seeks, because 
laughter provides multiple avenues for a speaker to endear herself to an audience.  Aristotle 
clearly defines positive uses for laughter that exceed Plato’s much more restrictive 
philosophy toward the subject, and he provides speakers with advice to help them rationally 
control some of laughter’s most beneficial effects.  Yet, Aristotle also maintains a strong 
sympathy with Plato’s view that some of laughter’s effects can actually do more harm than 
good, particularly when appeals to laughter are misused by a rhetor, where they can harm her 
ethos rather than bolster it.  In addition, Aristotle still holds to Plato’s position that laughter is 
often born from feelings of derision.  In the Poetics, for example, Aristotle defines comedy as 
“an imitation of men worse than average,” meaning that the main way we are inspired to 
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laugh is by looking down at representations of less than admirable subjects (1.5.33).  
However, while he sees in laughter some of the same dangers that trouble Plato, Aristotle’s 
rational approaches to laughter serve as the starting point for all rhetorical approaches to 
humor and laughter that follow.  Aristotle attempts to help orators control laughter’s effects, 
but he realizes these appeals are a risk because laughter can produce effects that exceed the 
rational control of the orator.  Therefore, Aristotle attempts to walk a fine with regards to 
laughter: he offers practical advice on how to conjure laughter in a way that maximizes the 
benefit, while minimizing the risk to a rhetor’s ethos. 
Even though Aristotle doesn’t call into question the “essence” of laughter – what it is 
– as explicitly and directly as will be seen in Cicero, Quintilian, and Castiglione, humor and 
laughter are crucial to his larger discussion of how pleasantries affect a speaker’s ethos.  In 
connecting humor so diametrically with ethos, Aristotle is also forwarding the notion that 
appealing to humor is an essentially human art, and he seeks to advise rhetors on how to 
learn to use humor effectively, or at the very least, to learn how not to misuse it.  The primary 
reason we can assume that Aristotle’s discussion of the forms of wit and the many uses and 
effects of appeals to laughter lacks the specificity of later rhetoricians’ work on the subject 
stems from the fact that Aristotle’s primary text on comedy has been lost.  While the Poetics 
is Aristotle’s treatise that focuses on tragedy, he composed a companion book on comedy 
that did not survive antiquity.5  Only snippets of passing statements that directly refer to 
                                                
5 Scholarly debate surrounds one particular text that, perhaps, has roots in Aristotle’s more 
expansive thoughts on comedy.  In 1839, a tenth century manuscript called Tractatus 
Coislinianus was discovered and published in Paris.  This manuscript was claimed by its 
discoverer to be derived from Aristotle’s lost book on comedy.  Prominent Aristotelian 
scholar Jacob Bernays quickly and forcefully discredited this opinion, as he suggested that 
the new publication “was the product of an ignorant and yet pedantic and persistent compiler” 
(Janko 3).  This view prevailed for a century and a half until Richard Janko submitted the 
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humor and laughter remain, tucked within the lines of the Poetics, Nicomachean Ethics, and 
his more general rhetorical treatise, On Rhetoric.  Even though his treatise on comedy has 
been lost, humor and laughter still play an important, if subtle, role in Aristotle’s larger 
rhetorical project on how a speaker successfully persuades an audience by presenting a 
favorable ethos.   
 By means of his connection of appeals to humor with ethos, Aristotle’s approaches to 
humor and laughter suppose a rational human speaker in control of the rhetorical situation.  
Humorous appeals present great opportunity for an orator to present a favorable ethos, yet 
there is always a risk to the orator who attempts to conjure laughter, and Aristotle’s brief 
encounters with humor and laughter demonstrate the paradoxical nature of attempting to 
rhetorically control the uncontrollable, because laughter produces effects that can exceed the 
orator’s rational attempts to control them.  For example, he comments in the Rhetoric on the 
natural connection between laughter and pleasures: “since laughter is among pleasurable 
things, necessarily laughable things (human beings and words and deeds) are also 
pleasurable” (1371b29).  Because pleasures can be beneficial to an orator, Aristotle advises 
rhetors on the means to better create this “friendly” feeling between the speaker and the 
audience, because the more friendliness the audience feels toward the speaker, the more 
likely they are to yield to the speaker’s attempts at persuasion.  He explains, “[we are friendly 
to people like] those who are ready to make or receive a joke; for in both cases they are intent 
on the same thing as their neighbor, able to be kidded and kidded in good sport” (1381a13).  
However, Aristotle also forwards the idea that one effective way a speaker can create this 
                                                                                                                                                  
original manuscript to rigorous linguistic and historical analysis and ultimately came away 
with a contradictory opinion; in Aristotle on Comedy: Towards a Reconstruction of Poetics II, 
Janko argues that the Tractatus Coislinianus is derived largely from Aristotle’s original ideas 
(Janko 1).   
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bond of friendliness with the audience is to use appeals to laughter in an attacking, aggressive 
manner that demonstrates superiority over one’s adversaries.  Plato had earlier identified as 
problematic the kinds of laughter that arise from “the spiteful man [who] is pleased at his 
neighbor’s misfortunes,” (Philebus 48b), a position that established Plato’s derogatory view 
of the sorts of pleasures laughter produces.  Interestingly, Aristotle agrees with this 
derogatory position in Nicomachean Ethics when he admits that laughter should still be 
censored in some instances: “For since a joke is a type of abuse, and legislators prohibit some 
types of abuse, they would presumably be right to prohibit some types of joke too” 
(1128a30).  Again in the Rhetoric, Aristotle goes on to expand on the idea that the sort of 
laughter which results from demonstrating superiority over others is troublesome when he 
writes, “The cause of pleasure to those who give insult is that they think they themselves 
become more superior by ill-treating others” (1378b6).  Therefore, this tactic can have a 
potentially damaging effect on a speaker’s ethos, because she runs the risk of committing the 
form of abuse that Aristotle elsewhere suggests is an offense worthy of legislative 
prohibition.  Yet in the Rhetoric, Aristotle argues that even though their roots may spring 
from less than admirable sources, there are still positive effects that can result from a 
speaker’s use of these aggressive types of appeals to laughter.  He claims that because being 
“given to rivalry” is a part of the human experience, “it necessarily follows that it is 
pleasurable to criticize one’s neighbors” (1371b27) and, along with things like love and 
friendship, he also identifies revenge and winning as pleasurable, noting, “there is an 
imagining of superiority for which all have desire either mildly or strongly” (1370b13).  
There is something inherently pleasurable about putting down our rivals so long as an orator 
is able to rationally parse out friends from foes.  By connecting the laughter that arises from 
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aggressive attacks on one’s adversaries with his topics of pleasure, Aristotle’s brief 
encounters with humor and laughter articulate the ethical complications that face orators 
when they attempt to appeal to laughter for persuasive ends.  On the one hand, conjuring 
laughter – even if it is done in an aggressive spirit – can actually improve an orator’s ethos.  
But because laughter produces effects that exceed the control of the orator, that same appeal 
can go wrong in a way that harms the speaker’s ethos.  But this possibility for failure is one 
effect that is always present in appeals to laughter; the possibility that laughter can produce 
effects that harm a speaker’s ethos is definitionally stitched into every appeal to humor that a 
speaker employs, and this possible risk has to be such a foundational part of appeals to 
humor if successful appeals are ever to occur.   
Aristotle identifies a similar kind of theoretical paradox orators face when appealing 
to humor in his discussion of the differences between the buffoon and the boor.   In 
Nicomachean Ethics, he describes how these two subjective categories are negative effects of 
appeals to laughter and argues that a speaker should always seek to avoid being identified as 
either: 
The buffoon cannot resist raising a laugh, and spares neither himself nor 
anyone else if he can cause laughter, even by making remarks that the 
sophisticated person would not even be willing to hear made.  The boor is 
useless when he meets people in these circumstances.  For he contributes 
nothing himself, and objects to everything, even though relaxation and 
amusement seem to be necessary in life. (Ethics 1128a32-1128b4) 
 
The suggestion here is that a speaker can avoid being negatively labeled a buffoon or a boor 
if she can rationally control her appeals to laughter.  Aristotle advises speakers that they 
should try to control the amount of their appeals to laughter so as to strike an appropriate 
balance, somewhere comfortably between the obnoxious buffoon and the lifeless boor.  
There are people who, by nature, are born either boors or buffoons, but Aristotle also 
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suggests that a speaker should be able to control the appearance of buffoonery and 
boorishness in the eyes of her audience:  
Those who go to extremes in raising laughs seem to be vulgar buffoons.  They 
stop at nothing to raise a laugh, and care more about that than about saying 
what is seemly and avoiding pain to the victims of the joke.  Those who would 
never say anything themselves to raise a laugh, and even object when other 
people do it, seem to be boorish and stiff.  Those who joke in appropriate ways 
are called witty, or, in other words, agile-witted, since those sorts of jokes 
seem to be movements of someone’s character, and characters are judged, as 
bodies are, by their movements. (1128a5-13)  
 
Aristotle seems to be implying here that by appealing to laughter in appropriate amounts, a 
speaker can fall comfortably in the middle ground between buffoon and boor.  But the 
manner in which Aristotle provides advice on how to navigate what he readily admits are 
subjective and not completely determinable categories reveals the challenge that laughter’s 
asignifying force presents to a rhetor’s rational abilities to control it: Aristotle is interested in 
determining the how, when, and how often appeals to laughter should most effectively be 
employed by an orator to improve her ethos, but he doesn’t systematically quantifying these 
approaches, because he ultimately knows he can’t. There is no context that can contain 
laughter’s effects any more than any other context.  Aristotle knows that laughter is a 
powerful tool for the orator, and he desires to aid orators’ understanding of the appropriate 
uses of laughter.  But his approaches also reveal a cognizance that the effects of laughter’s 
asignifying force are ultimately beyond the rational control of the human.  Aristotle’s 
approaches, while subjective and not tightly systematized, still constitute rhetoric’s earliest 
attempts to provide orators with practical advice in the use of humor as a rhetorical appeal, 
and their subjective nature points to an understanding that laughter’s asignifying force 
produces effects that matter far more then the meaning of any particular joke.  In the few 
references to humor and laughter that we have, Aristotle’s approaches reveal a rhetorician 
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fully aware that advising orators on how to use appeals to humor is an important, but 
inherently risky, endeavor. 
Cicero: The Performative Force of Appropriate Humor 
Cicero’s larger rhetoric project is interested in how an orator can become a certain 
kind of person.  Published in 55 BCE, On Oratory seeks to answer the question, “What 
constitutes the perfect orator?”  In answering this question, he presents what he finds to be 
most consequential in the writings of Aristotle, Isocrates, and other ancient rhetoricians to his 
contemporary readers in a more pleasing form, devoid of the lifeless technicalities often 
found in rhetorical handbooks.  The form of this presentation – the dialogue – allows On 
Oratory to maintain a dynamic relationship with the contemporary reader about the nature of 
the perfect orator and, specifically, how such an orator should appeal to audiences using 
humor.  But more importantly, the dialogue format allows Cicero’s discussion of humor and 
laughter to actually perform laughter’s asignifying effects.  Rather than simply providing 
advice for how an orator can appeal to an audience using humor, the characters in Cicero’s 
dialogues – by means of their discussions on how an orator can control laughter’s effects – 
actually employ laughter’s asignifying force to make their theoretical claims.     
Cicero takes up laughter’s unknowable, uncontrollable qualities more directly and 
thoroughly than Plato or Aristotle and foreshadows the treatment of laughter’s asignifying 
force that Quintilian and Castiglione will engage with further.  Whereas Plato clearly feared 
laughter’s uncontrollable persuasive effects on the human soul, and Aristotle hinted at its 
usefulness through his more prescriptive approaches that advise speakers on how to manage 
humorous appeals in persuasion, Cicero confronts laughter as an actual force and attempts to 
answer some foundational questions about its nature: What is it?  From where does it 
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originate?  Does it become an orator to wish to excite laughter?  To what degree should the 
orator develop this ability?  These questions create a tension within Cicero’s project: on the 
one hand, he is asking questions about the nature of humor and laughter as essentially human 
phenomena.  But on the other hand, as Cicero explores these questions, he does so always 
with an eye toward laughter’s rhetorical effects and how these effects exceed the limits of the 
rational human.  His findings produce some of rhetoric’s first clearly articulated comments 
on laughter’s asignifying force, while also bringing into sharper relief the paradoxical effects 
laughter presents an essentially human orator who attempts to bring those effects under 
control.  Cicero extends Aristotle’s project of suggesting techniques for how an orator can 
appeal to this force most effectively while also minimizing its possible negative effects, but 
the manner in which Cicero articulates his theory – he tells jokes, puns, and humorous stories 
peppered with cheeky wit – simultaneously performs the uncontrollable effects of jokes, 
puns, and humorous stories.  Ultimately, what is significant about Cicero’s treatment of 
humor and laughter is that the effects of his humorous performances are borne out by the 
participants of Cicero’s dialogues, creating an effect within the text that dramatizes how 
laughter’s asignifying force ultimately exceeds the constative claims of any treatise on humor 
and laughter. 
Cicero engages with the mystery of laughter’s fundamental nature directly.  His 
efforts to both suggest practical approaches for orators who wish to use humor as a rhetorical 
appeal as well as his more abstract musings on laughter’s essence work in concert to perform 
a theoretical approximation of laughter’s asignifying force.  In Book II, which contains 
Cicero’s sustained discussion of humor and laughter, the question “What is laughter?” is 
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responded to by Caesar in a manner that reveals an understanding that laughter produces 
effects that exceed the rational control of the orator: 
‘What laughter itself is,’ by what means it is excited, where it lies, how it 
arises, and bursts forth so suddenly that we are unable, though we desire, to 
restrain it, and how it affects at once the sides, the face, the veins, the 
countenance, the eyes, let Democritus consider […] I should not be ashamed 
to say that I am ignorant of that which not even they understand who profess 
to explain it. (II.LVIII) 
 
In this description, Caesar clearly views laughter as an interruptive force with the power to 
overtake the human subject.  It can overwhelm the body – “the sides, the face, the veins, the 
countenance, the eyes” – without the body’s authorization.  Its explosive effects, how it, 
“bursts forth so suddenly that we are unable, though we desire, to restrain it,” suggest that 
laughter’s asignifying force produces effects that the human cannot control.  And whatever 
this force is – “that which not even they understand who profess to explain it” – is ultimately 
unknowable, even by Cicero.  However, Cicero does not stop at the idea that laughter’s 
nature is beyond human understanding or control.  Quite the contrary: when Caesar makes 
this statement, he is about to begin his treatise on how an orator should best control appeals 
to laughter to produce effects of her own design.  In other words, Cicero’s attempts to bring 
rational control to laughter’s uncontrollable effects depart from this perspective that 
laughter’s effects are ultimately uncontrollable.   
Cicero might begin by acknowledging the limits of controlling or understanding 
laughter, but he still endeavors to provide orators with suggestions that may aid their use of 
humorous appeals.  For example, consider this introduction to his section on jests, when 
Caesar speaks at length about the various forms of jests and their various uses:  “Let us now 
consider briefly the sorts of jests that chiefly excite laughter.  Let this, then, be our first 
division, that whatever is expressed wittily, consists sometimes in a thought, sometimes in 
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the mere language, but that men are most delighted with a joke when the laugh is raised by 
the thought and the language in conjunction” (II.LXI, my emphasis).  In this example, Caesar 
not only defines what it is that “chiefly excites laughter,” but also places this definition into a 
larger taxonomy of definitions.  His broader analysis shows exhaustive attempts to address 
the wide range of concerns an orator might encounter when appealing to jests, and other 
forms of humorous appeals.  A partial list of particulars suggests that careful consideration 
must be taken by an orator when attempting to carry out humorous appeals.  He warns of “the 
caution that must be principally observed in joking,” provides advice on using the ridiculous 
appropriately so as to “distinguish the orator from the buffoon,” suggests that facial 
contortions and mimicry should be used “cautiously, if ever we do attempt it, and but for a 
moment,” and warns that indecent language should be avoided because it is “a disgrace not 
only to the forum, but to any company of well-bred people” (II.LVIII).  He also defines a 
detailed list of various sorts of jokes.  There are those produced by incongruity “when we 
expect one thing and another is said,” those produced by a “slight change in a word […][or] 
by the alteration of a letter,” those produced by confusion, “when you seem to understand a 
thing literally, and not in its obvious meaning,” and those produced “from some allegorical 
phraseology, or from a metaphorical use of some one word, or from using words ironically” 
(II.LVIII-LXIX).  Caesar also offers advice the types of humorous appeals that are more 
likely to produce positive effects.  He approves of “Ironical dissimulation […] when you say 
something different from what you think,” endorses using “any part of another person’s 
words in a different sense from that which he intended,” suggests sarcasm is appropriate 
when it “is jested upon in the same strain in which he has attacked another,” approves of self-
deprecating jokes “which carry a concealed suspicion of ridicule,” and champions any from 
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of interrupted expectation in humor, including the “union of discordant particulars” and 
granting “to your adversary what he wishes to detract from you” (II.LXIX-LXX).  Clearly, 
through Caesar’s granular attention to detail in his account of the many ways in which and 
orator could conjure laughter in her audience, Cicero is intent on parsing the use of humorous 
appeals into quite specific applications that both define how these appeals are most likely to 
succeed – the occasions when humor should be used and how to construct the best forms of 
humor during those occasions to produce the most appropriate laughter – as well as when 
appeals to humor and laughter are most likely to fail – which forms are the most risky 
because they either reflect poorly on the orator’s ethos or are prone to being misunderstood 
by the orator’s audience.  What these lengthy attempts to theorize the persuasive uses of 
humor and laughter demonstrate is rhetoric making its first sustained effort to engage with 
the nearly limitless possible effects of laughter.  By suggesting such a copious amount of 
approaches for how an orator can appeal to laughter – a force Cicero acknowledges is 
ultimately unknowable and, therefore, unexplainable – Cicero’s dynamic text reveals both a 
theoretical appreciation of laughter as an asignifying force beyond reason, while also 
acknowledging – through Caesar’s detailed advice – that laughter produces undeniable 
persuasive effects that are, ultimately, too useful to be ignored.   
These numerous efforts to account for laughter’s persuasive potential are summarized 
in the chapter’s conclusion in a way that bookends the theoretical paradox that permeates 
Cicero’s overall engagement with humor and laughter, a paradox that he does not shy away 
from but seeks to amplify.  In his article “Persuasive ΓΕΛΩΣ : Public Speaking and the Use 
of Laughter,” Dimos Spartharas suggests as much: “The irrational and elusive nature of 
laughter is also confirmed in Cicero’s De Oratore,” where Cicero can be seen to both “insist 
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chiefly on a typology of the techniques that cause laughter and […] dismiss the possibility of 
a systematic examination of its nature, because laughter is an intrinsically elusive 
phenomenon” (386).  Upon finishing his lengthy and detailed remarks on humor’s 
appropriate uses, Caesar leaves his audience with the following closing remarks: 
But I think that I have divided these matters [approaches to using humor and 
laughter] into too many heads already; for such as lie in the force and meaning 
of a word are commonly easy to settle and define; but in general, as I observed 
before, they are heard rather with approbation than laughter.  Jokes, however, 
which lie in the subject and thought, are, though infinite in their varieties, 
reducible under a few general heads; for it is by deceiving expectation, by 
satirizing the tempers of others, by playing humorously on our own, by 
comparing a thing with something worse, by dissembling by utter apparent 
absurdities, and by reproving folly, that laughter is excited. (II.LXXI, my 
emphasis) 
 
This decisive list of the ways in which laughter is excited might seem to reflect a sense that 
the approaches Cicero just outlined are stable, knowable, and controllable – “reducible under 
a few general heads.”  Yet recall that this section begins with Caesar stating of laughter, “I 
should not be ashamed to say that I am ignorant of that which not even they understand who 
profess to explain it” (II.LVIII).  In other words, the bookends surrounding Cicero’s 
approaches to humor laughter dramatize the paradoxical efforts of attempting to control 
laughter’s asignifying force.  Cicero’s attempts to theorize how humorous appeals can be 
used most effectively as persuasive tools starts from the premise that laughter is not only 
something that cannot be controlled by the human subject, but it cannot even be fully 
comprehended by human reason.  Therefore, by first testifying on laughter’s innate 
incomprehensibility, Cicero sets up his later approaches to be undertaken with caution, for if 
no one can predict with any certainty the effects that such an unknowable force will impart 
on an audience, how can an orator ever completely control its use?  Even though laughter’s 
asignifying force may be uncontrollable and unknowable from the get go, the spirit of 
 
 68 
Cicero’s approach – and those of Quintilian and Castiglione after him – is to seek to account 
for as much as possible.  In other words, Cicero’s section on humor and laughter in On 
Oratory performs the theoretical paradox of its subject matter: laughter’s asignifying force is 
included within Cicero’s rational approaches to humor and laughter, yet it also, 
simultaneously, exceeds their rational designs.  
However, Cicero’s approaches not only reflect the limitations inherent in attempt to 
theorize appeals to humor and laughter.  His manner of further accounting for laughter’s 
many effects – which, by his own admission cannot be accounted for fully – is to perform 
appeals to that force from within his approaches to controlling it.  Some scholars and 
historians have even argued that Cicero’s pertinacious telling of jokes in this section owes as 
much to Cicero’s desire to show off his witticisms as it does to dramatize his own rhetorical 
advice.  Regarding Cicero’s notable propensity to display his own wit, H. Bennett writes, “he 
had tasted the power of humor, had tasted the ecstasy of swaying a crowd to sympathetic 
laughter; for this intoxication produces a pathological condition that is well-nigh incurable.  
Cicero, indeed, did not struggle against it” (“Wit’s Progress” 193-4).  In some instances, the 
jokes Cicero tells perform a meta-rhetorical purpose, then, in that they call attention to the 
fact that the effects of jokes produce uncontrollable effects in both the audience and in the 
orator.  For Cicero, one such effect is that he becomes overtaken with his love for laughter 
and for creating laughter in others.  For example, Caesar cites Crassus’ defense of Curius 
(Casear is in dialogue with Crassus and Antonius in this section) to argue that an orator must 
learn to recognize how often to appeal to humor, and what types of appeals to use, given the 
natures of the orator’s audience: 
His whole defense in the cause of Curius, in opposition to Scaevola, was 
redundant with a certain pleasantry and humor; but of those sharp short jests it 
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had none; for he was tender of the dignity of his opponent, and in that respect 
maintained his own; tough it is extremely difficult for men of wit and 
facetiousness to preserve a regard to persons and times, and to suppress what 
occurs to them when it may be expressed with most pungent effect. (II.LIV) 
 
Caesar’s point is that the ability to show this kind of restraint is an essential skill for orators 
to possess; they must lean to recognize when they are going overboard and make efforts to 
limit their overuse of wit, especially the “sharp jests” that produce the “most pungent effect.” 
However, orators who are prone to witticisms often have difficulties reigning in their 
humorous charms, especially when an opportunity to really unleash the full force of their wit 
presents itself.  To further illustrate this point, Caesar tells a joke that uses this very rhetorical 
advice (advice he attributes to the Roman poet Ennius) as its setup and punchline: 
Accordingly, some jesters put a humorous interpretation upon the well-known 
words of Ennius; for he said, as they observe, That a wise man can more 
easily keep in flame while his mouth is on fire, than with-hold ‘bona dicta,’ 
good words; and they say that good words mean witty sayings; for sayings are 
called dicta by an appropriate term. (II.LIV) 
 
Given Cicero’s historical reputation as an excessive joke teller, this section makes a unique 
gesture: Cicero, himself an orator who loves to be witty, sets out in this section of On 
Oratory to provide advice to other orators about knowing how to rein in the use of 
witticisms, yet to make this point, he tells a joke, thus demonstrating his own wit.  In other 
words, by having Caesar perform this advice in this manner, Cicero is dramatizing the very 
difficulty that orators face when attempting to reign in their use of wit.  Because it’s one 
thing to advise someone how not to do something, and it’s another to actually resist doing it 
yourself: do as I say, not as I do.  But by using humor in this way in the midst of giving 
advice on controlling the use of humor, Cicero is performing one of the risks that humor and 
laughter present an orator and demonstrating that the effects of laughter’s asignifying force 
can actually interrupt both the audience and the orator.  Because if, as Bennett suggests, “the 
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ecstasy of swaying a crowd to sympathetic laughter […] produces a pathological condition 
that is well-nigh incurable,” an orator’s ability to control such an emotion lies beyond her 
rational control.  In this account, appeals to laughter are risky, not only because their effects 
on an audience are unknowable and uncontrollable, but also because the effects of the 
audience being swayed to sympathetic laughter can, in turn, produce effects that exceed the 
orator’s control of herself.  What is rhetorically significant about this section, and Cicero’s 
overall engagement with humor and laughter, is that it performs laughter’s asignifying force 
in a way that dramatizes how this very force exceeds human reason.  Cicero’s account of 
how to control laughter’s effects actually produces effects that demonstrate how the effects 
of laughter’s asignifying force are ultimately beyond an orator’s control. 
Cicero uses the dialogue format to further demonstrate how laughter is something that 
happens, meaning to understand what laughter “is” is to feel its effects rather than simply 
hearing those effects explained.  Since the asignifying force of laughter produces effects that 
lie beyond signification, advising orators on how to appeal to laughter requires Cicero to not 
only describe these appeals, but also to perform them in a way that dramatizes their effects. 
Caesar often turns to his audience and cites their past uses of humor to illustrate the kinds of 
approaches he is describing.  For example, when describing “the most common kind of joke, 
when we expect one thing and another is said; in case our own disappointed expectation 
makes us laugh,” (II.LXIII) Caesar states that some such jokes are produced by varying “a 
single word,” (II.LXIV) and he quotes Antonius to dramatize this point: 
In the case of Caelius, that joke of yours, Antonius, was assuredly of 
advantage to your cause; when, appearing as a witness, he had admitted that a 
great deal of money had gone from him, and as he had a son who was a man 
of pleasure, you, as he was going away, said, ‘See you the old man, touch’d 




While somewhat opaque to the contemporary reader, one can assume that this joke suggests 
the reason the old man has no money is because of his profligate son.  In another section 
where Caesar is explaining how some jokes lie “in expression, when you seem to understand 
a thing literally, and not in its obvious meaning,” he quotes from Crassus to demonstrate 
what he means (II.LXIV): 
Of this kind was you answer lately, Crassus, to one who asked you whether he 
should be troublesome if he came to you some time before it was light; and 
you said, You will not be troublesome: when he rejoined, You will order 
yourself to be waked then? To which you replied, Surely I said that you would 
not be troublesome. (II.LXIV) 
 
A final example is from Caesar’s description of certain kinds of jokes that are “rather 
trifling” and typically only fit for “actors in farces; but sometimes it finds a proper place with 
us, as even one who is not a fool may express himself like a fool in a humorous way” 
(II.LXVIII).  To demonstrate this form of humorous appeal, Caesar directly appeals to 
Antonius’ experience: “as Mancia congratulated you, Antonius, when he heard that you were 
accused by Marcus Duronius of bribery in your censorship: At length, said he, you will have 
an opportunity of attending your own business” (II.LXVIII).  In all of these examples, 
Caesar’s repeated attempts to appeal directly to his audience – to the other interlocutors in 
the dialogue who have requested that he “tell us what you think on jocoseness in general, 
lest, by accident, any part of eloquence, since that is your object” – by using his audience’s 
own experiences as examples demonstrates Cicero’s larger point: what is important about 
humorous appeals is not their constative meaning, but their performative effects (II.LVII).  
Jokes cannot be conveyed with logic alone, or, as Simon Critchley puts it, “A joke explained 
is a joke misunderstood” (Humour 2).  Therefore, Caesar has a better chance of 
accomplishing his larger goal if he can actually dramatize “jocoseness” in the minds of his 
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interlocutors, if he can make them feel the approaches he is describing rather than by simply 
explaining it.  A joke explained remains within the realm of reason and meaning, but jokes 
both reside within meaning and reason and in excess of them.   
A final note on how Caesar’s joke telling dramatizes laughter’s asignifying force: 
many of these jokes Caesar tells are incomprehensible for modern audiences.  The passing of 
two millennia clearly has a detrimental effect on a joke’s punchline, and for the 
contemporary reader, many of Cicero’s examples leave us with the unsatisfied feeling of just 
not “getting it.”  As Critchley explains, jokes don’t travel well for numerous reasons, one of 
which is translation: “Anyone who has tried to render what they believe to be a hugely funny 
joke into a foreign language only to be met by polite incomprehension will have realized that 
humour is terribly difficult to translate, perhaps impossible” (67).  However, rather than 
demonstrating that some sort of absolute context anchors jokes, what these “failures,” these 
inabilities for jokes to be translated or explained shows us is how humorous appeals are 
interrupted by their own future possibilities at the moment of their inscription.  Jokes can fail 
in many ways and they can succeed in many ways.  But these successes and failures are all 
possibilities that are stitched into the joke at the moment the joke is written, spoken, or 
conceived in the mind.  It is this limitless future possibility that pierces the joke at the 
moment of its conception or inscription or utterance that allows a joke to ever come off as 
successful.   The fact that we don’t understand some of Caesar’s jokes today is no different 
an experience than someone sitting in the forum listening to Caesar and not getting one of his 
jokes.  Time, translation, and culture are no more stable than any other context. So even 
though 2,100 years is a long time, and these jokes must be translated from the dead language 
of Latin into contemporary English, and all the cultural references and subtle local nuances 
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of ancient Rome are completely foreign to us, all these contextual factors – while they 
certainly play a role when it comes to whether or not we can understand Caesar’s jokes in 
2013 – do not prove that those jokes are anchored in one context any more than they are in 
other.  Jokes are just as capable of failing or succeeding in the comedy club tonight as they 
are when they get translated into different languages and transported across thousands of 
years of history, because laughter produces limitless possible effects, and these effects are 
definitionally stitched into any appeal to humor at the moment of its creation.  At both the 
theoretical and practical levels, then, Cicero’s treatment of humor and laughter dramatizes 
the paradoxical challenge orators face when attempting to use humorous appeals.   The 
expansiveness of his approaches reveal rhetoric’s first earnest attempt to theorize a force that 
is fundamentally untheorizable.  And through the performances of humorous appeals in his 
dialogues, Cicero dramatizes laughter’s asignifying force as something that exceeds 
signification; its effects have to be felt and not only explained.   
Quintilian: The Absolutely Indispensible Excitement of Laughter 
 In The Praise of Folly, written almost fifteen hundred years after Quintilian’s death, 
Desiderius Erasmus makes a joke about the ambitious scope of Quintilian’s approaches to 
humor and laughter: “And Quintilian, who is clearly the prince of rhetoricians, has a chapter 
on laughter that is longer than the whole Iliad” (82).  Erasmus’ joke, while perhaps only 
mildly amusing to a niche group of people, is accurate in its suggestion that Quintilian took 
his approaches to humor and laughter seriously.  So seriously, in fact, that a large percentage 
of Book Six in his expansive twelve volume exposition on oratory, Institutio Oratoria, is 
concerned with humor and laughter.  In this text, Quintilian, a trial lawyer who also founded 
his own rhetorical school devoted to developing the orator into a “good man, speaking well,” 
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provides the rationale for a rhetorically based education centered on reading and speaking 
(Institutio 12.1.1).  Quintilian was not simply interested in helping orators become more 
persuasive; he was interested in helping his students become better people as well.  George 
Kennedy suggests that the text is “a system of training for what [Quintilian] calls the orator 
from the cradle to retirement, if not the grave.  It thus combines the subjects taught by the 
elementary teacher and the rhetorician in a way which is unique among Classical works” 
(“Estimation” 132).  Quintilian’s concern with the moral duties of the orator have 
implications that extend to the general citizenry, and his claim “nothing is unnecessary to the 
art of eloquence” reflects the broad scope his work embodies (Institutio 1.P.5).  The ability to 
inspire the “excitement of laughter,” (6.3.22) for example, is seen as an “absolutely 
indispensible” (6.3.102) skill for the orator, a claim Quintilian defends through his expansive 
approach to articulating its various types and explaining its many uses. Therefore, 
Quintilian’s treatise arguably devotes more energy to humor’s productive possibilities than 
any other rhetorical text of his time.  While not written in the dialogue form used by Cicero 
and Castiglione, Quintilian’s approaches to humor and laughter represent traditional 
rhetoric’s most earnest attempt to actually account for as many of humor and laughter’s 
potential rhetorical effects as possible.  However, Quintilian’s detailed efforts both to define 
what laughter is and to demonstrate how an orator can learn to control laughter’s effects for 
persuasive means simultaneously reveals an acute attentiveness to what is uncontrollable and 
unknowable about laughter.  Quintilian’s ambitious efforts to provide advice on how to use 
humor – efforts that, again, are unparalleled in the tradition of rhetoric – also include the 
most engaged and literal reflections on the impossibility of his own efforts.  Therefore, 
Quintilian’s project shows us – on a theoretical level – how conflict occurs within any 
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attempt to theorize laughter.  Because of the care Quintilian takes to create a practical, 
utilitarian handbook for use by aspiring rhetors, and because of the diligence he takes in his 
attempts to grasp so many of laughter’s possible effects, his approaches become all the more 
interesting when they also bring to light the impossibility of ever completely controlling the 
effects of laughter’s asignifying force. Quintilian’s openness to the subject at hand and the 
seriousness with which he explores laughter’s uses and effects allows his text to encounter 
the effects of laughter’s asignifying force in ways that dramatize the very theoretical 
impossibility Quintilian sets out to articulate. 
 Quintilian’s chapter on laughter begins by articulating his main aim, which is to 
provide other aspiring lawyers with tools to employ laughter’s effects in the courtroom: 
I now turn to a very different talent, namely that which dispels the graver 
emotions of the judge by exciting his laughter, frequently diverts his attention 
from the facts of the case, and sometimes even refreshes him and revives him 
when he has begun to be bored or wearied by the case. (6.3.1) 
 
While it appears that Quintilian might be setting out to create a discipline specific taxonomy 
on humor and laughter mainly applicable to lawyers working in the context of the courtroom, 
this assumption is quickly dissolved when it becomes clear that for Quintilian, to talk about 
humor and laughter in any context is to talk about humor and laughter in every context.   For 
example, when he begins to articulate the challenges inherent in appealing to humor and 
laughter in the narrow context on the courts, his analysis of these specific challenges quickly 
takes on a much more generalized scope, as he encounters the unknowable aspect of the 
audience’s emotions: 
The chief difficulty which confronts the orator in this connection [the 
courtroom] lies in the fact that sayings designed to raise a laugh are generally 
untrue (and falsehood always involves a certain meanness), and are often 
deliberately distorted, and, further, never complimentary: while the judgments 
formed by the audience on such jests will necessarily vary, since the effect of 
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a jest depends not on the reason, but on the emotion which is difficult, if not 
impossible, to describe. (6.3.6-7, my emphasis) 
 
Quintilian’s strategy here is to begin his discussion on how to use appeals to laughter from 
the perspective that laughter is an emotion that is “difficult, if not impossible” to describe.  In 
other words, before he even begins providing advice on how an orator uses this “very 
different talent” of exciting laughter to create persuasive appeals, Quintilian confronts the 
very impossibility of the efforts that will follow.   Putting a finer point on why the effects of 
laughter make appeals to humor risky persuasive approaches, he writes: 
I do not think that anybody can give an adequate explanation, though many 
have attempted to do so, of the cause of laughter, which is excited not merely 
by words or deeds, but sometimes even by touch.  Moreover, there is great 
variety in the things which raise a laugh, since we laugh not merely at those 
words or actions which are smart or witty, but also at those which reveal folly, 
anger or fear.  Consequently, the cause of laughter is uncertain, since laughter 
is never far removed from derision. (6.3.7-8, my emphasis) 
 
Continuing on, Quintilian further refines his understanding of laughter as ultimately 
unknowable by dramatizing how the explosive effects of its asignifying force can interrupt 
the human subject’s rational control: 
Now, though laughter may be regarded as a trivial matter, and an emotion 
frequently awakened by buffoons, actors, or fools, it has a certain imperious 
force of its own which is very hard to resist.  It often breaks out against our 
will and extorts confession of its power, not merely from our face and voice, 
but convulses the whole body as well. (6.3.8-9, my emphases) 
 
Reading the above statements, and taking them at face value, one almost expects Quintilian 
to end this chapter abruptly by throwing up his hands, turning the page, and moving on to 
more stable, controllable topics suitable for a rhetorical treatise.  For if we don’t know what 
laughter is, and we don’t know what causes it, and we have no way of predicting its effects 
on an audience because the audience is not in complete control of laughter’s effects either, 
what could we possibly gain by further attempting to understand how to use this force for 
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persuasive purposes?   Such an effort would seem to be paradoxical in its intent and futile in 
its capacity to produce useful results.  When presented with this challenge, Quintilian accepts 
its apparent impossibility, yet he still continues in his attempts to account for what appears to 
be unaccountable.  He does this for the same reason others in the rhetorical tradition have 
continued down the same path: because, when successful, laughter’s effects are simply too 
persuasive for a rhetorician to give up on.  To provide a modern example from a different 
discourse, it’s as if we know there’s something fundamentally dangerous about nuclear 
power, something we don’t even really understand (can we really comprehend, for example, 
that some forms of nuclear waste take one million years to break down, given that that figure 
is eight-hundred-thousand years longer than human beings have even existed on earth?), yet 
the power produced by nuclear fusion is so profound and so remarkable that we simply can’t 
help but try our best to harness it and try to contain its many effects, even though some of 
those effects can be catastrophic if attempts at containment fail.  The dangers of a joke that 
bombs pale in comparison to the effects of a reactor meltdown or radioactive waste leaking 
into the groundwater; however, the logic being followed in both cases is the same.  If 
laughter didn’t have such profound power over an audience, if it wasn’t the factor that 
“frequently turns the scale in matters of great importance,” (6.3.9) Quintilian and the rest of 
the rhetorical tradition might simply give up on laughter as too much trouble to deal with, 
saying to those thinking of appealing using its unpredictable effects, “Good luck.  You’re on 
your own.” But this is not the case.  Just as Quintilian finishes his remarks on “whatever the 
essence of humor may be,” another statement steeped in unknowingness, he immediately 
presses forward with his first notable distinction in his classification: “I will insist on this 
much, that it [laughter’s potential for success] depends mainly on nature and opportunity” 
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(6.3.11-12).  In this way, laughter is directly connected to Quintilian’s larger rhetorical 
project, which seeks to develop orators with a moral, smart, adaptable disposition.  In other 
words, for Quintilian, laughter is not just a part of becoming a better persuader; laughter is an 
essential part of his larger rhetorical project of developing a certain kind of human being.  
And this is why it is so risky: laughter not only produces effects that the orator can’t 
persuasively control, but the effects of its asignifying force can also interrupt the 
development of the orator on a more fundamental, human level.  It is from this position that 
Quintilian begins his lengthy and challenging attempts to theorize appeals to humor and 
laughter, apparently knowing full well that whatever the essence of those appeals may be is 
never completely theorizable. 
 Despite his acknowledgement of the impossibility of ever knowing for certain what 
laughter is and where it comes from, Quintilian spares no effort when it comes down to 
offering advice to his readers on the uses of humor.  His approaches are generous, detailed, 
and he spares no effort in trying to account for as many possibilities as he can.  These 
detailed and thoughtful approaches for how to control what is admittedly uncontrollable, 
however, reveal the fruitfulness of Quintilian’s overall treatment of humor and laughter; 
rather than ignore the impossibility of controlling appeals to humor, Quintilian’s approaches 
instead amplify the paradoxical nature of any attempt to apply reasonable strategies to 
emotional responses.  In “Quintilian on the Art of Emotional Appeal,” Richard Katula speaks 
to the richness of Quintilian’s text and its continuing relevance to the human experience: “As 
the rush to understand the workings of emotion in the human mind and in human interaction 
continues, classical treatises on rhetoric remain valuable because they offer practical advice 
on the are of making emotional appeals.  Quintilian’s Institutes of Oratory, in particular Book 
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VI, provides one of the most thorough of such accounts” (14).  An example of this 
thoroughness can be seen when Quintilian makes overtures to “The essence […] of the 
subject we are now discussing […] the excitement of laughter,” as if this excitement is 
something natural, something human, that can be studied and understood in its entirety 
(6.3.22).  He argues of laughter: 
[It] has the same primary division as other departments of oratory, that is to 
say, it is concerned with things and words.  The application of humor to 
oratory may be divided into three heads: for there are three things out of 
which we may seek to raise a laugh, to wit, others, ourselves, or things 
intermediate. (6.3.22-23, my emphasis)    
 
Here we see Quintilian developing an approach that gives the appearance of stability, as he 
seems to be accounting for laughter’s “essence” by dividing its use into three distinct 
categories: we can laugh at others, ourselves, or things.  Quintilian continues to refine his 
categorization, further breaking it down into finer and finer specifics, while also 
acknowledging his system’s historical debt to Cicero’s own work on humor and laughter.6  
Of the three original heads, he provides more details on how they are to be used:  
In the first case we either reprove or refute or make light of or retort or deride 
the arguments of others.  In the second we speak of things which concern 
ourselves in a humorous manner and, to quote the words of Cicero, say things 
which have a suggestion of absurdity. […] The third kind consists, as Cicero 
also tells us, in cheating expectations, in taking words in a different sense 
from what was intended, and in other things which affect neither party to the 
suit, and which I have therefore styled intermediate. (6.3.23-25)  
                                                
6 Quintilian certainly shows a reverence toward Cicero’s work on the subjects of laughter and 
oratory, and his writing reveals that Quintilian sees his own work as an extension of Cicero’s.  
He acknowledges that Cicero, unlike Demosthenes who avoided all appeals to humor, might 
have been guilty of “being unduly addicted to jests, not merely outside the courts, but in his 
actual speeches as well,” although he admits that his own view, “Personally, I regard him as 
being the possessor of a remarkable turn of wit,” may be unduly influenced by his own 
“exaggerated admiration for the prince of orators” (6.3.2-3).  He places the blame for 
history’s regarding of Cicero as “being unduly addicted to jests,” not on Cicero himself, but 
on the publisher of Cicero’s, who should have “shown more judgment in selecting than zeal 




These categories appear to break down neatly into divisions that account for jokes about 
others, jokes about us, and jokes about everything else.  As his approach marches on, 
however, the details of Quintilian’s taxonomy become more and more complex and difficult 
to follow, and at times it seems that the inclusion of a graph or chart of some kind would be 
helpful to keep straight the divisions and subdivisions Quintilian is rapidly creating.  The 
effects of this complication become increasingly intense when he begins specifying – in great 
detail – the “universal” aspects that impact all appeals to humor including audience, context, 
intent, the reputation and status of the speaker, and the manner and number of appeals to 
humor a speaker should use.  Few stones are left unturned in this process; however, what is 
significant about this section is that Quintilian concentrates much more intently on what not 
to do when appealing to laughter – how to avoid failure – than on what an orator should do to 
make his or her appeals successful.  By looking closely at what appears to be Quintilian’s 
detailed effort to reliably articulate various approaches for using humor to persuade, we see 
an acknowledgement of laughter’s effects as being uncontrollable.  In effect, Quintilian is 
saying, “Yes, humor is very useful, but also very risky.  To avoid the words of its effects, 
avoid these approaches in particular.”  A partial list of what to avoid includes the following: 
Much depends on the occasion on which a jest is uttered […] Our jests should 
never be designed to wound, and we should never make it our ideal to lose a 
friend sooner than lose a jest […] But in the courts as elsewhere it is regarded 
as inhuman to hit a man when he is down […] It is most unbecoming for an 
orator to distort his features or use uncouth gestures […] No less unbecoming 
are ribald jests […] As for obscenity, it should not merely be banished from 
his language, but should never even be suggested […] he must not display his 
wit on every possible occasion, but must sacrifice a jest sooner than sacrifice 
his dignity […] Insolence and arrogance are likewise to be avoided, nor must 
our jests seem unsuitable to the time or place, or give the appearance of 
studied premeditation, or smell of the lamp, while those directed against the 
unfortunate are, as I have already said, inhuman […] Sarcasm that applies to a 
number of persons is injudicious […] A good man will see that everything he 
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says is consistent with his dignity and the respectability of his character; for 
we pay too dear for the laugh we raise if it is at the cost of our own integrity 
[…] above all doubles entendres and obscenity, such as is dear to the Atellan 
farce, are to be avoided, as also are those coarse jibes so common on the lips 
of the rabble. (6.3.28-47, my emphases) 
 
Taken at face value, the exhaustive material covered in this section might continue to give 
the appearance that an orator can reliably and rationally control appeals to humor, provided 
the orator does not use appeals to laughter in “inhuman” ways.  Therefore, Quintilian clearly 
pays more attention to what a speaker should avoid in this section than on the ways in which 
appeals to laughter can be successfully used.  This gesture bears significance to Quintilian’s 
overall efforts in this chapter, because it reveals an awareness on Quintilian’s part that 
laughter’s rhetorical effects can always escape the intentions of the speaker.  This gesture to 
create a taxonomy of what not to do bears a resemblance to Plato’s approach to censoring 
poets when they represent the gods being overcome with laughter. Quintilian, like Plato, 
seems to be suggesting that the surest way to avoid the unwanted effects of certain types of 
appeals to laughter is just to avoid those appeals entirely; the idea that laughter’s effects can 
ever be fully controlled is revealed as impossible. 
Quintilian’s explicit acknowledgement of laughter’s capacity to produce 
uncontrollable effects, however, is not limited to his remarks at the beginning of his section 
on humor and laughter.  On several occasions within his detailed treatise, Quintilian reflects 
on the curiously elusive “essence” of laughter.  These moments where Quintilian pulls back 
from his rational approaches to reflect on laughter’s ability to exert an interruptive, 
asignifying force on the human subject are the moments where Quintilian confronts how 
laughter brings us to the limit of reason.  The effect of these scattered references further 
dramatizes the theoretical paradox Quintilian is writing within.  For while we are in the midst 
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of his expansive approaches on how to construct humorous appeals to control laughter’s 
effects, it at times seems that Quintilian has forgotten all the talk about laughter’s 
unknowability that he began the chapter with, because his writing on advising orators in 
using humor is so confident and thorough.  Yet allusions to laughter’s uncontrollable effects 
are sprinkled in here and there amidst this seemingly stable collection of approaches, 
continuing to remind the reader (and, perhaps, Quintilian himself) of the impossibility of ever 
totally accounting for all of laughter’s effects. For example, immediately following the long 
passages cited above on the different kinds of appeals to laughter that should be avoided, 
Quintilian notes how laughter exceeds rational understanding:  “It is, however, a difficult 
task to indicate the sources from which laughter may be legitimately derived or the topics 
where it may be naturally employed.  To attempt to deal exhaustively with the subject would 
be an interminable task and a waste of labour” (6.3.35, my emphasis).  And then, almost 
immediately following this theoretical stepping back, this acknowledgment of the 
“interminable task” and the “waste of labour” it would be to deal exhaustively with humor on 
a strictly rational level, Quintilian again shifts directions and continues to provide a detailed 
list of advice on appealing to laughter: 
[W]it always appears to greater advantage in reply than in attack […] the 
narration of a humorous story may often be used with clever effect […] But in 
all such cases the whole narrative must possess elegance and charm, while the 
orator’s own contributions to the story should be the most humorous element 
[…] wit […] may be employed in two ways, according as we are the 
aggressors, or are replying to our opponents […] jests may be produced by the 
addition or removal of the aspirate, or by splitting up a word or joining it to 
another […] jests which turn on the meaning of things are at once more 
pointed and more elegant […] But such jests may be drawn not merely from 
the names of men, but from animals as well […] The comparison may also be 
drawn from inanimate objects […] the practice of combining different types 
of jest is very common, and those are best which are of this composite 
character […] Contraries give rise to more than one kind of jest […] Are not a 
large number of jests made by means of hyperbole? […] Is not even the most 
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severe form of irony a kind of jest? […] Cicero also employed metaphor to 
serve his jest […] He also employed allegory […] And everything is 
laughable that is obviously a pretense.  It is easy to make fun of folly, for folly 
is laughable in itself; but we may improve such jests by adding something of 
our own […] Another method of making light of a statement is to suggest a 
reason […] Of retorts, there are a number of forms, the wittiest being that 
which is helped out by a certain verbal similarity […] There remains the 
prettiest of all forms of humour, namely the jest which depends for success on 
deceiving anticipations or taking another’s words in a sense other than he 
intended […] Indeed the essence of all wit lies in the distortion of the true and 
natural meaning of words […] Best of all is when pretense is met by pretense 
[…] But the most agreeable of all jests are those which are good humoured 
and easily digested […] Sometimes it may be a good joke to speak of oneself 
[…] Sometimes you may get out of a tight corner by giving a humorous 
explanation of your embarrassment. (6.3.14-100) 
 
Given the scope of his efforts to provide advice to orators on how to use humor for 
persuasive effects, presented only in part here, Quintilian’s earlier comment that exhaustive 
efforts undertake to systematize laughter’s effects would be “a waste of labour,” is all the 
more paradoxical.  But these moments in Quintilian’s treatise where withdraws from the 
more utilitarian nature of his handbook and alludes to how laughter’s asignifying force is 
capable of producing effects that are beyond reason occur when he confronts the 
impossibilities of his own system, comes up against its limitations, and grasps the full 
challenge inherent in ever trying to control appeals to laughter.  While Quintilian’s treatise 
does not dramatize laughter’s uncontrollable effects like Cicero and Castiglione’s dialogues 
do, Quintilian still honors laughter’s uncontrollability by repeatedly undermining the 
absolute authority of his own approaches to controlling it.  Quintilian’s treatise on humor and 
laughter is both an earnest attempt to provide orators with useful advice for how to better 
conjure laughter in an audience and a demonstration of the impossibility of ever being able to 
completely control those efforts.  Quintilian’s treatise, then, performs a sort of theoretical 
paradox that reflects how humor and laughter function within signification, within reason, 
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and within the human (appeals to humor can be structured to produce laughter in the service 
of persuasion), and simultaneously produce effects that exceed these same distinctions. 
 Quintilian’s expansive treatise on humor and laughter is an ambitions attempt to 
account for a staggering amount of possibilities for laughter’s effects that is unparalleled in 
the history of rhetoric.  He defines a plethora of options that an orator could consider when 
he or she wants to successfully appeal to laughter, but he also identifies the appeals to 
laughter that an orator should use with extreme caution or avoid entirely because they can 
produce effects that interrupt his larger rhetorical project of developing a moral human being.  
Following the earlier lead of Aristotle and Cicero, Quintilian is after appropriateness in every 
circumstance, especially when it comes to humor and laughter.  However, appropriateness is 
difficult to define and, therefore, to theorize, because the concept of balance indicates an 
uncertain mixture between to distinct poles, equal parts “this” and “not this,” combined to 
perfection.  Quintilian turns to a cooking metaphor in an effort to articulate this concept: 
When, therefore, we speak of the salt of wit, we refer to wit about which there 
is nothing insipid, wit, that is to say, which serves as a simple seasoning of 
language, a condiment which is silently appreciated by our judgment, as food 
is appreciated by the palate, with the result that it stimulates out taste and 
saves a speech from being tedious.  But just as salt, if sprinkled freely over 
food, gives a special relish of its own, so long as it is not used to excess, so in 
the case of those who have the salt of wit there is something about their 
language which arouses in us a thirst to hear (6.3.19) 
 
The conundrum with a concept like “not used to excess” is that it implies that there exists 
somewhere a static boundary around a universal “excess” that everyone honors equally.  But 
if this were the case, to stay with Quintilian’s cooking metaphor, no salt shaker would ever 
be seen on a dining room table, for the cook – if he was worth his salt – would have 
objectively prepared the food to be salted appropriately and not to excess.  This is, of course, 
not the way cooking works.  You can’t just say, “salt appropriately,” and have that stand 
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definitively.  The same goes for humor and laughter.  And as Quintilian lays out his detailed 
advice for how to appeal to laughter appropriately, he continually acknowledges the 
challenge he faces, how difficult it is to just “salt appropriately.”  At this chapter’s beginning, 
sprinkled through its body section, and at the chapter’s conclusion, Quintilian never strays 
too far from the limitations of the very approaches he is offering.  In this way, Quintilian’s 
chapter on humor and laughter internally performs the very theoretical contradiction that it 
engages with.  Consider how this passage that closes Quintilian’s chapter bookends the 
sentiments expressed in the chapter’s beginning: 
Such I have either learned from others or discovered from my own experience 
to be the commonest sources of humour.  But I must repeat that the number of 
ways in which one may speak wittily are of no less infinite variety than those 
in which one may speak seriously, for they depend on persons, place, time and 
chances, which are numberless.  I have, therefore, touched on the topics of 
humour that I may not be taxed with having omitted them; but with regard to 
my remarks on the actual practice and manner of jesting, I venture to assert 
that they are absolutely indispensible. (6.3.101-102, my emphases)  
 
In this final passage, we see both an acknowledgement of the impossibility of ever fully 
comprehending the “infinite variety” of laughter’s effects as well as an assertion that efforts 
to rationally control these effects “are absolutely indispensible” for the orator as well as the 
good man, speaking well that Quintilian’s overall project seeks to develop.  Of course, there 
are rules that can be followed that can help an orator along in her efforts to be just the right 
amount of funny at just the right time for just the right audience, and there’s nothing to say 
that by following these rules an orator won’t have some success appealing to laughter.  
Sometimes these approaches will work just as they are intended.  But what is notable about 
Quintilian’s approach to humor and laughter is that it internally questions its own abilities to 
do what it sets out to do.  It continually returns to the fact that laughter can produce rhetorical 
effects outside of the orator’s control as well as threaten the humanness of the orator herself.  
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In this way, Quintilian’s chapter on humor and laughter, by continually recognizing and 
calling attention to the various effects of laughter’s uncontrollable, unknowable, asignifying 
force, performs its very own impossibility in a way that is unique within the rhetorical 
tradition, an achievement Kennedy proclaims is central to Quintilian’s legacy within the 
discipline of rhetoric: “The nature of Quintilian’s originality in rhetorical theory may well be 
illustrated in his treatment of humor in the third chapter of the sixth book” (“Estimate” 141). 
Castiglione: Laughter, Ladies, and Living the Good Life 
  Castiglione’s The Book of the Courtier, first published in 1528, extols the 
gentlemanly virtues glorified during the Renaissance and aims to produce the perfect 
courtier: a self-contained man of virtue.  In addition to being a courtesy book, The Courtier 
attempts to justify the lifestyles of Italy’s small courts by articulating a social position for the 
courtier as the rightful successor to the noble medieval knight.  Castiglione’s courtier is an 
amalgamation of the brave warrior and the thoughtful scholar who embodies the values of the 
classical hero.  The highest virtues Castiglione suggests a noble gentleman should possess are 
discretion, decorum, nonchalance, and gracefulness, although the manner in which these 
qualities should be cultivated can strike a rather insincere chord with modern sensibilities.  
An air of snobbery and self-obsession exudes from Castiglione’s fantastical accounts of the 
ruling class’ whimsical exploits.  This solipsism is made all the more unpalatable to the 
modern reader because it presents the court as a social island, completely removed and 
detached from what we can assume were much more wretched existences being lived just 
down the hill by destitute villagers (Courtier 1-4).   Erasmus, in one of The Praise of Folly’s 
most caustically humorous excerpts, derides the shallow lives lived by courtiers and their 
fellow court members:  
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Now what shall I say about the great lords at court?  Although most of them 
are utterly obsequious, servile, vapid, and degraded, nevertheless they would 
have us think they are the crème de la crème […] But if you examine their 
whole style of living more closely, they are nothing but playboys […] They 
sleep till noon.  Then some hired flunky of a chaplain, ready and waiting at 
their bedside, runs through a hasty mass while they are still half asleep.  Then 
off to brunch, which is hardly over before it’s time for lunch.  After that, dice, 
chess, drawing lots, buffoons, fools, strumpets, games, crude jokes.  
Meanwhile, one or two snacks.  Then dinner.  Afterwards, a round of drinks, 
and not just one either, by heaven!  And in this fashion, without ever feeling 
the weary burden of living, they let slip by them whole hours, days, months, 
years, ages. (108-9) 
 
What is significant about these indictments is that they call attention to the peculiarities 
found in the rhetorical situation of the court and raise questions about what Castiglione’s 
purpose is when he seeks to instruct a courtier on how to appeal to humor and laughter 
appropriately.  For while Castiglione’s project provides advice on how discretion, decorum, 
nonchalance, and gracefulness can be cultivated to create a noble, perfect courtier (much in 
the same way Aristotle wants to cultivate a favorable ethos in orators), there is an 
overwhelming feeling at times that his counsel’s endgame is nothing more noble than putting 
the courtier in a favorable position to continue to acquire favors from the noblemen who 
assure the courtier’s libertine pastimes at the estate.  However, there remains a strong 
connection between laughter and the human in Castiglione in that the courtier’s ability to use 
appeals to humor appropriately not only helps him gain favors in the persuasive context of 
the court, but more significantly, helps him nurture the essential air of nonchalance that is 
required of a perfect courtier.   
Structurally, The Courtier resembles Cicero’s On Oratory and the Platonic dialogues 
in that it recounts conversations that took place at the specific time and place, in this instance, 
a long weekend at the Court of Urbino in the early years of the 16th century.  Therefore, The 
Courtier, like Cicero’s On Oratory, captures a performance; Castiglione’s demonstrations of 
 
 88 
how a courtier should learn to control appeals to humor and laughter before the court are 
presented in dramatic fashion, spoken through witty, charming conversations between 
courtiers and the other members of the courts.7  In fact, the performances in Castiglione’s 
text are so lively, so playful, that the book itself sheds much of the “handbookish” qualities 
found in the earlier rhetoricians’ approaches to humor and laughter.  Castiglione, like earlier 
rhetoricians, wants to offer advice to courtiers on how humor can be used to affect the 
audience in a favorable manner.  Castiglione’s goal is to produce a courtier with an air of 
nonchalance, or an effortless presentation of his eternally appropriate ethos.  In turn, a 
courtier who successfully internalizes Castiglione’s approaches to using humor and laughter 
will increase his chances of achieving this desired air of effortlessness.  However, the power 
of Castiglione’s argument in this courtesy book lies much more in its performance than in its 
theorization.  The effects of Castiglione’s approaches to humor and laughter, both when they 
are being discussed in theory or performed in practice by Castiglione’s cast of characters, are 
actually borne out in the responses of the interlocutors.  In other words, what we see in 
Castiglione is theory in action; we see the effects of laughter play out in the responses of 
human interlocutors.  In this way, Castiglione’s text not only concludes this chapter by 
bringing the interruptive effects of laughter’s asignifying force to the surface in a dramatized 
manner, it also foreshadows the moves that Part Two of this project will make, when 
laughter’s asignifying force will be observed in action. 
                                                
7 If Plato had ever articulated the personalities and professionals that would comprise an 
Ideal Party List, it would read like the cast of characters Castiglione assembles in The Book 
of the Courtier.  Poets, extemporizers, courtiers, musicians, dancers, literary pundits, 
cardinals, sophisticates, authors, generals, Dukes, Duchesses, diplomats, politicians, sculptors, 
medalists, beauties, buffoons, versifiers, warriors, mimics, and singers gather to pontificate 
on the good life (23-9). 
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 Castiglione’s concept of nonchalance (sprezzatura in Italian) is foundational to both 
his conception of what a perfect courtier is and how this courtier should appeal to humor.  To 
be nonchalant for Castiglione is to exude an ethos of effortless appropriateness at all times 
and at all occasions that “conceals all artistry and makes whatever one says or does seem 
uncontrived and effortless” (Courtier 67). Yet, Castiglione’s conception on nonchalance is 
intrinsically paradoxical, because nonchalance’s effortlessness must be diligently practiced.  
As Harry Berger Jr. explains in The Absence of Grace: Sprezzatura and Suspicion in Two 
Renaissance Courtesy Books, in order to come across as nonchalant, a courtier must 
demonstrate “the ability to show that one is not showing all the effort one obviously put into 
learning how to show that one is not showing effort” (296).   In order to deal with this 
paradox, Castiglione contradicts nonchalance with the concept of “affectation,” which he 
maintains a courtier must “steer away from […] at all costs, as if it were a rough and 
dangerous reef” (Courtier 67) because of how “incompatible it is with gracefulness and how 
it robs of charm every movement of the body or of the soul” (87).  However, the effects of 
nonchalance extend beyond the courtier’s interpersonal relationships to his more abstractly 
defined reputation, his way of being; nonchalance is a disposition, but one that requires work 
to achieve.  Castiglione’s concept of ethos is presented as more expansive than the way 
earlier rhetoricians conceive of ethos, in that the best courtier makes a favorable appearance 
on whatever court he is planning to visit before he ever sets foot on the property.  It is an 
ethos that transcends physical subjectivity and exists, more or less, as whispers on the wind 
that are less reducible to stable notions of time and space.  Therefore, the expansive effects of 
the courtier’s reputation should produce an almost legendary mystique around him, and 
because of this, the courtier Castiglione seeks is an amalgamation of impossible perfection.  
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Note in the following list of desired traits Castiglione’s numerous uses of absolutes that the 
perfect courtier should embody: 
[He] should be neither too small nor too big […] However, if one is forced to 
choose between the two evils, then it is better to be on the small side than 
unduly large […] well built, with finely proportioned members […] his first 
duty is to know how to handle expertly every kind of weapon.  For […] often 
differences arise between one gentlemen and another and lead to duels […] it 
is of the highest importance to know how to wrestle […] He should always 
show readiness and courage […] be an accomplished and versatile horseman 
[…] he should put every effort and diligence into surpassing the rest just a 
little in everything, so that he may always be recognized as superior […] 
above all, he should accompany his every act with a certain grace and fine 
judgment if he wishes to earn that universal regard which everyone covets 
[…] hunting […] is a suitable pursuit for a courtier […] should know how to 
swim, jump, run and cast the stone for […] such sports can help to build up a 
good reputation, especially with the crown which the courtier always has to 
humour […] another noble sport which is very suitable for the courtier to play 
is tennis […] the courtier sometimes [should] descend to calmer and more 
restful games, and to escape envy and enter pleasantly into the company of all 
the other by doing everything they do; although he should never fail to behave 
in commendable manner and should rule all his actions with that good 
judgment which will not allow him to take part in any foolishness.  Let him 
laugh, jest, banter, romp and dance, though in a fashion that always reflects 
good sense and discretion, and let him say and do everything with grace. (61-
4, my emphases)8 
 
Obviously, the courtier who could demonstrate this laundry list of disparate skills and talents 
would clearly have shown a discipline and dedication in practicing their craft.  But the 
perfect courtier must not only possess such mastery across this broadest expanse of human 
activities, but he must also perform these abilities in a way that obfuscates his own mastery 
of them.  It is not enough for the courtier to be a person of unparalleled human excellence; a 
perfect courtier must also excel at not making a show of this excellence.  For example, 
                                                
8 A note on the looming air of privilege that taints Castiglione’s text for the modern reader: in 
the activities listed above that a courtier is expected to master, he should always remember to 
“refrain from mixing with the common people, or at least to appear among them only on the 
rarest occasion” when demonstrating his excellence (119-120).  This is one of the few 
references to humans who are other than nobility in the entire text. 
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Castiglione sees true art as “what does not seem to be art; and the most important thing is to 
conceal it, because if it is revealed this discredits a man completely and ruins his reputation” 
(67).  Because the courtier is the living embodiment of this conception of “true art,” 
Castiglione insists on his ability to always conceal his own art.  Therefore the courtier, by 
behaving with a non-affected, nonchalant style, will always give the appearance of effortless 
casualness and moderation in all his actions, saying and doing “everything with grace” (64).  
Because nonchalance involves such a performative dimension – to be nonchalant is to be so 
practiced that you obscure your own practice – it is a concept that is impossible to grasp with 
theory alone.  Therefore, the way into Castiglione’s approach to the nonchalant use of 
appeals to humor is to trace the force of the performances captured in The Courtier.  In this 
way, Castiglione’s impossible theoretical approach – impossible because it centers on a 
“perfect” courtier’s ability to master the paradoxical concept of nonchalance when using 
humorous appeals – actually reveals infinite possibilities in its performance of actual appeals 
to humor and laughter. Castiglione’s text internally dramatizes how laughter’s asignifying 
force is irreducible to reason; it succeeds more by producing the kinds of effects he aspires 
toward than it does at defining what those effects are and how they can be rationally 
controlled. 
 Given that the primary rhetorical situation for Castiglione’s courtier is the lively and 
celebratory context of the court and not the more serious and stoic context of the forum or the 
legislature, the opportunities for the courtier to cultivate laughter are numerous.  But even 
though the court, as Erasmus notes, is a more debauched rhetorical context than the forum or 
the legislature, Castiglione still tries to define a similar sense of balance in his approaches to 
humor and laughter that are reminiscent of Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle’s approaches. 
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This balanced behavior of the members of the court as a group takes its cues from the 
courtier himself, as he “must always be adapted to those and with whom he is talking […] in 
such a way that, without even being tedious or boring, he is always a source of pleasure” 
(151).  For example, consider Castiglione’s articulation of how the members of the court 
should strive for a balance between decorum and free-spiritedness when in the presence of a 
Duchess:   
 [E]veryone was allowed to talk and sit, make jokes and laugh with whom he 
pleased, though such was the respect we had for the wishes of the Duchess 
that the liberty we enjoyed was accompanied by the most careful restraint […] 
So for these reasons in her company the most decorous behavior proved 
compatible with the greatest freedom, and in her presence our games and 
laughter were seasoned both with the sharpest witticisms and with a gracious 
and sober dignity. (43)  
 
In this example, the court’s capacity to enjoy “the sharpest witticism” and “the greatest 
freedom” is authorized through the somewhat paradoxical means of demonstrating “the most 
decorous behavior” and “the most careful restraint.”  By behaving with nonchalance, or a 
perfect balance of grace and decorum, the courtier not only controls his own behavior, but 
consequently, by setting the nonchalant tone that other court members will follow, he also 
controls the larger rhetorical situation of the court as a whole.  In the case described above, 
for example, the free enjoyment of games and laughter would not be possible were the 
courtier not exuding his nonchalant mix of grace and decorum, a performance that ratifies the 
atmosphere as being agreeable and open to merriment.  Consider a further example of how 
this balance is achieved, as Castiglione – like Cicero, Quintilian, and Aristotle before him – 
specifically warns the courtier against crossing the line into buffoonery: 
For to cause laughter is not always fitting for the courtier, nor should he do so 
after the manner of fools and drunkards, or stupid clowns and buffoons.  And 
though it appears that people like this are in demand at the Courts, they do not 
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merit the name of courtier but each should be called by his proper name and 
judged for what he is.  (159) 
 
This perspective suggests that buffoonery is not necessarily a negative quality – buffoons 
warrant a place at court – but a courtier is not a buffoon, and, as such, must always control 
his appeals to laughter in a balanced manner, as when he uses forms of imitation: 
[W]e must be prudent and pay considerable attention to the place and timing 
and the kind of people to whom we speak, and not descend to buffoonery or 
go beyond bounds […] For to be sure it would not be right for a gentleman to 
pull faces, to week and laugh, mimic voices and wrestle with himself […] But 
what we must do is to make use of this kind of imitation casually and subtly, 
remembering always our dignity as gentleman, eschewing vile words and 
indecorous acts […]. (159-160) 
 
Considering these examples, the persuasive powers Castiglione places in the courtier exceed 
reason and meaning because their effects are felt more than they are understood.  You don’t 
know that the balance between “the most decorous behavior” and “the greatest feeling” or 
between “dignity as a gentleman” and “descen[t] to buffoonery” is being achieved as much 
as you feel the effects of it.  Because these effects are felt more than they are conceived of 
rationally, Castiglione turns to performing appeals to humor to dramatize laughter’s 
numerous effects and to provide the aspiring courtier with a broader understanding of the 
risks inherent when appealing to humor. 
 Castiglione demonstrates laughter’s persuasive power through witty banter between 
court members as they discuss issues ranging from sports and games and speech and writing 
to the art of painting and the need for laughter.  Given the playboy nature of Castiglione’s 
court, the discussions surrounding how the courtier should use his charm to “win universal 
favour with lords, knights, and ladies” provide ample opportunities to view the effects of 
appeals to humor and laughter (124).  The effects of the various appeals to humor in this 
section dramatize the larger point that laughter is a powerful way to talk about rhetoric 
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because the effects of laughter are so unmistakable.  We really feel the effects of appeals to 
laughter, whether they succeed and result in laughter, or fail and result in confusion or even 
offense.  Laughter, as an emotional response, is beyond reason, and what we see in these 
performances is how Castiglione’s concept of nonchalance, a concept that is beyond reason 
given its paradoxical foundation, can produce a response that is also beyond reason, the 
effect of laughter.  For example, consider this exchange where Bernardo Accolti, poet and 
extemporizer, Gaspare Pallavicino, a noble and one of the youngest participants in the 
conversations, and Emilia Pia, a companion of the Duchess of Urbino and “a model of virtue 
and gaiety,” are engaged in a conversation about the use of blasphemous and obscene jokes 
in court (28).   The exchange begins in a way familiar to other approaches to humor and 
laughter in the rhetorical tradition; it attempts to define an approach – in the form of a set of 
rules – for how a courtier could use humor to achieve desired results in an audience.  What is 
unique about this exchange, however, is that in their attempts to follow their own advice and 
practice the rules laid out in their approaches, the interlocutors actually produce the effects of 
laughter in themselves, effects that exceed the designs of the approaches they are discussing.  
Bernardo begins with a call for how the courtier should avoid blasphemous jokes and 
obscene language: 
We should also avoid irreligious jokes, for these can turn an attempt at wit 
into blasphemy, and then we find ourselves growing more and more ingenious 
in the way we blaspheme […] This is an abominable thing; and therefore 
those who wish to appear amusing by showing little reverence for the 
Almighty ought to be driven out of good society.  The same holds for those 
whose speech is obscene and foul, who show no respect for the presence of 
ladies, and who are constantly searching for witticisms and quips merely for 
the pleasure of making them blush for shame. (175) 
 
Bernardo first lays out his theoretical approach to jokes of these natures in a familiar way: the 
best way to control the effects of these kinds of jokes is to not tell these kinds of jokes (or, in 
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the case of obscene of foul jokes, don’t tell them when ladies are present).  However, 
Bernardo then tells the following foul joke to demonstrate his point, and in doing so, he 
dramatizes the very dangers he is trying to avoid because he tells a joke that supposedly 
shows no respect for ladies in the presence of a lady, Emilia Pia.  The joke is foul, but funny, 
and is told as such:9 
For example, earlier this year in Ferrara, in the presence of many ladies at a 
banquet, there happened to be a Florentine and a Sienese who, as you know, 
are usually at odds with each other; and in order to taunt the Florentine, the 
Sienese said: ‘We have married Siena to the Emperor, and we have given him 
Florence as the dowry.’  And he said this because at the time it was reported 
that the Sienese had given a certain amount of money to the Emperor and he 
had taken Siena under his protection.  Then, without hesitating, the Florentine 
retorted: ‘Siena will first be ridden’ (meaning this in the French sense, though 
he used the Italian word) ‘then the dowry will be settled at leisure.’ (175) 
 
After telling the joke, Bernardo immediately attempts to explain why it was inappropriate: 
“As you see, the joke was very clever, but as ladies were present it was also indecent and 
unseemly” (175-6).  The young Gaspare Pallavicino then speaks an objection to Bernardo’s 
claim, arguing, “Women take pleasure in hearing nothing else, and yet you want to deprive 
them of it.  And as for me, I have found myself blushing for shame far more because of 
words said by women than by men” (176).  A brief, witty tit-for-tat follows between 
Bernardo and Gaspare: 
Bernardo: I am not speaking of women of that sort […] but of virtuous women 
whom every gentleman should honour and respect. 
Gaspare: You would need to discover a very subtle way of recognizing them, 
seeing that most times those who appear the best are in fact the worst. 
                                                
9 Another particularly funny joke, albeit a bit corny, is as follows: it’s “the story of a miser 
who in desperation after he had refused to sell his grain for a good price, and then seen the 
price tumble, hanged himself from a rafter in his bedroom; however, a servant of his heard 
the noise, ran in to see his master hanging there and quickly cut the rope, saving him from 




Bernardo (laughing): If it were not for the presence of our signor Magnifico, 
who is universally recognized to be the protector of women, I should 
undertake the task of refuting you; but I do not want to usurp his place. (176) 
 
When these two gentlemen’s debate about the appropriateness of uncouth humor in the 
presence of women subsides, an actual woman, Emilia Pia, weighs in.  Emilia’s argument 
shares in the witty, jesting spirit of Bernardo and Gaspare’s exchange, as she enters the 
discussion laughing, yet her claim problematizes the topic at hand, which is how to control 
the appropriate use of particular forms of humor.  Emilia states: 
Women have no need of a defender against a critic of so little authority.  So 
leave Gaspare to his perverse opinion, which is caused more by the fact that 
he has never found a woman to look at him than by any frailty that exists in 
women themselves, and continue with your discussion of pleasantries. (176) 
 
More than just joining in the jocular banter of the moment, Emilia’s dismissal of Gaspare’s 
opinions by aligning his views with his lack of appeal to women, is, at the same time, a 
dismissal of the conversation’s stated attempts, which are to define how a courtier can 
appropriately control the effects of particular appeals to humor.  Because not only is Emilia 
unoffended by Bernardo’s joke – told to dramatize how jokes of that sort should not be told 
among women because women will take offense – she throws the offending spirit of the joke 
back at her two “protectors,” deftly displaying her own abilities to “bust chops” or “break 
balls” right along with the boys.  Castiglione uses these performances to dramatize how 
laughter produces effects that cannot be contained rationally and, therefore, are impossible to 
completely theorize.   
 Because the leisurely context of the Court of Urbino offers occasions to observe court 
members performing their approaches on using humor and laughter, Castiglione’s 
approaches to humor and laughter in The Book of the Courtier demonstrate how laughter’s 
effects exceed the theoretical.  On the one hand, Castiglione’s approaches bear resemblance 
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to the earlier approaches of Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle in that they are designed to 
provide advice to an aspiring courtier on the nonchalant use of laughter: 
[A]lthough all jokes are meant to provoke laughter, yet in this respect they 
produce varying effects.  For there are some which are characterized by a 
certain modest humour and grace, others which have a hidden or obvious 
sting, others slightly indecent, some which provoke laughter as soon as they 
are heard, and others which do so the more they are thought about, others 
which cause blushes as well as laughter, and still others which arouse a show 
of anger.  But at all times attention should be paid to the disposition of those 
who are listening, for jokes can often make those who are suffering suffer still 
more, and there are some illnesses that only grow worse the more they are 
treated.  So if the courtier, in his witticisms and pleasantries, has regard for 
time and person and his own rank, and does not indulge in them too frequently 
(since it can be very tedious to be joking day in and day out, and in all one 
says to no purpose) then he may be called an amusing man. (186-7) 
 
The underpinning of this passage might seem to indicate that controlling appeals to humor 
and the effect of laughter are achievable aims.  If the courtier minds “the disposition of those 
who are listening,” shows “regard for time and person and his own rank,” and “does not 
indulge in them too frequently,” then the courtier can achieve the distinction of being “called 
an amusing man.”  In other words, a simple, balanced, appropriate approach to humor and 
laughter, executed with nonchalance, will yield desirable results.  However, Castiglione’s 
text itself is more dynamic than that.  For example, in this passage we can also see 
Castiglione mention “various effects” that appeals to laughter produce, from the successful 
effect of laughter to the less desirable effects of “blushes” and “anger.”   These affective 
responses to appeals to humor reveal an awareness that laughter’s effects lie beyond reason.  
In other areas of The Courtier, Castiglione makes similar statements that attest to laughter’s 
impossible to understand nature.  Consider the following testament to laughter’s unknown 
origin, a statement that bears an almost word for word resemblance to Cicero’s earlier 
thoughts on the same subject: 
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So you can see that laughter is most agreeable to everyone and the one who 
inspires it at the right time and place deserves praise.  But what laughter is, 
and where it is to be found, and how it sometimes takes possession of our 
veins, our eyes, our mouth and sides, and sometimes seems about to make us 
burst, being uncontrollable no matter how hard we try, I shall leave to 
Democritus to explain; who, even if he should promise to find the words, 
would not be able to. (155)  
 
What we see in Castiglione here is another example of the paradox that the rhetorical 
tradition’s approaches to humor and laughter seem to hinge upon.  On the one hand, these 
approaches all make efforts to provide orators with advice on how to use humor and laughter 
for the most favorable persuasive results.  Yet these same approaches also acknowledge the 
various effects of laughter’s asignifying force.  Sometimes humorous appeals to laughter 
produce the effect of laughter just as the speaker wanted, other times unwanted effects are 
produced, and, sometimes, laughter’s asignifying force produces effects that interrupt 
subjectivity itself, effects that dramatize the limitations of rational efforts to control it.  
Castiglione, like the rest of the thinkers in the rhetorical tradition, attempts to account for as 
many of humor’s potential effects as he can, but at the same time he acknowledges the 
impossibility of these attempts. 
In other words, the paradox that these approaches in Chapter Two both acknowledge 
and struggle with is that laughter has such potential as a tool of persuasion if only it its 
effects can be controlled.  However, persuasion is not the only reason humor and laughter are 
so important to the history of rhetoric.  In each of these approaches, we also see humor and 
laughter being explicitly connected to what it means to be a rational human.  Yet the rational 
human is precisely what is called into question by the interruptive effects of laughter’s 
asignifying force.  In Plato, for example, laughter’s ability to turn the soul away from its 
rational part and toward the part ruled by appetites and desires is precisely what makes him 
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fear it so much.  And even though later rhetoricians see more positive, productive potential in 
laughter’s effects as a persuasive tools, each of these later approaches continue to come back 
to Plato’s initial fears to some degree.  Because the effects of laughter’s asignifying force can 
exceed rational human control, they pose a threat to the development of a favorable ethos in a 
speaker (Aristotle), the creation of a perfect orator (Cicero), the cultivation of a good man 
speaking well (Quintilian), and the nurturing of the perfect courtier (Castiglione).  In other 
words, the rhetorical tradition tries to provide approaches that a rational, human subject can 
follow to control laughter’s effects, but that control is constantly being placed at risk by the 





























I wonder what happened, betwixt and between. 
- John Hartford 
At this point, while we are simultaneously not quite where we once were and not yet 
where we will once be, I’d like to take a brief moment to reflect upon this indeterminate 
space, this betwixt and between, that divides the two parts of this project.  While it may 
appear that we have just finished the rhetorical tradition’s historic approaches to humor and 
laughter and are now moving forward toward postmodern locations where laughter’s 
asignifying force can be observed in action, I would like to offer a different, and, perhaps, 
somewhat paradoxical possibility.  Even though the signifying operation unfolds linearly, 
positing this word before that word, placing one lexical foot in front of the next to create the 
appearance of meaning as a logically ordered production, this Interchapter attempts a 
challenge of this rational imperative.  In other words, this moment calls attention to the 
necessarily porousness of the boundary between Parts One and Two. 
For while it is, of course, physically impossible to actually be in two places at the 
same time, there is no way one could physically encounter both Parts One and Two of this 
project simultaneously.  In other words, to experience a project of this sort is, on one level, to 
start at one point in time and move forward.  Because we have so much practical experience 
encountering signification in this manner, however, this kind of encounter with signification 
has been reified as if it were the only way to proceed, as if starting from the beginning and 
ending at the end is “The” way to meaning.  However, since this project seeks to explore how 
laughter – as a kind of asignifying force – exceeds rational control and signification, it seems 
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apropos to suggest that there may be another way to proceed, another way to arrive at another 
kind of meaning. 
With this suggestion in mind, I would like to invite the reader to approach both where 
we have just been and where we are now going not as discrete locations contained within the 
signifying operation of this project, but as fluid locations that must, to an extent, exist 
simultaneously.  Just as the humorous object necessitates the effect of laughter to make it a 
humorous object as opposed to any other kind of object, and laughter necessitates the 
humorous object in order to catalyze its asignifying force, Parts One and Two of this project 
necessitate each other.  Part Two explores the effects of laughter’s asignifying force as it 
interrupts subjectivity, exceeds context, and troubles the boundary between the human and 
the non-human.  In other words, without Part Two’s dramatization of how humorous appeals 
are always already interrupted by the future possibilities, the nearly limitless effects of 
laughter’s asignifying force, there would be no way that any humorous appeal, such as the 
kind Part One attempts to control, could ever succeed.  So while Part One concentrates on 
how thinkers across the rhetorical tradition have tried to exert rational control over what they 
acknowledge is an uncontrollable force, suggesting ways an orator can best construct 
humorous appeals to produce desired effects, Part Two will shift the focus of the humorous 
rhetorical situation to the interruptive effects of laughter’s asignifying force, effects that 
dramatize the limits of an orator’s abilities to exert rational control.   
Therefore, by standing on its own while simultaneously being haunted by the effects 
of its surrounding parts, this Interchapter – always already betwixt and between – seeks to 
honor the historical distinction between object (humor) and effect (laughter) as individual 
components of the rhetorical situation, while simultaneously leaving an opening for ongoing 
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recursive movements between the two concepts. In other words, the Interchapter – as the 
pivot point in the project’s formal center – performs the discrete yet simultaneously 
interrelated relationship between both humor and laughter and, respectively, between Parts 
One and Two: the individual concepts, humor and laughter, are both incomplete and 





















Part Two: No Talk, All Action 
Chapter Three 
I Didn't Do It, Man, I Only Said It: The Performative Force of The Lenny Bruce Performance 
Film 
 
A stripper in a burlesque joint gets on stage and says, 'Here it is boys, let's da 
da da,' it's cool.  But let her do that in the public park on the way home and 
her ass is in jail.  And the reason for that is the people in the park didn't ask 
for that.  In other words, you can yell fire in a crowded theater if you're on 
stage, but don't do it off stage.  The theatre is make believe, that's where it's 
at. 
 
- Lenny Bruce 
 
In October of 1961 the stand-up comedian Lenny Bruce was arrested for the first time 
in San Francisco for uttering the word “cocksucker” on stage.  Over the next four years, more 
arrests followed – he was busted in Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Sydney, Australia.  
In the Australian case, Bruce’s charge was blasphemy.  His account of the Crucifixion, “‘We 
Jews killed Christ, and if he comes back, we’ll kill him again!’” was deemed an attack on 
both religion and on the individuals who practice it, meaning Bruce’s performance “breached 
both the law of man and the people’s faith” (qtd. in Collins and Skover 13).  In his U.S. 
cases, however, the First Amendment protected Bruce from charges of blasphemy, but it did 
not protect him from a related crime, obscenity10.  In the 1957 Supreme Court case Roth v. 
United States, Chief Justice William Brennan wrote the majority opinion that defined the 
parameters for what defines obscenity and how it differs from protected speech: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene […] It has been 
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of the exposition of 
                                                
10 The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.” 
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ideas, and are of such slight social value […] that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality. (qtd. in Collins and Skover 31) 
 
In short, the general effect of this ruling was that prosecutors only needed to succeed in 
defining a text as “obscene” for the offender to be found guilty of obscenity (31).  There is an 
important distinction here between the charges of blasphemy and of obscenity:  Where 
blasphemy is interpreted as “‘a real or imagined attack’” against religion in general, or 
against specific religious individuals, the charge of obscenity relates to “the words […] and 
not the parties against whom they were directed” (qtd. in Collins and Skover 14, my 
emphases).  In other words, blasphemy presumes a sort of force, an attack directed against 
religious persons or things, whereas obscenity argues that the meaning of the words 
themselves is vulgar and without social value.  In Bruce’s case, it is not, for example, too 
much “fucking” that gets him into trouble; his use of the word itself would appear to be 
enough for the courts to find him guilty of obscenity.   
The issue of force versus meaning occupies an historic location in the tradition of 
rhetoric.  The discussion originates with Plato and his privileging of speech over writing.  
Plato places speech in the advantaged position over writing because he aligns speech with 
presence and writing with absence.  In the Phaedrus, Plato describes speech as superior to 
writing because he believes the idea, “the living, animate speech of the man,” is more at risk 
in writing, which “would rightly be called a kind of phantom” (267a7-10).  In other words, 
speech is seen as the expression of the human soul’s intentions, whereas writing is merely an 
image, a representation. Plato’s fear is that, unlike speech, where clarifying questions can be 
asked of the speaker if confusions occur, writing has no one to respond for it.  Orphaned 
from the voice of their author, when they are written down, “every composition trundles 
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about everywhere in the same way, in the presence both of those who know about the subject 
and of those who have nothing at all to do with it” and, in the event misunderstanding occurs, 
writing, “always needs its father to help it; for it is incapable of either defending or helping 
itself” (275e1-6).  In this traditional communication model, as Jacques Derrida will come to 
call it, writing is seen as merely a subservient technology that, “extends the field and the 
powers of locutionary or gestural communication” (“Signature” 3) in such a way that it “will 
never have the slightest effect on either the structure or the contents of the meaning (the 
ideas) that it is supposed to transmit” (4). 11  Writing is a tool in this model that can, at best, 
function like a painting, a representation that can “stand there as if alive,” but is, in and of 
itself, lifeless (Phaedrus 275d6).  It does not add to, or contribute to, or in any way influence 
what it represents, and if you ask a written text a question, it will always respond in the same 
manner, “they preserve a quite solemn silence” (275d7).  In short, writing’s limited function 
in the traditional communication model is to represent meaning. 
While the traditional communication model and its orientation toward meaning has 
long dominated the conversation in rhetoric, a parallel history exists that questions what 
language does in addition to communicating meaning.  In The Future of Invention: Rhetoric, 
Postmodernism, and the Problem of Change, John Muckelbauer claims that the traditional 
view of the rhetorical situation and its orientation toward stability and meaning has long 
                                                
11 Derrida's intervention intends to demonstrate that, in fact, the same risks that have been 
long associated with writing also apply to speech/gesture and all other forms of 
communication.  In short, Derrida’s claim is that all language – speech, gesture, writing – 
along with all experience, including the experience of being itself, is structured like writing.  
Writing is not a subservient tool to speech/gesture that carries “a continuous and 
homogenous reparation and modification of presence in the representation,” but is rather a 
“break in presence” (“Signature” 5).  This breaking force occurs at the moment of inscription 
of any form of communication, suggesting that all language forms are structurally susceptible 




dominated the conversation in rhetoric.  He notes that “the domain of rhetoric has 
traditionally been limited to very particular concerns,” a limitation that creates a 
“‘managerial rhetoric,’” wherein, “speakers turn to rhetoric only after they have decided 
upon the proposition that they will advocate,” leaving rhetoric itself as merely a “supplement 
to the proposition,” whose sole purpose is the accurate transmission of propositions meaning 
(Future 16).  But Muckelbauer also identifies a parallel history in rhetoric that challenges the 
supremacy of this view and questions what else language does beyond simply 
communicating meaning: 
[A]t least in its classical incarnation, rhetoric seems largely indifferent to 
signification and to the processes of either producing or interpreting a 
meaning […] If signification seems inclined toward meaning, understanding, 
and indeterminacy, rhetoric seems inclined toward what we might call an 
‘asignifying’ dimension of language, focusing on forces, actions, and effects” 
(“Rhetoric, Asignification” 239). 
 
Muckelbauer’s project, therefore, is to turn rhetoric’s focus back to its earliest sophistic 
interests as an art of persuading by means of a force that isn’t necessarily reducible to 
meaning and reason.   He writes, “although this point is frequently overlooked in 
contemporary scholarship, rhetoric’s traditional emphasis on persuasion means that it is not 
identical to practices that emphasize the central role of understanding, practices that we 
might refer to as ‘communicative’” (Future 17).  To illustrate this point, Muckelbauer 
examines these “acts of communication” alongside what he calls “acts of persuasion.”  An 
act of communication is what he terms a signifying operation, meaning that it “attempts to 
transmit its proposition through understanding [and] endeavors to reproduce, as accurately as 
possible, the proposition in the mind of its audience […] as if it were, above all, an 
identifiable content that can be reproduced” (17).  Above all, an act of communication’s 
objective is “to identically reproduce this meaning, to ensure that the content of the 
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proposition is grasped or understood” (17).  Acts of communication, therefore, privilege 
meaning, and create the impression that the meaning they communicate is determinable, 
complete, and stable.  An act of persuasion, however, is what Muckelbauer terms an 
asignifying operation, meaning it does not attempt to “identically reproduce the proposition 
as a meaning in the mind of the audience […] [but] to give it a certain force” (17).   
Asignifying operations, then, refer to “the dimension of language that is irreducible to 
questions of meaning and understanding” (13) and an act of persuasion does not necessarily 
rely on meaning to make its proposition compelling, but instead effects persuasion based on 
“its capacity to exert a compelling force, its ability to evoke particular responses in specific 
audiences” (17).  In other words, an act of persuasion is not interested in what the proposition 
is, but rather in what the proposition does. 
Although there might appear to be a clear distinction between communication and 
persuasion in these two models, this should not be assumed.  Muckelbauer cautions against 
bracketing off communication from persuasion, or vice versa, and argues, “it is crucial not to 
imply a rigid, either/or separation between them,” because communication and persuasion, 
“exist in close proximity” to each other (18): 
Of course, these two dimensions of language aren’t mutually exclusive (I most 
likely want my audience to understand what it is that I want them to do, 
though not necessarily).  It may even be the case that these two dimensions of 
language actually require each other (certainly, much traditional rhetoric 
assumes that I should understand what I am trying to accomplish).  But the 
fact that these two dimensions exist in close proximity does not indicate that 
they are the same. (“Rhetoric, Asignification” (239) 
 
Persuasion, for example, frequently employs “the movement of understanding as one of its 
strategies,” and, for a speaker or writer, “some element of understanding is always necessary 
in order to initiate a persuasive act,” if for no other reason than the speaker or writer must 
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present a convincing enough ethos before an audience if a desirable response is ever to be 
provoked (Future 18-19).  In other words, contemporary rhetoricians interested in 
asignifying operations are neither looking to replace the traditional communication model 
nor to move language’s asignifying force into a privileged position in relation to language’s 
role in signifying meaning and understanding.12  Rather, in a field that remains 
predominately devoted to epistemological concerns, the intention is to shift the focus of the 
discussion in rhetoric back toward questions of force and effects, questions that highlight 
Muckelbauer’s depiction of a “[t]raditional rhetoric [that] is not principally an art of 
communicative understanding, but an art of provoking responses and effects” (19). 
The Lenny Bruce Performance Film, a recording of Bruce’s second to last 
performance from August 1965, provokes questions of language’s asignifying force and how 
the myriad effects of that force can at times be unintentional and uncontrollable.  Between 
1961 and 1965, Bruce’s stand-up comedy performances produced significant legal 
consequences that had taken their toll on the man himself; he was simultaneously being tried 
                                                
12 Diane Davis and Bradford J. Vivian have written on various aspects of rhetoric’s 
asignifying force.  Davis calls attention to the importance of the often overlooked “non-
hermeneutical dimension” of rhetoric, a dimension “that has nothing to do with meaning-
making, with offering up signification to comprehension” (“Addressing Alterity” 192).  For 
Davis, this dimension deals not in the aspect of language that “opens itself up to 
interpretation,” a position she equates with J.L. Austin's constative speech act and Levinas' 
concept of the “said,” but rather in the “saying,” the dimension of language that “necessarily 
unsettles what is congealed in the already-said” and, in Austin's terms, “indicates a 
performative” (192-193). Vivian likewise moves away essentialist notions of the human 
subject in asking whether it would be possible to conceive of rhetoric without first appealing 
to an essential subject. Vivian doesn't intend to replace one ontology of the subject with 
another, as a mere inversion of the system would again do nothing to disrupt the organizing 
principles of the system itself, but he intends to move towards a conception of the subject in 
such a way that it no longer governs the entire scene and system of the rhetorical process, but 
rather becomes a “rhetoric beyond representation - one no longer organized, that is, by the 
representation of moral truth or transcendental reason nor representative of an ideal 




on obscenity charges in Chicago and New York and narcotics charges in Los Angeles; he 
was defending himself in court after firing his legal team; he was bankrupt, addicted to 
heroin, and was banned from performing anywhere in the United States outside of San 
Francisco. (Collins and Skover 459-470).  In the performance the film captures, Bruce carries 
the legal documents relating to his New York case on stage with him, reading from them at 
length throughout the performance and stopping frequently to riff on the many ways he feels 
the courts have received the inaccurate meaning of his act.  The performance is a greatest hits 
of sorts, in that it is always looking backwards; it’s a stand-up act that repeats previous stand-
up acts and takes up how those repetitions have been received in various contexts.  By 
reading the speech act and performance theories of J.L. Austin through Derrida’s later 
interventions, this paper will show that this film not only demonstrates how language’s 
asignifying force breaks from all contexts and inspires effects that clearly do many things in 
excess of accurately communicating meaning, but, because the primary force at issue in this 
performance is laughter, this text also joins an ancient debate within the history of rhetoric 
regarding the pitfalls and potentials of laughter’s particular persuasive effect on an audience. 
The Lenny Bruce Performance Film extends this debate by taking up laughter as a specific 
example of language’s asignifying force.  Rhetoric’s historical interest in laughter has largely 
focused on how a subject’s ethos is shaped by appeals to laughter: wit used in appropriate 
amounts can help a speaker seem more urbane and appealing, but wit used excessively, or the 
use of inappropriate means like obscenity to achieve laughter, can paint the orator as a 
buffoon, or worse.  In other words, it has long been suggested that a stable subject can be 
trained in the deployment of humorous appeals in such a way that s/he can control the effects 
of laughter in a given rhetorical situation.  However, The Lenny Bruce Performance Film 
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shows us how laughter interrupts subjectivity from the get go.  The traditional notion of a 
human subject at the center of the rhetorical situation is not as stable it may seem, and, 
therefore, the control such a subject exerts over the rhetorical situation is in fact rather 
tenuous.   Whereas rhetoricians have long sought to advise orators on how to appropriately 
employ appeals to humor in an effort to control laughter’s effects, Bruce’s performance 
demonstrates that laughter’s uncontrollable, asignifying force is irreducible to control by the 
human speaker. 
Throughout this performance, Bruce believes that his act has been erroneously 
defined as obscene because the definitions are based on inaccurate transcripts made by court 
appointed police officers assigned to watch his act and then present their written 
transcriptions before the court.  Consider this bit where Bruce first describes the 
circumstances behind his repeated busts: 
And I figured out after four years why I got arrested so many times.  You see 
what happens … it’s been a comedy of errors.  Here's how it happens.  I do 
my act at, perhaps, 11 o’clock at night.  Little do I know that at 11 a.m. the 
next morning, before the grand jury somewhere, there’s another guy doing my 
act who’s introduced as Lenny Bruce (in substance).  ‘Here he is, Lenny 
Bruce! (in substance).’  A peace officer who is trained for, to recognize clear 
and present dangers, not make believe, does the act.  The grand jury watches 
him work and they go, ‘That stinks!’  But I get busted!  And the irony is I 
have to go to court and defend his act! 
 
The dilemma described here by Bruce is that the police officers on the beat aren’t trained to 
transcribe stand-up acts and, thus, the transcriptions made of his act, and the performances 
given in court by police officers posing as Lenny Bruce, “in substance,” cannot communicate 
the accurate meaning of his act to the grand jury.  Bruce’s argument throughout the film 
seems to be that if he were granted an opportunity to perform his act before the courts, in 
person and in his own words, the accurate meaning of his act would be conveyed to the 
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justices and they would understand that the act is neither obscene nor devoid of any 
redeeming social value.  In other words, Bruce wants to change the context from the non-
serious, “make believe” world of the nightclub to the serious, “real” world of the courtroom 
in an effort to communicate the accurate meaning of his act.  Former Rolling Stone editor 
Ralph Gleason writes in the liner notes to the posthumous album The Real Lenny Bruce: 
He desperately tried to get the various courts to allow him to do his routine for 
the judges so that he could be judged for what he actually did and not for what 
some cop on the beat thought he did, but the courts would never permit him.  
[The Lenny Bruce Performance Film] … was designed originally to be a 
substitute for an in-person performance in court.  Lenny wanted to enter the 
film of his show as evidence in his own defense but he could never get that 
accepted either (4).   
 
In this film, then, Bruce is making his case on stage that he should be granted an opportunity 
to make his case before the court, and, in doing so, he is effectively performing his own 
defense before the nightclub audience who pose as the grand jury, “in substance.”  This 
creates a unique rhetorical dynamic within the text.  As a stand-up comedy performance, 
Bruce’s act is, expectedly, a form of epideictic rhetoric as it seeks to entertain an audience by 
way of assorted jokes, bits, characters, and anecdotes.  But because it concurrently functions 
as a defense of his earlier arrest-provoking performances, this performance can also be 
considered an example of forensic rhetoric, which is conspicuously atypical for a stand-up 
act.  What results is a comedy performance given in a surprisingly unfunny manner, a non-
serious context harboring unexpectedly serious themes.  Bruce’s comic genius is still a 
powerful force at times, but these moments feel more like lightening flashes in an otherwise 
somber sky where his lamentations on representational failure often come across as erratic, 
uneven, tangential, and awkward.   
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The idea of there being one context where language is serious and another context 
where language is non-serious is a foundational concern for J.L. Austin in How to Do Things 
With Words.  In this text, Austin's primary intervention is to shift commonly held 
assumptions about language in analytical philosophy away from ideas where “the business of 
a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact’, which it 
must do either truly or falsely,” (1) (statements that he labels “constatives”) and toward a 
broader consideration of speech acts “in which to say something is to do something; or in 
which by saying or in saying something we are doing something” (statements he calls 
“performatives”) (12).  One of the steps Austin takes in his effort to understand why 
performative utterances sometimes succeed and sometimes fail is to attempt to distinguish 
serious speech from non-serious speech.  In order for serious speech to occur, he believes the 
“circumstances, including other actions, must be appropriate,” and the speaker “must not be 
joking, for example, nor writing a poem,” (9) or, as Bruce puts it in The Lenny Bruce 
Performance Film, “you can yell fire in a crowded theatre if you're on stage, but don't do it 
off stage.”  Language that is spoken on the stage or in a poem, Austin claims, is “parasitic 
upon its normal use” and should be excluded from consideration when trying to isolate pure 
performative utterances from constative utterances: “Our performative utterances, felicitous 
or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances” (22).   Yet even as Austin 
undertakes rigorous efforts to define a clear distinction between serious and non-serious 
contexts, his text in many ways works against the limitations he wishes to define.  For 
example, when he uses slang expressions like “cock a snook” (119) and self-deprecating 
humor like, “Of course, this is bound to be a little boring and dry to listen to and digest; not 
nearly so much so as to think and write” (164) to make his points about the need to sequester 
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jokes, poetry, and plays from serious communication, he is in effect using performative 
utterances to make constative claims.  Considering How To Do Things With Words was 
originally delivered as a series of lectures, Austin's text ultimately performs its very purpose; 
it becomes about what it does and not necessarily about what it says (119).13  Ultimately, 
Austin’s openness toward his own methodology leads him to accept that there is a little bit of 
the constative and a little bit of the performative in any utterance: “we found sufficient 
indications that unhappiness nevertheless seems to characterize both kinds of utterance, not 
merely the performative; and that the requirement of conforming or bearing some relation to 
the facts [...] seems to characterize performatives” (91).   
Bruce's performance in The Lenny Bruce Performance Film illustrates the challenges 
inherent in attempts to bracket off “ordinary circumstances” and delimit between serious and 
non-serious speech.  Because if it were really acceptable to yell “fire” in a crowded theatre as 
long you are on stage, the issue of Bruce's legal predicaments would appear to be 
nonexistent; he is using “non-serious” speech (as a stand-up comedian, he is, by definition, 
“joking”) in circumstances that are not “ordinary” (as a performer on a stage in a nightclub).  
By this logic, Bruce’s staged performances would appear to occupy a space that would limit 
the ability of his words to do much beyond the make believe world they are encapsulated 
within. But this is clearly not the case. Bruce's utterances clearly do do things, even from the 
stage.  They make some of us laugh, but they also offend some of us, which, in turn, affects 
Bruce's ability to earn a living, threatens his rights as a free citizen, and so on.  Austin raises 
                                                
13 Austin's self-effacing awareness of the polemical qualities within his work - that it 
dislodges the value of true/false tests sacred to analytical philosophy - is a position Shoshana 
Felman takes up with vigor in The Scandal of the Speaking Body through her analysis of the 
Don Juan myth where she promotes in Austin's work the very deconstructions Derrida will 
later make to it in “Signature, Event, Context”: “In fact Austin, like Don Juan, is not simply 
an unbeliever, he is an iconoclast, a destroyer of fetishes” (42).   
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a point about how constative and performative utterances relate to American law that is 
curiously germane to Bruce’s situation: 
It is worthy of note that, as I am told, in the American law of evidence, a 
report on what someone else said is admitted as evidence if what he said is an 
utterance of our performative kind: because this is regarded as a report not so 
much of something he said, as which it would be hear-say and not admissible 
as evidence, but rather as something he did, an action of his. (13) 
 
One of Bruce’s more enduring one liners shares a similar sympathy: in response to an arrest 
for saying “cocksucker” on stage, Bruce appealed to the arresting officers by saying, “I didn’t 
do it, man, I only said it.”  While Bruce is correct that he didn’t do anything other than say 
the word on a stage, what his case will repeatedly bear out is that his words will be 
interpreted by the courts as something he did, not merely as something he said.  These 
performative effects of Bruce’s performance – both intentional and otherwise – demonstrate 
laughter’s asignifying force as being irreducible to questions of meaning and understanding. 
The bulk of The Lenny Bruce Performance consists of Bruce reading from the court's 
transcripts (“People of New York versus Lenny Bruce and Howard Solomon, April 3, 1964”) 
and then retelling the mistranslated jokes, correcting inaccuracies along the way.  His 
retellings are taken on good faith to be more accurate representations of his earlier 
performances than the transcriptions made by the police officers in his audience, in part 
because surrendering to Bruce's supposed expertise on the matter is vital for the audience to 
have access to the performance's most humorous moments, which rely on the disparity 
between what “they say” Bruce said and what “Bruce says” Bruce said.  For example, 
consider Bruce's bit about the beat cop who is assigned to “go steal his act” and then re-
perform the act before the court.  The dialogue is between the judge and the beat cop: 
'Alright officer …' 
'I don't remember the whole act, your honor, but I made these notes …  
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Let's see now, uh, uh, Catholic, asshole, shit, uh, let's see, and uh, in the park, 
and, tits and shit and Catholics and Jews and shit.  That's about all I 
remember, it's, that's about the general tenor of the act.'   
'Those are the words that he used, did he, is that all of it?'  
'No, your honor, it's, you know …'  
'But he used those words,'  
'Yeah, yeah, he said shit a lot of times.' 
 
The judge's act of focusing on the words alone appears to illustrate Austin's definition of a 
constative utterance as one that truly or falsely states a fact: the courts are focusing on the 
meaning of the word “shit” defining it as obscene, determining if Bruce actually said the 
word, and, ultimately, defining Bruce’s performance as obscene based on his use of the word.  
But I suggest this scenario is more complicated than this.  Even though the court’s 
determination that both the word and the performance are obscene seems to happen at the 
constative level, the reasons behind why any of this matters to the court is because of the 
words’ effects.  The effects of obscenity are what the court wants to curtail, but, based on the 
conditions of the Roth ruling described above, they seem to be taking a constative approach 
to what might be more accurately described as a performative problem.  Similarly, Bruce’s 
act of focusing on the meaning of the words in his act is reflected in his search for a context 
where he can perform his act without the depredating effects of translation and, therefore, can 
– in his mind at least – communicate the accurate meaning of his act to the court.  By 
contrasting what he believes the accurate meaning of his act is with what the judge thinks the 
accurate meaning of his act is based on the versions transcribed in the court documents, 
Bruce does succeed in provoking his nightclub audience to laugh, as many of depictions in 
the court’s transcriptions are absurdly funny.  But in doing so, he also maintains that by 
changing the context of his performance he will somehow ensure the faithful reproduction of 
its content.  Both of these positions – the court’s focusing on the definition of the words 
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themselves and Bruce’s focusing on the context those words are spoken in – reflect the 
traditional communication model’s notion of a pure, present meaning that can be accurately 
communicated through language.  But it is precisely this faith in the traditional model of 
communication that The Lenny Bruce Performance Film challenges.  Through its formal 
reliance on repetition, what Derrida calls the citational power of language, or it's “essential 
iterability (repetition/alterity),” The Lenny Bruce Performance Film offers a unique 
reconsideration of Derrida’s intervention in the constative/performative conversation opened 
up by Austin (“Signature” 9).   
Derrida identifies that writing (and all language, as well as experience, “even the 
experience of being”) carries within it, in “the very structure of the written text,” a force “that 
breaks with its context, that is, with the collectivity of presences organizing the moment of its 
inscription,” and, “by virtue of its essential iterability, a written syntagma can always be 
detached from the chain in which it is inserted or given without causing it to lose all 
possibility of functioning, if not all possibility of 'communicating'“ (9).  No context can 
assuredly communicate Bruce's intended meaning more than any other context because of the 
breaking force inherent within the structure of all communication.  One detail from Bruce's 
performance adds a layer of rather humorous irony to this conversation: nowhere does there 
exist a definitive recording of the contested earlier performances Bruce is defending.  In The 
Trials of Lenny Bruce, Ronald Collins and David Skover's exhaustively researched book on 
Bruce's legal predicaments, the authors reveal that, “The police's Microfon recording [of the 
performances at issue in The People of the State of New York – against – Lenny Bruce, 
Howard L. Solomon, and Ella Soloman] was largely inaudible” (228).  Bruce makes light of 
this detail in the film when he jokes, “We have a tape recording here, the tape recording is 
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inaudible.  However, we made an accurate transcription.”  This line is one of Bruce’s 
funniest in the performance, but it also illustrates how this unique performance calls attention 
to the radical absence of both receiver and sender, a notion that Derrida's deconstruction of 
the traditional writing model revolves around.  The court is concerned with whether or not 
Bruce, for example, uttered the word “cocksucker” at a particular place at a particular time, 
as was the case when he was charged with violating, “Municipal Police Code Sections 176 
and 205 (unlawful presentation of an ‘obscene, indecent, immoral, or impure’ performance) 
and California Penal Code Section 311.6 (knowingly speaking ‘lewd or obscene’ words ‘in 
any public place’ […])” for uttering the phrase, “‘the club was overrun with cocksuckers’” 
during a performance at Ann’s 440 in San Francisco on Tuesday, October 4, 1961 (Collins 
and Skover 47-53).  If it is determined that he did say the word, and the word “cocksucker” is 
defined by the court as an obscene word, Bruce’s use of that word in that particular 
performance, at that particular place and time as noted in the transcripts, can be understood 
by the courts as an act of communicating an obscene meaning, and Bruce can be found guilty 
of obscenity.  Again, because of the Roth Supreme Court ruling that set the standard for what 
constitutes obscenity in 1965, prosecutors needed only to succeed “in branding a book, 
movie, play, or performance ‘obscene,’ that was typically the end of the matter – off to the 
holding-tank with the moral offender” (Collins and Skover 31, my emphasis).  Bruce is 
acutely aware of the penal codes he is being charged of violating in the film.  Recall that at 
the time of the filming, he has taken to defending himself in court, and, as he reads from the 
transcripts, he makes occasional mention to the codes he is being charged with violating.  For 
example, in a bit where he points out that the courts had interpreted his gesture of 
benediction as a gesture of masturbation, Bruce directly refers to the law on the books: 
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“Cause there’s a part of [inaudible] penal code test that says, ‘And goes substantially beyond 
the customary limits of candor and description or representation.’  So not only did the guy 
describe, represent, he said jack off, but he did it.” 14 
Considering Bruce’s familiarity with the law – that if prosecutors can prove that he 
uttered words understood to have obscene meanings he can be found guilty of obscenity – it 
is understandable that Bruce would take such a keen interest in how the words of his act are 
being represented to the courts. Bruce is the one who will pay the price if he loses the case, 
so if communicating meaning is the name of the game, it is reasonable that he would want to 
take the game directly to the court.  However, Bruce and the court are both emphasizing the 
position that the words of his act can somehow identically reproduce the meaning of his act.  
The iterative form of this performance, however, demonstrates that both the court’s and 
Bruce’s wishes for a stable context where meaning can always be accurately represented and 
communicated are unsound. The “illimitable” number of contexts in this performance 
dramatize Derrida's break with Austin on the issue of serious versus non-serious speech 
(“The 'non-serious,' the oratio oblique will no longer be able to be excluded, as Austin 
wished, from 'ordinary' language”) (18) and, therefore, illustrate the disillusion of the 
boundary between the courtroom and the stage: “This citationality, this duplication or 
duplicity, this iterability of the mark is neither accidental nor an anomaly, it is that 
(normal/abnormal) without which a mark could not even have a function called “normal’” 
(12).  In other words, if the mark is always breaking from context, the context can be no 
                                                
14 Bruce appears to take particular offense to this part of the transcript, because such 
accusations, if true, would harm his standing in the eyes of his more sophisticated female 
audience members:  “I would never make gestures of masturbation, cause, I like … I, I'm 
concerned with my, image, in that, I, I know it offends chicks.  And I, you know, it frightens 
them, it's ugly to them, and, Dorothy Killgallen is not going to see some crotch grabbing 
hooligan.  I would just never do anything like that.  It's offensive.” 
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more fully present than the text it seems to surround.  Bruce's iterative performance 
illustrates the inherent problem of attempting to fix a stable meaning to Bruce's words in a 
particular context at a particular moment in time, and it reminds us that meaning is just one 
possible effect of language’s citational drift.  Even though meaning isn't always successfully 
communicated, if this drifting didn't occur, as Derrida suggests, what we understand as 
“meaning” would never be possible:   
By no means do I draw the conclusion that there is no relative specificity of 
effects of consciousness, or of effects of speech (as opposed to writing in the 
traditional sense), that there is no performative effect, no effect of ordinary 
language, no effect of presence or of discursive event (speech act).  It is 
simply that those effects do not exclude what is generally opposed to them, 
term by term; on the contrary, they presuppose it, in an asymmetrical way, as 
the general space of their possibility. (19) 
 
Despite the limitlessly repeatable nature of language, the “possibility of disengagement and 
citational graft which belongs to the structure of every mark, spoken or written, and which 
constitutes every mark … can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new 
contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable,” both the courts and Bruce insist on 
viewing his performance as an act of communication and want to, therefore, control how the 
meaning of the performance is received (“Signature”12).  But what ultimately proves quite 
serious about this atypical comedy performance is that it demonstrates how the non-serious 
realm of the stage is, in fact, a structural necessity for the serious realm of the court to exist. 
In its idiosyncratic demonstration of language’s essential iterability, The Lenny Bruce 
Performance Film makes explicit language’s non-representational elements, or its 
asignifying force.  In the following bit, Bruce describes one such non-representational 
element unique to stand-up performances, “marking time.”  In this bit, the courts have 
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extracted a piece of Bruce’s act and defined it as obscene, but the piece they extracted was, in 
Bruce’s estimation, not supposed to be considered a part of his official act:  
Here, I’ll give you an example of the bits that were found, the utter 
obscenities.  Ok, for example, ‘Eleanor Roosevelt and her display of tits, first 
performance, transcript of third performance at page 27.’  What I, alright, now 
dig, from an hour show this went one second.  And it’s really weird, what I 
was doing, I was just marking time, because there were so many policeman in 
the audience that night … Interpol, state police, federal heat, you know? – that 
what I said was, ah, ah, ah … oh.  I said, I was talking about … nenes, you 
know, and the fact that the tittie, perhaps, is repugnant to the people, it’s not 
the word.  Because Las Vegas, that’s the entertainment capital of the world, 
and the attraction’s not a Monet exhibit, it’s tits and ass. 
 
Bruce states that he “was just marking time” when he made the purportedly obscene 
reference in his initial act.  Comedians “mark time” for various reasons: to wait for laughter 
from a previous joke to subside, to control audience distractions (hecklers, people getting up 
to go to the bathroom, etc.), to take a drink, to remember the next bit, to settle down after a 
joke that bombs, and so forth.  In other words, marking time means the comic is “riffing,” or 
improvising until the moment is right to get back to the performance’s scripted material.  In 
the case of the bit cited above, Bruce is apparently marking time to work his more suggestive 
material around the presence of the “Interpol, state cops, federal heat” that were in the 
audience so as to not allow them the opportunity to gather more legal ammunition to be used 
against him in court (a strategy that clearly backfires).  “Just marking time,” then, implies 
that the words Bruce utters during that time period are not part of the official act.  They are 
off the record utterances spoken between official parts, much in the same way a stage actor 
might break character during a power outage in the middle of a play and chat informally with 
audience members only to return to her official role within the play once the power is 
restored.  These utterances spoken when marking time are, therefore, not intended to signify 
part of a performance’s “bona fide” meaning.  For example, they are not utterances that 
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would be included as part of a play’s official script for sale in a bookstore, but are merely ad-
libbed improvisations not to be considered along with the formal, composed material created 
for the performance.  Yet even though such utterances might not be part of the intended 
meaning the performer sets out to communicate, the words spoken while marking time still 
produce effects and provoke responses.  These effects and responses are possible, in part, 
because of the non-representational nature of stand-up comedy; even though Bruce wants to 
sequester the official part of the act from the part where he is just marking time, the form of a 
stand-up performance blurs the line between the scripted and the unscripted parts of the 
performance much more than in the aforementioned example of a theatre play.  Bruce’s 
treatment of marking time in The Lenny Bruce Performance Film, then, is a particularly vivid 
example of how the non-representational elements of language make acts of communication 
not as easily determined as we might think, no matter what context they are presented in.  For 
Bruce, his words still produce effects and provoke responses from the court despite their 
unofficial “just marking time” status in the performance, and in spite of whatever Bruce’s 
communicative intentions may be. 
Implicit in the act of charging Bruce, or anyone else, with obscenity is a belief in the 
existence of a stable and complete subject who intends to communicate obscene meaning to 
an audience.  In Bruce’s case, he must be, as Judith Butler states, “isolate[d] […] as the 
culpable agent” of the obscene utterances in order for him to pay the price for their being 
uttered in the first place, “as if the speaker were at the origin of such speech” (Excitable 39).  
Yet The Lenny Bruce Performance Film calls into question such notions of a stable, 
intentional subject with respect to Bruce’s status as expert witness when he attempts to 
defend his own act.  The traditional communication model would argue that Bruce, as the 
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speaking subject, would possess an authentic, personal connection to the legitimate meaning 
of his previous performances, yet this position is called into question several times by none 
other than Bruce himself, who often stumbles and stammers when trying to recollect his own 
bits.  For example, he begins to retell a mistranslated bit from the court’s transcript to correct 
its inaccuracies, yet can’t remember what it was he originally said:  
‘St. Paul giving up fucking.’ Ok, now, what I said there, that’s how the bit is 
reported, what I said … I forget, it’s been so long since I did the bit, I said, ah 
… oh, it’s a celibate, I said, it, it … how the hell’d I do that?  How celibacy 
was introduced?  See, I forget the bit.  Um … uh … It’s weird, cause I didn’t  
know that was a bit, they, they put that form there, and then I forget where it 
started.   
 
Though it may seem like a mere hitch in Bruce's performance, this forgetting actually 
demonstrates the structural necessity that governs all language use: no self-presence 
authorizes our utterances.  As Derrida suggests by way of the “shopping list for myself” 
example: “At the very moment ‘I’ make a shopping list, I know … that it will only be a list if 
it implies my absence, it if already detaches itself from me in order to function beyond my 
‘present’ act … The sender of the shopping list is not the same as the receiver, even if they 
bear the same name and are endowed with the identity of a single ego” (“Limited Inc a b c 
…” 49).  In other words, the Lenny Bruce in The Lenny Bruce Performance Film is not the 
same Lenny Bruce cited in the court transcripts, nor the same Lenny Bruce infamously 
branded “Dirty Lenny” by the media, nor the same Lenny Bruce who was born Leonard 
Alfred Schneider in 1925.  Because for both the addressor and the addressee of an utterance, 
language is always breaking from its context, always capable of being lifted from one place 
and put into another where it will still function, even as it doesn't “communicate” the same 
meaning, showing that just as “no context can entirely enclose it,” neither can a speaking 
subject (“Signature” 9). Bruce doesn't have to remember his performance correctly for it to 
 
 123 
communicate a different meaning in a new context; in fact, Bruce's forgetting of his initial bit 
in this retelling - the “forgetting where it started,” and the fact the he “didn't even know it 
was a bit” – is precisely what inspires the bit’s laughter; it’s what makes it funny.  The 
laughing response, here, demonstrates a recognition that all language, all experience, “even 
the experience of being,” carries within it, as Derrida states, a force “that breaks with its 
context, that is, with the collectivity of presences organizing the moment of its inscription” 
(9).  It is the court that defines Bruce's utterances both as a bit (“they put that form there”) 
and as obscene, and it is Bruce who then says that the court’s definitions are incorrect, yet 
both parties appear to remain insistent on the transmission of accurate meaning through an 
act of communication.  What this particular performance demonstrates, however, is at the 
moment of the performance, be it this filmed reproduction or the “original” performance 
under debate, language was (and is) already breaking from context and becoming part of a 
larger, endless citational chain: Bruce gives a prior performance where a transcript is made 
by police, the words from this act are lifted from their original context where they take on 
new meaning in a new context, in a court of law. The words are then lifted again from the 
transcripts by Bruce and placed in a new context, back on a different stage, where they are 
preformed before a different audience, filmed by Magnuson, and eventually archived on 
DVD; they are then viewed by me, lifted once again and transcribed in this paper, where they 
are read by whoever is reading this, and on and on and on.  Through the unique way this 
performance demonstrates language’s essential iterability, it shows us that that no context 
can guarantee Bruce’s intended meaning more than any other context because of the breaking 
force inherent within the structure of all language at the moment of its inscription.  In 
addition, this performance demonstrates how language’s breaking force not only applies to 
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contexts and addressees, but also to addressors, as Bruce’s own subjectivity is called into 
question by way of how the multiple iterations of his act are differently received not only by 
the courts, but by Bruce himself. 
 Rhetorically reading the “edges” of The Lenny Bruce Performance Film further 
highlights the serious/non-serious and constative/performative tensions at work throughout 
this singular performance and begins to bring this discussion full circle.  Barbara Johnson, in 
the translator's introduction to Jacques Derrida's Dissemination, notices a rhetorical technique 
- a “fading in and out” - in many of Derrida's essays: “The beginnings and endings of these 
essays are often the most mystifying parts [...] It is as though the borderlines of the text had 
to be made to bear the mark of the silence - and the pathos - that lie beyond its fringes, as if 
the text had first and last to more actively disconnect itself from the logos toward which it 
still aspires” (xvii).  I suggest that a similar rhetorical technique frames The Lenny Bruce 
Performance Film.   The first words that appear on screen during the film’s opening credits 
are, “This is not a documentary.  This is a performance.”  This is a significant beginning for 
this film, one that underscores its importance to rhetoric, because it frames the text in terms 
of the discussion on acts of persuasion versus acts of communication.  Were we to consider 
this film as a documentary, it would be expected to function as an act of communication that 
seeks to, in Muckelbauer’s words, “transmit the truth as a content” using various forms of 
“signification, identical reproduction, [and] an emphasis on understanding” (Future 18).  But 
instead, the opening asks us to consider the film as a performance, that is, as an act of 
persuasion that seeks to “incite a response” (18).  The “fading in” of this film thus serves as 
an invitation of sorts, an offer from the filmmaker to read this film as an asignifying 
operation rather than a signifying operation.  Similarly, at the end of the film, Bruce’s 
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performative actions help punctuate the theoretical themes raised throughout the film.  As his 
act draws to a close, Bruce does not exit the stage by walking off into the wings as would be 
expected of a stand-up comedian.  Instead, he weaves his way through the audience toward 
the club’s side doors that open onto Broadway Street.  Once the doors open, Bruce positions 
himself at the threshold between the nightclub and the city streets outside, taking a few 
moments to play at the edges of the tenuous boundary between the stage and the real world, a 
theoretically illusory boundary that has, nevertheless, inflamed tumultuous effects in his 
personal life.  He banters jestingly with passers by:  
Hello there.  How are you? … 
You've been in trouble haven't you?  A few times? …  
Hello, the lady with the balloon.  You're with the red balloon, I assume? …  
Young lady with the marijuana eyes … 
 
 He puts on a sleazy accent, perhaps playing up his infamous alter ego “Dirty Lenny”:  
You like a filthy show? … 
Come on … 
Gotta girls, everything …  
Oh, you lika girls? … 
You want a girl for the night?  … 
 
The pithy, lighthearted conversations all appear one sided as it is impossible to hear what any 
of the passers by are saying.  Like the shadows projected on the wall of Plato's cave, the 
people walking through the San Francisco night are seen only as flickers of light against the 
open club door, yet, like the world outside the cave in Plato's allegory, they are understood as 
existing in the serious world.  They are not on stage performing with Lenny Bruce and are 
not even part of the audience watching the staged performance.  They are simply so-called 
real people walking down a city street.  However, this strange coda to an already unusual 
performance raises some critical theoretical questions: does Bruce’s act of addressing passers 
by (not, technically, from the stage anymore, but still while speaking into a microphone, 
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while engaged in a comedy performance, and while being filmed) somehow implicate them 
into the performance?  Do they suddenly pass from the serious realm into the non-serious 
realm through the force of a performative speech act?  Or does Bruce's dalliance at the 
nightclub’s threshold emphasize that - in Derridian terms - the outside is the inside, and that 
the force of his performance cannot be bracketed off to the non-serious context of the stage?  
At the beginning of this performance, Bruce states, “the theatre is make believe, that’s where 
it’s at.”  However, by physically standing at the boundary between the nightclub and the 
street in the last moments of his performance, Bruce further dramatizes the performative and, 
rather poetically, illustrates how the division between serious and non-serious contexts will 
not hold.15  
The performance given in The Lenny Bruce Performance Film is as close as Bruce 
ever came to the forensic defense he wanted to give.  His efforts to perform his act before the 
courts were never realized, and he was found guilty of obscenity in the New York case he 
defends in this performance. The Supreme Court rejected his appeal for review, although on 
December 23, 2003, Governor George Pataki posthumously pardoned him, the first such 
pardon in the history of the state (Kifner).   When Lenny Bruce died on August 3, 1966, a 
victim of an accidental overdose of morphine, he might have maintained - we can only 
assume - that he was also a victim of a failed act of communication: he never had the 
opportunity to transmit the accurate meaning of his act to the courts.   
                                                
15 Before Bruce exits the club to the street outside in the final seconds of The Lenny Bruce 
Performance Film - the second to last performance he would make before his death - his last 
words spoken on camera were vintage Lenny Bruce - irreverent, odd, sincere, funny:  “I 
really dug working with you, and good night, and as Will Rogers said, I never met a dyke I 




Up till now, I have been forwarding a position that Bruce's defense strategy in The 
Lenny Bruce Performance Film appears to be that if he could only introduce a more accurate 
version of his performance into the context of the courtroom, he could successfully 
communicate the accurate meaning of his act to the judges and they would then understand 
that his act was not obscene.  This line of thinking seems to hinge on the traditional 
communication model’s view of speech and gesture as superior to writing and on Austin’s 
failed attempts to segregate non-serious utterance from serious utterances based on definably 
stable contexts.  But perhaps Bruce’s position is more complex than that.  Perhaps Bruce, on 
some level, intuits that the effect he wants the courts to receive from his act actually resides 
in its performative force.  In the same way that he seems to be insisting on accuracy and on 
instilling himself as the point of origin of these utterances, another way to read this is that he 
is actually more interested in what his utterances do than in what they mean.  He appears to 
suggest as much in the bit cited above about how burlesque shows are advertised on Las 
Vegas marquees when he says, “The fact that the tittie, perhaps, is repugnant to the people, 
it's not the word.  Because Las Vegas, that’s the entertainment capital of the world, and the 
attraction’s not a Monet exhibit, it’s tits and ass.”  That is to say, the word “tittie” itself isn't 
offensive, but rather it is the force of the “tits and ass” Las Vegas performances that people 
have a problem with, because such performances have effects on audiences that trouble 
certain moral perspectives.16  The parallel that can be drawn here between Bruce’s act and a 
                                                
16 In the interest of the performative element of this essay, I'd be remiss if I failed to connect 
Bruce here to George Carlin's treatment of “tits” in his seminal 1972 bit “Seven Words You 
Can Never Say on Television” from the album Class Clown (an album Carlin dedicates to 
Lenny Bruce for “taking all the risks”).  In the bit, Carlin satirizes the absurd ratio of the 
400,000 total words in the English language to the seven words you can't say on television 
(“They must really be bad!”), taking particular umbrage with the inclusion of “tits” on the 
list:   
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“tits and ass” Vegas act is that the importance of both acts resides in their force and not their 
meaning.  The attraction of burlesque acts for people who go see them lies not in what they 
mean, their constative element – those are naked women – but in what they do to certain 
audiences, their performative element – those naked women are turning me on.   Because 
ultimately, Bruce is not campaigning for an opportunity to appear before the court and 
explain the literal meaning of his act to the judges, he is literally begging for the chance to 
perform his act again for them.  Likewise, he isn't asking for the opportunity to write out his 
own transcripts of his act for the courts to judge him on, but rather (in lieu of an in-person 
performance) wants to enter The Lenny Bruce Performance Film as evidence in his defense.  
Bruce might be theoretically naive in believing that by changing the context of his act he will 
change the meaningful outcome of his trial, and a more versed theoretical position might 
hold that a transcript and a film are both representations where meaning is but one of many 
possible outcomes, and, therefore, one context is unable to guarantee accurate meaning 
transmission more than any other context.  Yet Bruce, on some level, appears to be wrestling 
with the fact that the crux of his show lies in its performative force and not in its constative 
meaning, because he seems cognizant of the fact that the significance of his act resides 
                                                                                                                                                  
And tits doesn't even belong on the list, you know?  Yeah ... That's such a 
friendly sounding word.  Sounds like a nickname, right?  'Hey, Tits, come 'ere, 
man! Hey, Tits!  Hey!  Hey Tits, meet Toots, Toots, Tits, Tits, Toots, man!' 
Sounds like a snack, doesn't it, huh?  Yes, I know, it is, right, just that ... but I 
don't mean your sexist snack ... I mean new Nabisco Tits!  And new Cheese 
Tits!  And Corn Tits and ... Pizza Tits and Sesame Tits, Onion Tits ... Tater 
Tits ... Betcha can't eat just one, huh? 
Less levity is found in another connection between Carlin's bit and Bruce's performance; a 
version of “Seven Words” broadcast on WBAI New York in 1973 led to a lawsuit that was 
appealed all the way to the Supreme Court, who, in 1978, ruled in favor of the FCC. This 
decision formally established regulations in American broadcasting regarding times of the 




somewhere beyond the words themselves.  After all, he doesn’t want the judges to 
comprehend the precise meaning of his act as much as he wants to give them the experience 
of its performative force.  Because if he were able to give them the experience of his 
performance, the court might be provoked into a different kind of response, one that does not 
necessarily hinge on the meaning of the words in the act.  Bruce is hoping that by giving 
them the experience of his act’s performative force, he will succeed in provoking a specific 
response from the courts: laughter.  Bruce is a stand-up comedian, and like all stand-up 
comedians, audience laughter is the only name of the game. Whether or not the courts 
understand his act correctly is not necessarily important for Bruce’s purposes, a point 
Muckelbauer underscores in claiming, “One need not transmit the truth as a content in order 
to incite a response or persuade someone to act in accordance with this truth” (Future 18). 
Bruce might be theoretically naive in believing that by changing the context of his act he will 
change the meaningful outcome of his trial, but his actions do suggest an underlying intuition 
that language does more than just mean things and that his show contains within it a quality, 
a force, that can only be conveyed – and appreciated – through its performance. 
Finally, when we talk about this asignifying force of language as having the ability to 
provoke responses in an audience without principally appealing to meaning and 
understanding, we must take care to acknowledge that this force we talk about is not some 
monolithic entity, but a movement, a dynamic repetition that is always being created again 
and again in different contexts.  In other words, all force is not the same.  One of the 
contributions The Lenny Bruce Performance Film makes to the ongoing conversation on 
force within rhetoric is to dramatize the unique effects of a particular example of this force: 
laughter.  Laughter has held a long and tangled position in rhetoric’s historic conversation 
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about persuasion, as rhetoricians have indicated both a concern for and a guarded 
appreciation of its powerful effects on an audience.   Plato most pointedly shows dismay for 
laughter’s uncontrollable force when he famously derides laughter as a kind of malice 
exhibited by “the spiteful man [who] is pleased at his neighbor’s misfortunes,” (Philebus 
48b8-9).   In the Republic, he argues that laughter affects the human soul like a drug, 
intoxicating its rational part and making the individual more vulnerable to persuasion and 
influence.  Plato insists that, in his ideal kallipolis, any stories by poets that depict the gods as 
being overcome with laughter should be censored, since the gods should be beyond such 
unjust behavior: “Whenever anyone says such things about a god, we’ll be angry with him, 
refuse him a chorus, and not allow his poetry to be used in the education of the young” 
(383b10-c1).   Later rhetoricians didn’t share Plato’s extreme trepidation toward laughter, but 
a lingering anxiety about its powerful effects can still be discerned.  In the Ethics, Aristotle 
identifies a balance a subject should strive toward between “[t]hose who go to extremes in 
raising laughs […] vulgar buffoons,” and “[t]hose who would never say anything themselves 
to raise a laugh […] [the] boorish and stiff” (1128a5-13).  Cicero writes of laughter’s ability 
to “give pleasure to an audience,” an ability that he sees as, “often of great advantage to the 
speaker,” but he still maintains that, “jokes should be suppressed when there is no fair 
occasion for them” (Oratory II.LVI).  And Quintilian acknowledges the important talent of 
inspiring laughter because it “dispels the graver emotions” in an audience, but he likewise 
cautions that a subject must not “display his wit on every possible occasion, but must 
sacrifice a jest sooner that sacrifice his dignity” (Books IV-VI 449).  These positions are all 
concerned with how a speaking subject’s use, or misuse, of appeals to laughter will influence 
his or her ethos in the eyes of the audience.  In other words, laughter is viewed as just another 
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means of persuasion, but one that requires extra special care in how it is implemented.  Yet 
this view still implies that the speaking subjects at the center of the rhetorical situation can be 
trained to control appeals to laughter, even though they might need to exercise more caution 
when attempting to provoke it in certain audiences. 
The apprehension rhetoricians have long held toward laughter, however, reveals their 
recognition of its asignifying force that can escape an orator’s control and provoke 
unintended effects.  Cicero, for example, describes the effect of a joke on an audience as an 
explosive burst that becomes, “fixed in the mind of the hearer, before it appears possible to 
have been conceived” (On Oratory II.LIV).   Quintilian similarly notes, “the excitement of 
laughter” (Institutio Books IV-VI 6.3.23) as having, “a certain imperious force of its own 
which it is very hard to resist,” emphasizing that, “It often breaks out against our will and 
extorts confession of its power, not merely from our face and voice, but convulses the whole 
body as well” (6.3.9-12).   Given the powerful qualities of laughter’s force, Cicero and 
Quintilian maintain an intense respect for the potential dangers such a force can present an 
orator, and they therefore try to identify which of the strategies used to inspire laughter might 
be especially counterproductive to persuasion.  One such strategy singled out as being 
especially dangerous for the orator is the use of inappropriate words, or obscenities.  Cicero 
refutes, “indecency in language [is] a disgrace not only to the forum, but to any company of 
well-bred people” (On Oratory II.LXII) and Quintilian renounces obscenity as something 
that, “should not merely be banished from this language [of the forum], but should never 
even be suggested” (Books IV-VI 6.3.33-5).    
When considering the issues at stake in The Lenny Bruce Performance Film, then, in 
terms of these longstanding views within rhetoric about laughter’s potentials and pitfalls, this 
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particular performance proves especially significant, both because it joins the ancient 
rhetorical conversation on laughter’s unique force, and because it dramatizes the 
uncontrollable and potentially dangerous effects of this force that have concerned 
rhetoricians since antiquity.  In particular, this performance calls attention to the specific 
effects that can be provoked by the use of language defined as obscene.  The bursting forth of 
laughter that Quintilian believed was an “absolutely indispensible” skill for an orator to 
possess is clearly on display in the form of Lenny Bruce as a brilliant stand-up comedian, a 
contemporary version of the ancient orator who artfully uses laughter as his primary means 
of persuasion.  But also clearly on display are the potential dangers implicit when any subject 
invites an audience to laugh.  In The Lenny Bruce Performance Film, the dangerous effects 
of this force are manifested in very serious ways.  When we reflect on the cumulative effects 
of this force on Lenny Bruce’s life, the overwhelming results seem to rationalize the cautious 
approach rhetoricians have historically taken toward laughter.  The reason these rhetoricians 
approach laughter so cautiously is because what laughter places at risk is the subject itself.  
Laughter’s asignifying force exceeds the bounds of the subject and, therefore, cannot be 
controlled by the orator. The Lenny Bruce Performance Film shows us an example of such an 
unstable subject, a subject interrupted by the asignifying force of laughter.   
The Lenny Bruce Performance Film not only provides a dramatization of language’s 
asignifying force, but also allows us to focus on laughter as particularly powerful example of 
this force.   This unusual performance highlights the tension between the constative and the 
performative that Austin wrestled with and helps call attention to language’s myriad 
performative effects that are irreducible to questions of meaning and understanding.  
Through its unique demonstration of the language’s iterability, the film illustrates how no 
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context can guarantee a speaker’s intended meaning more than any other context because of 
the breaking force inherent within the structure of all language at the moment of its 
inscription.  In addition, it demonstrates how this breaking force not only applies to contexts 
and addressees, but also to addressors, as Bruce’s own subjectivity is called into question by 
way of how the multiple iterations of his are differently received by not only the courts, but 
by Bruce himself.  By virtue of these many attributes, this particular text makes a unique 
contribution to rhetoric.  It provides the conversation on asignification with an explicit 
example of a particular type of asignifying force, laughter, and the many unintentional and 
uncontrollable effects of that force.  It not only connects to the ancient discussions on 
laughter within rhetoric, but it also challenges them by demonstrating that no matter how 
well orators are trained, no matter how well their ethos is constructed, laughter is an 
uncontrollable force that often provokes unintended effects.  It therefore makes a 
contribution to what rhetoricians say about the subject, because it shows us that the orator at 
the center of the rhetorical situation does not get to control this particular force of laughter 
the way ancient rhetoricians wished he or she could.  
Even as I advocate for an increased focus on asignification, it is important to take a 
moment to stress that the intention here is not to move language’s role in provoking 
responses and effects into a privileged position in relation to language’s role at creating 
meaning and understanding; that move would simply be replacing one system with another.  
But in a field that remains largely devoted to epistemological concerns, The Lenny Bruce 
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Performance Film shifts the established focus from questions of meaning, signification, and 




















                                                
17 In closing, I leave you with the last lines of journalist Dick Schaap's eulogy to Lenny 
Bruce from Playboy magazine: “One last four-letter word for Lenny.  Dead.  At 40.  That's 




I’m So Glad You’re Fake: Postmodern Slapstick and the Creation of the Real 
 
This show features stunts performed by professionals and/or total idiots.  In 
either case, MTV suggests that neither you or [sic] any of your dumb little 
buddies attempt the dangerous crap in this show.   
 
- Disclaimer from the television program Jackass  
 
The longest-running scripted American television program, The Simpsons, features a 
recurring segment called “The Itchy and Scratchy Show,” a children’s show-within-a-show 
that depicts the ultra-violent anthropomorphic exploits of Itchy, a cartoon mouse, and 
Scratchy, a cartoon cat.18 The plotline of “Itchy and Scratchy” is unvarying: Itchy kills 
Scratchy.  Always.19  But the fashion in which this predictable outcome is achieved is 
remarkable because of the seemingly infinite ways in which Scratchy meets his gratuitously 
violent ends.  An episode called “Bang the Cat Slowly” begins with an innocent birthday 
party for Scratchy, but takes a dark turn when Itchy places a lit bomb into an empty box, uses 
Scratchy’s tongue to wrap the box as a present, and snaps the present into Scratchy’s mouth 
like a rubber band.  The bomb explodes, and Scratchy’s head is blown into the air, where it 
drifts back down only to be impaled on the spiked end of his own party hat.  Another 
episode, “Cat Splat Fever,” begins with Itchy leaving a suicide note for Scratchy to find.  
Scratchy sees Itchy throwing himself into a well, so he races into the back yard and leaps 
down after his friend.  As Scratchy falls, he passes Itchy sitting safely on a ledge, laughing 
                                                
18 Technically, “The Itchy and Scratchy Show” is itself a segment of “The Krusty the Clown 
Show,” the favorite television program of the three Simpson children, making “Itchy and 
Scratchy,” a show-within-a-show-within-a-show. 
19  The one exception was the episode, “Burning Down the Mouse,” of which Lisa Simpson, 
remarked, “This is the one where Scratchy finally gets Itchy.”  However, the Simpson’s 
television set gets unplugged in the middle of the episode and we, therefore, miss the one 
time Itchy gets his comeuppance.  When the television set gets plugged back in, Krusty the 
Clown declares that the network will never allow that episode of “Itchy and Scratchy” to be 
broadcast again.   
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hysterically.  Scratchy plunges to the bottom of the well and into the open mouth of a waiting 
alligator.  Now deceased, Scratchy’s dejected, harp-playing soul rises slowly back up the 
well only to again encounter Itchy, who shoots Scratchy’s ghost in the head with a revolver.  
And in “My Dinner With Itchy,” Itchy serves Scratchy what appears to be a glass of wine.  
Scratchy drinks it, screams in pain, and looks down to find that his body has been stripped to 
the skeleton from the neck down.  Itchy shows Scratchy the wine label, a skull and 
crossbones embossed with the word “ACID,” and throws his own glass into Scratchy’s face.  
His fur and flesh now completely burned off, Scratchy’s disoriented skeleton runs screaming 
from the restaurant and into the street, where he is flattened by a passing trolley car.  
Predictable as the sunrise, Itchy kills Scratchy.  Over and over and over and over again. 
 Within the context of The Simpsons, “Itchy and Scratchy” serves a dual purpose.  On 
the one hand, the creators of The Simpsons are clearly making a comment on the violent 
nature of mainstream entertainment and the voraciousness with which children consume it.  
After all, when each and every episode of “The Itchy and Scratchy Show” concludes, we see 
the Simpson children sitting on their couch laughing hysterically.  This juxtaposition of the 
graphically violent nature of “Itchy and Scratchy” with the overwhelming pleasure Bart, 
Lisa, and Maggie take in watching it occurs with the same monotonous regularity as the 
plotlines of “The Itchy and Scratchy Show.”  In other words, this creative choice by the 
creators performs the very statement they are trying to make: children become desensitized to 
violence with repeated exposure, children become desensitized to violence with repeated 
exposure, children become desensitized to violence with repeated exposure … On the other 
hand, however, The Simpsons is a situational comedy, and “The Itchy and Scratchy Show” 
serves a much more pragmatic purpose: it’s funny.  The more savagely poor Scratchy gets 
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taken out, the harder we laugh.  And even though it might initially seem sadistic to find great 
joy in such brutal depictions of violence (regardless of the make believe, cartoon format of 
the depictions), those of us amused by such things can’t help ourselves: we laugh anyway. 
 Traditionally, the discipline of humor theory would identify “The Itchy and Scratchy 
Show” as an example – albeit it a rather extreme one – of slapstick comedy. Slapstick is a 
physical form of comedy in which unruly actions are enacted upon a body in excessive, 
ridiculous, and sometimes, violent manners.  Because slapstick typically derives its response 
from an individual’s misfortune, whether that misfortune takes the form of a pie in the face 
or a fall down a flight of stairs, slapstick is considered a form of comedy that dramatizes the 
superiority theory of humor.  In The Philosophy of Humor and Laughter, John Morreall 
defines the superiority theory succinctly: “According to the Superiority Theory […] we laugh 
from feelings of superiority over other people, or over our own former position” (5).  Simply 
put, we feel better when someone else has it worse off than we do, even if that someone else 
is us at a previous moment in time.  The oldest of the primary three humor theories (the relief 
theory and the incongruity theory being the other two), the superiority theory traces its roots 
back to Plato.  Plato questioned the ethical and moral merits of laughter to varying degrees, 
because he believed certain types of laughter are “always directed at someone as a kind of 
scorn,” and he feared that the effects of laughter would lead the human soul away from its 
rational part and toward the part ruled by appetites and desires (5).  Today, the superiority 
theory is seen as somewhat outdated in the circles of humor theory, because, as Morreall 
states, we now accept that “there is no essential connection between laughter and scorn,” and 
“[t]he Superiority Theory turned out to be a classic case of a theory built on too few 
instances” (3).  However, its domination of the philosophical tradition for over two thousand 
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years has left an enduring legacy that is not universally accepted as positive.  Morreall, for 
one, laments the negative impact of laughter’s longstanding alignment with scorn has had on 
philosophy: “The sloppy theorizing that created and sustained the Superiority Theory has 
troubled the whole history of thought on laughter and humor” (4).  In other words, not only 
was laughter something traditionally taken as non-serious because of its jovial and whimsical 
effects, but when it was taken seriously, it often represented something spiteful in human 
nature that should be treated with great caution and skepticism.  
Despite its conflicted theoretical past, however, examples of the superiority theory, 
such as slapstick, represent some of the earliest and most enduring forms of comedy, with 
roots in Greek and Roman theatre that continue through to the present day.  For example, 
Aristophanes’ play The Frogs featured the excessively exaggerated whippings of the slave 
Xanthias and the god Dionysus by King Aeacus. Many of Shakespeare’s most famous 
comedies such as Two Gentlemen of Verona, Love’s Labour’s Lost, and A Comedy of Errors 
liberally employ slapstick as well, and the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
American vaudeville houses featured a style of slapstick that later found international fame in 
the “Golden Era” silent films starring the Keystone Cops, Charlie Chaplain, The Marx 
Brothers, Laurel and Hardy, and The Three Stooges.  In the 1960s, popular children’s 
cartoons such as Wile E. Coyote and the Roadrunner and Tom and Jerry (the latter of which 
clearly inspired Itchy and Scratchy’s grotesque cat and mouse satire some thirty years later) 
maintained slapstick’s popularity for new generations of television viewers.  So even as the 
superiority theory has fallen out of favor as an all-encompassing theory of humor, one of its 
most basic examples, slapstick, still endures.  Aeacus might have merely beaten Dionysus in 
Aristophanes’ The Frogs, whereas Itchy is burning Scratchy’s flesh off with acid in The 
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Simpsons, but the key tenant of the superiority theory is still present: in either case, we are 
laughing at the misfortune of someone, or something, else.    
The traditional argument for why the western world has been laughing at slapstick 
from 400 BCE to the present day has relied on a stable boundary that separates the real from 
the fake.  In Comedy: Meaning and Form, Robert Corrigan claims that comedy’s ability to 
produce the effect of laughter necessitates the absence of pain: 
Pain is never funny in itself.  Painful circumstances that turn out to have no 
serious consequences do provoke laughter.  In comedy, action has definite 
consequences, but these consequences have had all of the elements of pain 
and permanent defeat removed.  The pratfall is a fitting symbol of the comic.  
Even death is never taken seriously or considered as a serious threat in 
comedy.  (10-11) 
 
Even though, as the superiority theory claims, we laugh at the misfortune of others, the 
depths of our masochistic capacities are not limitless.  So while a pie in the face, a pointed 
insult, and a fall down a flight of stairs might all be examples of us laughing at other people’s 
misfortunes, the fall down the flight of stairs really requires us to believe that it is not really 
happening – that it’s fake – because the effects of a fall down a flight of stairs are potentially 
life threatening, whereas the effects of a pie in the face are generally nothing more than an 
embarrassing mess.  In other words, we’re capable of finding pleasure in malice, but we’re 
not that malicious.  Just as Plato wanted to outlaw the kinds of uncontrollable laughter that 
interrupts the rational soul’s pursuit of the good life, he still allowed for the kinds of 
laughters “which a healthy, self-controlled man has, and in general all those pleasures which 
accompany every kind of virtue” (Philebus 63e3-6).  Corrigan further refines comedy’s need 
to maintain the distinction between the real and the fake: 
[M]anifestations of the ludicrous must be made painless before they can 
become comic.  The writhings of the cartoon character who has just received a 
blow on the head, the violent events in some of Moliére’s plays, or the 
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mayhem committed by slapstick clowns remains funny only as long as it is 
quite clear that no pain is involved.  One reason why the violence of slapstick 
is so effective in films […] is that it is virtually impossible to fear for the 
characters, since the actors have no physical reality. (11) 
 
In other words, because we know Moe is not really poking Curly in the eye and hitting him 
in the head with a two-by-four, and we know Itchy isn’t really burning Scratchy with acid 
and shooting him in the head (they’re cartoon animals, after all), we are in some way 
authorized to laugh at these examples of violence because we accept them as fake.  These 
examples that would be quite serious if they were real, but because we know they are not, we 
can safely, and painlessly, find them funny.   
However, much in the same way that laughter shows us that the definition between 
the human and animal is not as stable as it appears, this comic boundary between pain and 
the absence of pain in slapstick comedy – between the original and the copy – is not as stable 
as it has traditionally appeared either.  For while the traditional view has been that slapstick 
produces laughter only when we know the performers’ “physical reality” is never in 
jeopardy, certain forms of what I call postmodern slapstick problematize this distinction.  
Examples of postmodern slapstick abound in the motion picture Jackass 3D, the final 
installment in the Jackass television series and film franchise.20 The postmodern slapstick 
                                                
20 For those unfamiliar, the basic premise for Jackass is rather down market and simplistic: 
people perform various pranks and stunts that produce self-inflicted injuries in order to 
conjure up laughter in the viewing audience. Conceptually, Jackass evolved out of the 1990s 
skateboarding culture celebrated in the magazine Big Brother, as several of the show’s 
creators and actors were professional skateboarders who contributed early versions of 
Jackass material to the magazine.  As such, the physical pranks captured in Jackass are 
oftentimes skateboarding related.  In one longer segment, blindfolded skateboarders skate 
over an elevated platform while medicine balls tethered to the ceiling swing across their path 
like wrecking balls.  In another very brief clip, an actor skates down a thirty-foot ramp and 
slams into a Plexiglas wall.  However, as the show’s production level has steadily increased, 
culminating with the third and most recent film being presented in 3D, the examples of 
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found in Jackass 3D differs from traditional forms of slapstick in several ways, the most 
significant of which is that the humorous appeals used in postmodern slapstick relies on the 
essential humanness of the actors.  Unlike traditional forms of slapstick, whose humor 
derives from producing images of actors lacking physical human reality, the appeals in 
Jackass 3D derive from images of actual painful and damaging effects inflicted upon the 
actors’ physical realities.  Here we’re not laughing in spite of the actors’ pain in postmodern 
slapstick, but because of it.   As such, postmodern forms of slapstick comedy present the 
images of their rhetorical appeals as being closer to the original, to the human, and to the real 
than traditional forms of slapstick.  The differences between postmodern and traditional 
slapstick are also rhetorical, in the sense that both forms present their humorous appeals to 
the audience in different manners.  In the case of traditional slapstick, the humorous appeals 
announce themselves to the audience as being explicitly produced.  The idea that we can 
laugh at Curly’s “pain” and the Coyote’s “pain” is because we know that this “pain” is not 
real.  It is clearly an image of pain that makes no effort to hide the fact that it is produced.  
However, in the case of postmodern slapstick, the humorous appeals in this form want to 
announce themselves to the audience as being non-produced, as being real images.  
Humorous appeals in postmodern slapstick must appear as essentially human and essentially 
real to function as such (“real” human pain is befalling the actors, and that’s what makes this 
form unique from other forms of slapstick), but the production of them – these images of 
human “realness” – and the means by which they are exchanged with the audience 
paradoxically raise questions about the essentialness of the original and of the human, 
because this sense of the real is ultimately an effect postmodern slapstick produces in itself.   
                                                                                                                                                  
postmodern slapstick have taken on a grander scope as well, as actors get gored by bulls, 
attacked by police dogs, attacked by bees, and fired out of cannons. 
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The humorous appeals used in the postmodern slapstick of Jackass 3D help us rethink 
the distinction between the original and the copy.  These questions have long been a 
foundational concern to rhetoric, traceable back to Plato’s sustained opposition between 
philosophy’s “original” truth and sophistry’s degraded copy of truth.  In The Sophist, Plato 
defines two different kinds of image-making, “the art of making likenesses, and phantastic or 
the art of making appearances” (264c).  Both the philosopher and the sophist create a 
resemblance of knowledge, though the former’s resemblance is always oriented toward 
Truth, while the latter’s is oriented toward persuasion.  Therefore, the sophist’s “art is 
illusory,” because the sophist “deceives us with an illusion,” and, as a result, “our soul is led 
by his art to think falsely” (263c).  In this way, sophistry and laughter are dangerous for Plato 
for the same reason: they lead people away from the rational part of their souls toward the 
part ruled by appetites and desires.  They both “deceive us with illusion,” and lead our souls 
to “think falsely.”  The philosopher’s resemblance of knowledge, because it respects the 
original, is a true copy of knowledge, but the sophist’s, because it shows no regard for the 
original, is a false copy of knowledge.  In terms of slapstick comedy, the notion of the true 
copy and the false copy are dramatized in the relationship between traditional and 
postmodern slapstick.  Both are copies of an original, “real,” pain.  While pain is difficult to 
define and distinguish because it, like laughter, is an emotion, the argument here is that both 
traditional slapstick and postmodern slapstick are producing images of pain for the purposes 
of creating humorous appeals for an audience.  But traditional slapstick maintains an 
appreciation for the distinction between the original and the copy because it always 
announces itself to the audience as a representation of actual pain, never suggesting that the 
injuries befalling the actors are real.  In that sense, it functions as a true copy, maintaining a 
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regard for the original. However, the humorous appeals captured in postmodern slapstick 
announce themselves to the audience not as representations of pain, but as actual pain.  But 
because they are still images, still dramatized as humorous appeals for the purposes of 
making an audience laugh, they are also still a copy of real pain.  So postmodern slapstick 
does not show the same regard for the original and the copy as does traditional slapstick; it 
functions as a false copy.  But since both forms are still images of physical violence befalling 
people, they can – at times – resemble each other.  For Plato, this is the risk of representation 
and the reason why the sophist is such a danger: because both the philosopher’s copy of 
knowledge and the sophist’s copy of knowledge resemble each other, it is difficult to 
distinguish the difference between the two.  Muckelbauer suggests that the effects of the 
sophist’s false copy are so troublesome to Plato because the sophist claims to be a teacher of 
wisdom but he is “a pretender to this lofty lineage, a counterfeiting thief whose very presence 
threatens the proper inheritance of wisdom” (“Sophistic Travels” 228).  In other words, the 
sophist possesses the resemblance of knowledge on all subjects, but this knowledge is not 
original knowledge, and, therefore, falsely leads us away from the pursuit of original 
knowledge.  And because it is difficult to tell the difference between the philosopher’s 
resemblance of knowledge and the sophist’s, we might not even know we are following the 
wrong one.  So, as Muckelbauer suggests, what the false copy, or simulacrum, places at risk 
is the very idea of there being an original at all: “Resemblance is the very condition for 
Plato's dialectical movement; that the sophists knowledge and the philosopher's knowledge 
resemble each other places the dynamic of resemblance and, therefore, dialectical thought, at 
stake (233).  The postmodern slapstick of Jackass 3D also functions as a simulacrum that 
places the distinction between the original and the copy at risk.  Humorous appeals in 
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Jackass 3D are structured to produce the sense of the real in the audience vis-à-vis images 
that dramatize injuries to the physical reality of the actors.  Because these appeals are 
presented to the audience as images amplified and manipulated by cinematic enhancements 
such as high-definition 3D technology, however, this sense of the real that the actors are 
experiencing gets called into question.  In other words, much of what appears as real in 
postmodern slapstick are actually effects of a false copy, effects that are ultimately more for 
the audience’s sense of real than they are for the actors.  
 In order for the postmodern slapstick in Jackass 3D to distinguish its humorous 
appeals from those of traditional forms of slapstick, the film must always be actively working 
to produce a sense of the real in its own performances.  One important way it does this is by 
means of presenting something fake to contrast itself against.  In Simulacra and Simulation, 
Jean Baudrillard notes that fake spaces like Disneyland function to produce a sense of the 
real in the surrounding city of Los Angeles: 
Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest 
is real, whereas all of Los Angeles and the America that surrounds it are no 
longer real, but belong to the hyperreal order of simulation.  It is no longer a 
question of a false representation of reality (ideology) but of concealing the 
fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality principle.  (12-
13) 
 
So just as the boundary surrounding the Magic Kingdom and all its imaginary “play of 
illusions and phantasms” must remain distinct from the city around it in order to for the 
conception of something of a “real city” to be possible, the boundary surrounding Jackass 3D 
must establish a similar boundary between its postmodern slapstick and the more traditional 
forms (12).  In this way Jackass 3D and Disneyland follow inverse paths to creating a sense 
of the real: Disneyland produces a sense of realness in Los Angeles by calling attention to its 
own lack of reality, whereas Jackass 3D constructs its own sense of reality by calling 
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attention to what is fake around it.  For example, in the opening interlude, the film presents 
an image of a traditional form of slapstick humor – one in which the physical reality of the 
actors is never at risk – to contrast its postmodern forms of slapstick against. The first image 
viewers see on screen in the film’s interlude is Butthead, half of the imbecilic cartoon 
comedy duo Beavis and Butthead.  Butthead’s purpose appears to be to explain to the 
audience that the movie they are about to see will be presented using 3D technology: “You 
will see the Jackasses as never before.”  His partner Beavis then joins in to explain, “in order 
to experience this new dimension, you must put on the special glasses that you were given in 
the lobby.” Butthead looks down at his own hand and says, “Whoa!  Beavis, look at my 
hand! It’s in 3D!”  Beavis, the more moronic of the two, begins to say, “Really? It really 
doesn’t look too different …” but his response is interrupted by a punch in the face from 
Butthead that seems so real to Beavis, it convinces him of the authenticness of the 3D 
technology: “Whoa!  That’s amazing!  It felt like you really hit me!”  Beavis continues on 
about the “amazing technology,” as Butthead continues to punch and slap him about the head 
and face.  This interlude concludes with Butthead saying, “So sit back and enjoy the movie,” 
as he slaps Beavis one more time for good measure, punctuating his last slap with his 
infamous tagline, “Dumbass.”   
While an argument could be made that this segment merely performs the utilitarian 
“how-to-put-on-your-3D glasses” purpose that all 3D films must apparently meet (a 
seemingly unnecessary sort of cinematic regulation along the lines of how the airline industry 
still insists on instructing millions of human beings on how to put on a seat belt before each 
and every takeoff), Beavis and Butthead’s inclusion here serves the larger purpose of 
demonstrating how traditional slapstick comedy differs from the postmodern forms found in 
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Jackass 3D.  For one, while the juvenile sense of humor found in Beavis and Butthead might 
aesthetically be in concert with what will follow in the main event, their performance of 
cartoon slapstick places Jackass 3D squarely within the tradition of slapstick comedy, while 
also providing it with a point of divergence from that same tradition.  Like Tom and Jerry 
and “The Itchy and Scratchy Show,” Beavis and Butthead’s cartoon version of slapstick 
comedy is a non-human form of the genre.  As such, it dramatizes the idea that traditional 
slapstick comedy’s success as a form of comedy precludes the absence of pain.   Butthead 
can beat Beavis all day and night, and, even though we might take some pleasure in watching 
this (partially because Beavis is a character that quickly gets under the skin), we ultimately 
know that no harm is ever coming to either of them.  Furthermore, the “new dimension” 
Beavis makes reference to in the interlude, the incorporation of the 3D technology itself, 
enhances the manner in which Jackass 3D transgresses the boundary between the real and the 
fake.  The entire purpose of 3D, from a cinematic standpoint, is to take the two-dimensional 
format of film and represent it in a manner that more closely resembles real life (a fact 
reflected in the name of today’s preeminent 3D company: Real3D).  In other words, 3D 
technology, both rhetorically and, in a way, “physically,” is always structured toward the 
audience, toward the outside.  It is not there for the actors, not there for the original action, 
but for the audience.  It attempts to produce a visual copy of the action and bring it closer 
(literally, visually closer) to the audience.  But in this effort to produce a more “real” copy of 
the original action, it loses all regard for the original because it is always structured outside, 
always away from the original, always toward the audience. When Butthead slaps Beavis in 
the face, his hand reaches out into the audience and swings right in front of our own faces, as 
well, never touching, of course.  We are still in the free play of cinematic fantasy, yet this 
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gesture provides an authentic approximation – a spatial closeness that Tom and Jerry could 
never approach – that stimulates the perception of the boundary between the real and the fake 
making it appear more illusory than we might often admit.  Much like, as Baudrillard argues, 
Los Angeles relies on Disneyland and other theme-parks such as “Enchanted Village, Magic 
Mountain, Marine World […] imaginary stations that feed reality, the energy of the real to a 
city whose mystery is precisely that of no longer being anything but a network of incessant, 
unreal circulation” (13), Jackass 3D also relies on “imaginary stations.”  The explicit non-
reality of cartoon performances and twenty-first century cinematic technology help maintain 
a distinction between fake forms of humorous appeals found in traditional slapstick and the 
sense of the real that Jackass 3D wants to construct in its own postmodern slapstick.  In other 
words, the technological amplification produced by Beavis and Butthead’s cameo at the 
beginning of Jackass 3D sets the stage for the non-cartoon performances that will follow, 
performances that will contrast the non-human cartoon slapstick against the human 
postmodern slapstick, as both extremes are continually enhanced by Real3D. 
Jackass 3D’s further produces a sense of the real in its forms of postmodern slapstick 
by way of the disclaimer.  Every iteration of Jackass, from the earliest television series to the 
final feature film, has begun (and ended) with a disclaimer about the stunts contained within 
the film.  The epigraph that begins this chapter is taken from the very first television episode 
of Jackass that aired on MTV in 2000.  In it, we see an air of informality, both in the lax 
grammar of the copy (neither you or …) and in the casual irreverence of the semantic 
references to “total idiots,” “dumb little buddies,” and “dangerous crap.”  In total, this 
disclaimer tries to downplay its authority and seeks to fit in as part of the show itself, sharing 
in the anti-intellectual, anti-authoritarian spirit of the performances that will follow.  By the 
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time we get to Jackass 3D, however, the disclaimer has evolved along with the show’s 
performance budget, becoming appreciably more grown up (i.e. more legally binding) in the 
process:  “WARNING:  The stunts in this movie are performed by professionals, so for your 
safety and the protection of those around you, do not attempt any of the stunts you are about 
to see.”  Gone are the references to “total idiots,” (apparently they’re strictly professionals 
now), “dumb little buddies,” and “dangerous crap,” and they’ve apparently run the copy past 
a high school English teacher as well, as the either/or, neither/nor grammatical faux pas 
found in the earlier version has been corrected.  Additionally, not only does this disclaimer 
present a more formal written appearance, it is also read aloud by a young but serious-
enough-sounding male, ensuring that even those movie goers trying to send out one final text 
message before the film starts will at least hear the warning, reflecting a clear effort on the 
production company’s part to cover its legal bases in every manner possible.  Because, 
ultimately, that is what a disclaimer of this sort is intended to do: we told you letting a snake 
bite your penis was a dangerous idea, so you can’t sue us if you decide to do it anyway.  As 
the production value of the film increases, so does the film’s budget, and so does the film’s 
overall exposure and risk, all of which invites the legal team to step in and remind us all that 
not everything in life is a joke.  The moral here is even Jackasses have to grow up sometimes, 
and in Hollywood, no matter how fantastically whimsical the story you are selling may be, 
money is always very, very real.  Ultimately, though, the disclaimer in Jackass 3D performs 
an additional role in that it declares that the film’s performances of postmodern slapstick put 
the actor’s safety at risk.  Quite literally, it tells us that the postmodern slapstick in the movie 
you are about to watch is so real that it can hurt you.  The disclaimer explicitly draws a 
distinct boundary around Jackass 3D that divides it from all previous, traditional forms of 
 
 149 
slapstick comedy, and, in doing so, connects postmodern slapstick more explicitly with the 
human.   
In the near five hundred years Shakespeare’s comedies have been staged, disclaimers 
have never (at least this explicitly) been an aspect of their productions.  The same is true for 
the cartoon slapstick of Tom and Jerry and “Itchy and Scratchy”; Tom and Jerry has been 
entertaining children for over fifty years with physically violent forms of Saturday morning 
entertainment without any kind of warning, which is precisely what the sensationalized 
violence of “Itchy and Scratchy” satirizes.  Even the 2012 Farrelly Brothers’ reproduction of 
The Three Stooges manages to avoid warning the audience about the dangerousness of the 
pranks and stunts contained within, even though non-cartoon depictions of eyes being poked 
and hair being pulled are clearly actions that could be quite dangerous.  In all of these 
examples of traditional slapstick, the assumption appears to be that we know enough to know 
that what we are seeing on the screen is fake, and, therefore, we don’t have to be warned 
otherwise; this boundary has been historically repeated and maintained to such an extent that 
no one even questions it anymore.  However, this clear-cut distinction cannot be assumed 
with postmodern forms of slapstick.  The image of the disclaimer serves to explicitly address 
the physical reality of the human actors and to make the audience aware of how these forms 
of slapstick differ from traditional forms.  But the disclaimer, like the 3D technology of the 
film itself, shows no regard for the original events.  It shows no regard for the original, 
physical reality of the actors (they obviously didn’t heed its advice), but is instead turned 
toward the audience.  It dramatizes the film itself as a false copy, or simulacrum, as always 
turning away from the original, always structured toward the audience.   Jackass 3D uses the 
disclaimer to further set up how its humorous appeals in the form of postmodern slapstick 
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continually reproduce a sense of the real by maintaining the perception that traditional 
slapstick is as fake as Disneyland. 
By using traditional forms of slapstick and the image of the disclaimer at the film’s 
outset, Jackass 3D sets the stage for the audience to receive a heightened sense of the real 
within the film’s postmodern comedic form.  In Baudrillard’s terms, the humorous appeals 
found in these postmodern slapstick skits dramatize how the simulacrum threatens this 
distinction between the original and the copy because it doesn’t imply a presence, or a regard 
for an original, but an absence, which calls into question the principle of reality itself: 
To dissimulate is to pretend to have what one has.  To simulate is to feign to 
have what one doesn’t have.  One implies a presence, the other an absence.  
But it is more complicated than that because simulating is not pretending: 
‘Whoever fakes an illness can simply stay in bed and make everyone believe 
he is ill.  Whoever simulates an illness produces in himself some of the 
symptoms’ (Littré).  Therefore, pretending, or dissimulating, leaves the 
principle of reality intact: the difference is always clear, it is simply masked, 
whereas simulation threatens the difference between the ‘true’ and the ‘false,’ 
the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary.’  Is the simulator sick or not, given that he 
produces ‘true’ symptoms? (3) 
 
While the simulation produced by Jackass 3D is not a technically a kind of sickness 
(although a case could probably be made), its postmodern slapstick does appear to want to 
give the appearance that “true” symptoms are being produced in the actors.  For in traditional 
slapstick, we clearly see a form of dissimulation, or of pretending to have what one does not 
have – pain – in a way that leaves the distinction between real and fake intact.  Traditional 
slapstick implies presence.  However, while the postmodern slapstick in Jackass 3D produces 
the symptoms of pain in the actors, the production of these symptoms, as images structured 
toward the audience, is enhanced in ways that have no regard for the original actions. 
Two specific skits from Jackass 3D dramatize how the film problematizes the 
distinction between the original and the copy.  The two bits, “Beehive Tetherball,” and 
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“Gorilla in a Hotel Suite,” demonstrate the lengths to which postmodern slapstick will go to 
create a sense of the real.  Additionally, because both of these bits feature humor created by 
bringing together the human and the animal, looking at them together helps further 
complicate the human-animal relationship that has been viewed as foundational in traditional 
theories of humor.  As Simon Critchley writes: 
Humour is human.  Why?  Well, because the philosopher, Aristotle, says so.  
In On the Parts of the Animals, he writes, ‘no animal laughs save Man.’ This 
quotation echoes down the centuries from Galen and Porphyry, through 
Rabelais to Hazlitt and Bergson.  Now, if laughter is proper to the human 
being, then the human being who does not laugh invites the charge of 
inhumanity, or at least makes us somewhat suspicious. (On Humour 25) 
 
From this traditional perspective, laughter lends a sort of authenticity to the human 
experience of humor, sequestering it from the experiences of other animals.  This makes 
laughter more “real” to the human being than to the animal, because in the animal kingdom, 
so the traditional view goes, laughter is impossible.  Therefore, any reference to an animal 
laughing must be fake (Itchy the cartoon mouse laughing at Scratchy’s repeated demise, for 
example) and naturally divided from the authentic experience of human laughter.21  While 
the skits included do not overtly engage in the debate about animal laughter, they do rely on a 
certain distinction between human and animal in order to perform their forms of postmodern 
slapstick, while simultaneously teasing at this distinction. 
 The first skit, “Beehive Tetherball,” is a quintessential example of postmodern 
slapstick performed within the Jackass oeuvre.  The skit produces its humorous appeal by 
celebrating the pain of two Jackass actors and, in doing so, revisits Plato’s early 
                                                
21 However, as Chapter One explained, chimpanzees produce identifiable laugh types when 
responding to other laughing chimps and lab rats are attracted to other lab rats who exhibit 
frequent laughing chirps.  So this traditional distinction is becoming eroded as the human 
increasingly moves closer to the animal and vice versa. 
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apprehensions about how malicious forms of humorous appeals interrupt the subject’s 
rational pursuit of the good life.  In the skit, actors Steve O and Dave England are 
(minimally) dressed as bears:  furry bear ears, wristbands, sneakers, and underwear briefs.   
The bears play a game of tetherball using a beehive as the ball.  The skits protracted setup, 
featuring testimony from a professional beekeeper and a predatory animal expert, produces 
the sense that the actors are in very real danger.  The beekeeper, commenting on the roughly 
50,000 bees in the hive that will be used in the skit, all but guarantees the punchline will be 
delivered: 
Camera Operator: What do you think the chances are of these guys getting 
stung today? 
   Bee Keeper: They’re gonna get stung.  Yeah, there’s no doubt in my mind, 
  when you hit a ball full of bees, you’re going to get stung. 
 
After establishing sting certainty, the predatory animal expert quantifies the range of danger 
as it pertains to bee stings, a testimony that serves to further ratchet up the drama surrounding 
the skit’s pain and safety levels: 
  Steve O: How many bee stings do you think we can take? 
  Predatory animal expert: I think it takes about a hundred to kill a man. 
  Dave England: What? 
  Steve O: There’s 50,000 bees in there … 
  England: Did you just make that up?  Please? 
 
The skit unfolds much as one would expect.  Steve O and England, before they even take 
their places around the tether ball, are clearly getting stung, as bees swarm around the 
dangling tether ball and frantic voices from off-frame (“This is gonna be gnarly now, man!”; 
“I’m already getting hit!”; “Come on! Do it! Do it!  Do it!  Do it!”) highlight the moment’s 
precariousness.  Loomis Fall, playing the role of referee (and getting stung himself), 
introduces the skit while screaming in pain: “Got a butt-ton of bees!  My two sexy players! 
This is Beehive Tetherball!  Game on!”  Steve O and England hit the ball back and forth 
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about a half dozen times, all the while screaming, swearing, and swatting bees from their face 
and legs, before England finally submits and runs from the frame, screaming, “I can’t do it 
anymore!!!”  As England flees in pain, the promise of postmodern slapstick in the skit 
becomes successfully realized: everyone (actors, crew, predatory animal expert) gets 
repeatedly stung by bees.  Rather than being sidestepped here, pain is celebrated, and, as a 
result, laughter is produced in the audience (again, that is, if you’re in to this sort of thing).   
 “Beehive Tetherball” realistically represents the painful experience of getting stung 
by bees and, by this logic, might be simply seen as inverting the pain/absence of pain binary 
upon which traditional slapstick comedy relies. However, even though laughing at the misery 
of Steve O and England’s beestings is clearly an example of the superiority theory of humor, 
this skit’s effects are not reducible to flipping this pain/absence of pain binary by capturing 
the base, animalistic, and painful experience of postmodern slapstick on film in a humorous 
way.  Instead, the formal cinematic techniques used in the production of the skit both create 
and perform a simulation that is structured toward the audience and produces effects that 
exceed the naturalness of the skit’s bee sting premise, raising questions about the distinctions 
between original and copy, human and non-human.  Throughout the skit, scenes highlight 
certain safety considerations that the film’s dialogue does not explicitly call attention to.   For 
example, while Loomis Fall introduces the skit (with bees already stinging Steve O, England, 
and Fall himself), standing in the background – yet still clearly in frame – is the predatory 
animal expert, who is holding a long spear with a sharp metal point at one end.  One assumes 
that this man and his spear are nearby in the event things take a turn for the worse.  Similarly, 
after England flees the game, a camera follows him as he sprints through an open field, arms 
flailing, in an effort to get as far away from the bees as possible.  When the camera operator 
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finally catches up to him, he is hysterical and begins to sob (“Oh, fuck! … Oh, Dude … It 
fucking hurts! … Oh god … Oh fuck!”) as bees continue to swarm him (“Please put me 
somewhere where there’s no bees!”).  As England pleads for help, parked behind him and 
very much in frame is an ambulance, present, like the predatory animal expert, to provide 
assistance to the actors.  Of course there are pragmatic purposes for having these safety 
measures in place when you are filming a skit like “Beehive Tetherball,” but the filmmakers 
make decisions to include these specific safety measures in the film’s final cut.  These 
choices effectively transform the ambulance and predatory animal expert from their original 
pragmatic purpose in the scene into images or props that produce effects exceeding their 
original purposes.  Exchanged now as images not limited by their roles on set, these props 
further the film’s efforts to produce a sense of the real by enhancing the overall image of 
danger and risk inherent in the skit’s production of postmodern slapstick.   
To take this a step further, “Beehive Tetherball” creates another image of heightened 
danger by means of the film production technique “Foley.”  Foley is the use of reproduced 
sound effects, which are added during postproduction to subtly enhance the sonic realism of 
a scene.  Throughout Jackass 3D, Foley is liberally employed to heighten the sense of 
physical impact dramatized in the postmodern slapstick skits.  For example, in the recurring 
“Rocky” skits, where actors are snuck up on from behind and punched in the face while the 
Rocky theme plays, and in “Roller Buffalo,” where Johnny Knoxville is run over by a 
charging buffalo while wearing roller skates, Foley is added to the slow-motion replays of 
each scene, enhancing the moment of impact with more sonically dramatic sound effects that 
exceed the original sound captured by the microphones on set.  Similarly, in “Beehive 
Tetherball,” Foley is used to create the image of an ongoing sense of dread by means of the 
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din of buzzing bees.  Throughout the different scenes edited together to create the skit, the 
loud sound of buzzing bees is always present at both a decibel level and a consistency that 
clearly exceeds the crew’s sustained physical proximity to the hive.  In an effort to capture 
the real effects of postmodern slapstick, “Beehive Tetherball” employs artificially 
reproduced sound effects added to the film’s soundtrack long after the scene has been filmed; 
the fake is used, as it is throughout Jackass 3D, to create the sense of the real.  Perhaps this 
paradoxical process of producing the real by means of artificial cinematic enhancement is 
best dramatized in the exchange between England and an off camera crewmember shortly 
after England comes to terms with the unfortunate mathematical equation of 50,000 bees + 
100 bee stings = death.  England, with obvious concern, asks, “So what are we doing here?” 
to which an off camera voice responds, “We’re making a hit movie.” 
While “Beehive Tetherball” transforms precautionary safety measures and employs 
Foley sound effect techniques to create images that artificially produce a sense of danger, the 
“Gorilla in a Hotel Suite” skit functions somewhat inversely, creating a sense of real danger 
with an “authentic” image of fake danger.  The “Gorilla” skit is a variation on postmodern 
slapstick in a sense, because unlike “Beehive Tetherball,” for example, physical pain is not 
intended to befall any of the actors.  Instead, the punchline for “Gorilla in a Hotel Suite” is 
the emotional trauma that actor Bam Margera’s parents, April and Phil, experience when 
they check into their hotel suite and encounter a full-grown gorilla. The animal is fake, 
nothing more than actor Chris Pontius in an extremely realistic gorilla suit.  April and Phil, of 
course, don’t know this.  This scenario is further enhanced by the fact that April and Phil 
have been recipients of countless pranks at the hands of their son over the years, both in the 
Jackass franchise and in a spin off television production starring their son called Viva la 
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Bam, so there is a strong precedent that the element of chaos makes occasional, unexpected 
appearances in these people’s lives.  This particular skit, however, tries to exploit that 
precedent by making it appear that this is not a prank, per se, but a prank gone wrong.  The 
“Gorilla in a Hotel Suite” does not perform a real prank, but a copy of a prank, a prank that is 
fake.  What this skit dramatizes is the impossibility of staging an illusion in the era of 
simulation, when images are only exchanged with each other.  As Baurdillard writes, “The 
impossibility of rediscovering an absolute level of the real is of the same order as the 
impossibility of staging illusion.  Illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer 
possible” (19).  In other words, faking a prank shows us that a real prank is, itself, just a 
performance produced in the image of all the pranks that came before it.  Staging a real prank 
and an illusion of a prank are both made impossible in the era of the hyperreal, as Baudrillard 
argues in his depiction of a fake holdup:  
Organize a fake holdup.  Verify that your weapons are harmless, and take the 
most trustworthy hostage, so that no human life will be in danger (or one 
lapses into the criminal).  Demand a ransom, and make it so that the operation 
creates as much commotion as possible – in short, remain close to the ‘truth,’ 
in order to test the reaction of the apparatus to a perfect simulacrum.  You 
won’t be able to do it: the network of artificial signs will become inextricable 
mixed up with real elements […] in short, you will immediately find yourself 
once again, without wishing it, in the real, one of whose functions is precisely 
to devour any attempt at simulation, to reduce everything to the real – that is, 
to the established order itself. (20) 
 
What this suggests, therefore, is that a real holdup is really just a re-enactment of the genre of 
the holdup, showing us that “if it is practically impossible to isolate the process of 
simulation, through the force of inertia of the real that surrounds us, the opposite is also true 
[…] it is now impossible to isolate the process of the real, or to prove the real,” a point the 
“Gorilla in a Hotel Suite” exemplifies (21).    
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In the skit, hidden cameras capture the action in both the hallway outside the hotel 
suite and from various angles inside.  As soon as April and Phil enter the suite, two cast 
members in the hallway lock April and Phil inside.  The gorilla appears, dragging a potted 
plant into the frame and making aggressive sounds and gestures that, obviously, terrify April 
and Phil, who flee to a corner of the suite, where they watch through a doorway as the gorilla 
destroys the room.  April screams uncontrollably while Phil tries unsuccessfully to leave 
through the sealed off front door.  Singer/songwriter and actor Will Oldham, in a cameo 
appearance as the panicked gorilla trainer, runs into the scene and tries to establish control 
over the animal: “No, no, no, no, no!  It’s ok, it’s ok, it’s ok!  This is Sampson, this is 
Sampson, just, don’t make eye contact.  Sampson down, be quiet.  He’s a good boy, he wants 
to be a good boy, he’s a good boy.  Just don’t make eye contact.  No sudden movements.  
Don’t make eye contact.” Oldham then tries to communicate with the gorilla by means of a 
series of grunts, a strategy that quickly fails as the gorilla knocks him across the room.  At 
this moment, the skit appears to blow its own cover, as a cameraman runs from a closet 
screaming, “Get out!  Get out of here!”  What is being performed here is a pretend failure, a 
skit turned bad because it has gotten dangerously away from the cast and crew to such an 
extent that any further effort to maintain the artifice would not be in the interest of 
everyone’s safety.  The joke, however, is that this chaos, this apparently failed prank, is all 
part of the act, all part of the process of creating a fake copy of a real prank.  The front door 
of the suite is finally opened, and the cast and crew take positions at one end of the hotel 
hallway while the trainer appears to hold the gorilla at bay at the other.  From this position of 
relative safety, an overwrought April and her son have the following exchange, with the cast 
and crew all feigning the same level of fear and trepidation April is projecting: 
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April: Oh my god, I never saw a gorilla before. 
Bam: He’s tame. 
April: He’s not tame, he just wrecked the whole room! 
Bam: Well, no, there’s a fucking trainer there. 
April: Big deal!  Did this go wrong or something? 
Bam: Kinda. 
 
The power of the image to produce a sense of the real is exemplified April’s terrified 
response, as she still believes she is in the presence of real gorilla: “What was supposed to 
happen? […] What was it supposed to be just fun or something?”22  Poor Phil’s response, 
however, might prove more indicative of skit’s performative force, as we come to find out 
that he was so scared by what he thought was a rampaging gorilla in his hotel suite that he 
sought refuge from the attack in the bathroom.  As the camera crew heads back into the suite 
to check on him, Phil, from off-camera, utters a dejected, “I shit myself.”  Ultimately, the 
fake prank reveals its full artifice when the gorilla breaks character and begins to speak: “I 
need this thing off, I can’t breathe.  I need this off.”  April, upon overhearing the gorilla 
speak, gets wise to what is afoot: “Is that a person?  That’s a fricking person!”  Oldham steps 
in and removes the mask, revealing the sweaty, smirking Pontius inside.  The gig is up, and a 
sense of the real has been restored.  April, after taking a fresh inventory of the scenario, 
embraces the now headless gorilla and declares, with a palpable relief that underscores the 
impossibility of staging an illusion, “I’m so glad you’re fake!”   The illusion has been 
revealed, dramatizing Baudrillard’s point that real pranks function in the same manner: 
This is how all the holdups, airplane hijackings, etc. are now in some sense 
simulation holdups in that they are already inscribed in the decoding and 
orchestration rituals of the media, anticipated in their presentation and their 
possible consequences.  In short, where they function as a group of signs 
dedicated exclusively to their recurrence as signs, and no longer at all to their 
‘real’ end.  But this does not make them harmless.  On the contrary, it is as 
                                                
22 A funny coincidence apropos to this bit is that all the Jackass cast members always refer to 
April by her nickname: Ape. 
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hyperreal events, no longer with a specific content or end, but indefinitely 
refracted by each other […] it is in this sense that they cannot be controlled by 
an order that can only exert itself on the real and rational. (21) 
 
The fact that the gorilla was fake did not render it harmless, as April’s blood pressure level 
and Phil’s intestinal discord clearly attest.  Instead, the preexisting genre of the prank 
precedes this attempt to fake a prank, showing that no “real” prank could ever succeed 
without this same preexisting “recurrence of signs.”  It is the simulacrum that precedes the 
original and gives the original its own sense of authenticity. 
The notion of the true copy and the false copy are dramatized in the relationship of 
traditional slapstick and postmodern slapstick.  Traditional slapstick maintains an 
appreciation for the distinction between the original and the copy because it always 
announces itself to the audience as a representation of actual pain, never suggesting that the 
injuries befalling the actors are real.  In fact, the humorous appeals in traditional slapstick 
rely on this distinction to function in the first place.  We can laugh at Curly’s eye pokes 
because we know the human being playing Curly isn’t getting hurt, and the Coyote’s injuries 
are similarly authorized because he is a cartoon and not a human at all.  Thus, traditional 
slapstick is a copy, but because it maintains a distinction between the original and the copy, it 
is a true copy.  Postmodern slapstick, on the other hand, blurs this distinction.  The humorous 
appeals captured in the postmodern slapstick of Jackass 3D announce themselves to the 
audience not as representations of pain, but as actual pain.  However, because Jackass 3D is 
a film it is still a copy of the real.  By employing various cinematic techniques to enhance 
this production of the real, Jackass 3D does not maintain the same distinction between the 
real and the copy that traditional slapstick relies on; therefore, Jackass 3D is a false copy that 
lacks the concern for the original.  Both traditional slapstick and postmodern slapstick are 
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copies, and both copies, in a sense, resemble each other.  But because the postmodern 
slapstick is a false copy, a simulacrum with no concern for the original, it calls into question 
the distinction between the original and the copy.23  
  














                                                
23 On a closing note, the final on-screen image in Jackass 3D is a callback to the film’s 
opening disclaimer.  Read in the same youthful, yet serious tone as the opening montage, this 
disclaimer also looks backwards in the past tense, as it tries to buttress any nostalgic impulse 
that this closing montage and the film itself may have inspired in the movie going audience: 
REMINDER: The stunts in this movie were performed by professionals, so 
for your safety and the protection of those around you, do not attempt any of 
the stunts you have just seen. 
In other words, it still takes a professional Jackass to be a real Jackass, so don’t try to fake it.  





So I Don’t Even Know My Own Name?: Approaching Alterity in Soundboard Prank Phone 
Calls 
 
Wouldn’t you typically just hang up on a weirdo? 
- Howard Stern 
 
[A telephone rings.  An older male (interlocutor A) answers the phone at his 
home and begins a conversation with celebrity fitness advocate and Deal-A-
Meal entrepreneur Richard Simmons (interlocutor B).  Interlocutor A does not 
recognize interlocutor B.] 
 
A: Hello? 
B: For all these years I wondered, what I would ever say if I ever  
found you. 
A: Who is this? 
B: My name is Cheryl.  I believe I am your daughter. 
A: Uh … you must have the wrong number. 
B: Oh my god.  My name is Cheryl.  And I’m your daughter. 
A: I don’t have a daughter named Cheryl. 
B: Please tell me why you’re doing this to yourself? 
A: What do you mean why I’m doing this to myself?  You better get  
off this phone before I call the telephone company and have 
them come git’cha. 
B: I don’t like this new attitude of yours. 
A: Well you don’t have to like it!  Just get off my phone! 
[A Hangs up.] 
 
[Telephone Rings again …] 
A: Hello. 
B: I just want you, to be my mom. 
A: You want what? 
B: I just want you, to be my mom. 
A: How can a man be a mom? 
B: Well, I’ll think about it … 
A: Well you better think a long, long time and don’t dial this number  
again. 
B: I mean for your whole life you knew nothing about me. 
A: And I don’t want to know anything about ya’, now, I just want you  
to get off my phone and leave me alone. 
B: I’m so sorry. 
A: Well show me that by not calling me anymore. 
B: OK! 
A: …  




[Telephone Rings again …] 
A: Hello. 
B: My name is Cheryl.  I believe I am your daughter. 
A: I told you to get off my phone and quit calling me!  Now I mean it!   
I’m gonna have you put in jail if you don’t! 
B: What’s wrong? 
A: Huh? 
B: What’s wrong? 
A: What’s right? 
B: Please don’t hang up the phone again. 
A: I’m gonna hang up the phone again, because I’ve got no time for  
you! 
B: Don’t you start with me! 
A: What do you mean don’t start with you, you, you started it.  You  
started it when you dialed my number! 
B: Where’s mama? 
A: What? 
B: Where’s mama? 
A: You heard mama?  What are you talking about? 
B: I’m sorry. 
A: Well show me you’re sorry by leaving me alone, and don’t dial my  
number anymore. 
B: I’ll call back in an hour! 
A: You’d better not! 
B: Yes!  Yes!  Yes! 
A: I’ll tell you what … If you call back the telephone company is  
gonna monitor the call and they’re gonna know who you are 
and they’re gonna come git’cha! 
B: You’re so beautiful. 
A: I don’t know what you’re talking about. 
B: My name is Cheryl.  And I’m your daughter. 
A: No, you’re not my daughter.  I don’t have a daughter named  
Cheryl.  I don’t have a daughter that’s a man.   
B: Sure. 
A: Obviously, obviously you’re a male.  You sound like a male.   
B: No! 
A: And how could I be your mom?  Because I’m a male, too. 
B: Don’t you start with me! 
A: Well you started this! 
B: I don’t like this new attitude of yours! 
A: I don’t like you either! 
B: What’s wrong? 
A: What? 
B: What’s wrong? 
A: What do you mean, “What’s right?” 
B: Well, I’ll think about it … 
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A: Wait, why do you say, “No”? 
B: Is this Diane? 
A: What? 
B: Is this Diane? 
A: Is it … what? 
B: Is this Diane? 
A: Tan? 
B: Is this Diane? 
A: … No!  
[A Hangs up.] 
Imagine yourself getting caught up in a conversation such as this one.  You’re home 
alone, the phone rings, and you answer it.  Quickly, something seems … off.  The responses 
of the party on the other end of the line don’t follow any rational pattern you can relate to.  
Certain statements seem logically (and perhaps biologically) contradictory.  The person 
doesn’t seem to be comprehending you, or even listening to you or to what you are saying.  
No matter what you say, you get the feeling that it is not being interpreted, and, try as you 
might, you can’t make the other person’s words ring any hermeneutic bells for you, either.  
You find yourself continually struggling to make any meaning at all out of the 
communication that is taking place, to return any part of the other party’s utterances into the 
realm of your own experiences so as to make some sense of it.  But you keep trying, 
desperately, to find a way to understand what the other is saying, or to get them to understand 
what you are saying, on your own terms.  Ultimately, you’re left not really knowing what to 
do about the situation you have found yourself in, and you start to get the feeling that the 
only sensible explanation for all of this is that the person on the other end of the phone is a 
complete weirdo.   
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But what if the person on the other end of the line wasn’t really a person at all?  In 
this conversation transcribed above, the reason why interlocutor A found the conversation so 
frustratingly impenetrable was because it wasn’t really a conversation at all.  Not in the 
traditional sense, anyway.  From A’s perspective in this phone call, the voice on the other 
end of his line sounds like a human voice (and, technically, it is).  The sounds A hears are, on 
a sonic level, the very sounds created when Richard Simmons speaks, and the words being 
spoken are actual words that he has spoken himself at one time.  But the living, breathing 
human being whose experiences are collected under the name “Richard Simmons” is not 
actually present on the phone call.  In other words, it is not Richard Simmons himself, not a 
self-present human subject, who is talking to A.  The reason why interlocutor A is struggling 
so hard to make sense of the person on the other end of his line is because the person on the 
other end of his line is not an actual person.  But unfortunately for A, he doesn’t know it.   
What interlocutor A actually is in this conversation is the butt of a joke, an unwitting 
victim of a prank telephone call constructed using a technique called soundboarding.  While 
lexically similar to the new-millennial coercion technique known as waterboarding, 
soundboarding (although perhaps itself a low-level form of torture) has a much less grave 
intent than waterboarding.  Soundboarding is a technology regularly employed by producers 
on “The Howard Stern Radio Show,” meaning these prank phone calls are created 
specifically with Stern’s audience in mind.  Like any other prank phone call, soundboarding 
is a way to play a practical joke, to “get one over” on unsuspecting victims. Because these 
soundboard pranks require a butt of the joke, they produce laughter at the expense of 
someone else.  As such, they are examples of the superiority theory of humor, or the ethically 
suspect form of humor that greatly troubled Plato.  The fear for Plato is that when we laugh 
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at the expense of someone else, the source of laughter is malice, and malice is not something 
a soul seeking to live the good life should take pleasure in.  Laughing at these jokes interrupts 
the subject’s rational pursuit of the good life, and, as such, Plato argued for their censorship 
in his Ideal Republic.   
As examples of the practical joke genre, prank calls have been around since cheeky 
children have had telephone lines in their homes and free time on their hands.  The classic 
gags of the genre, cliché’s at this point with unknown origins, include “Do you have Prince 
Albert in a can?” and “Is your refrigerator running?”  Traditionally, the early forms of prank 
calls were always done by actual human beings on other actual human beings.  For example, 
when the corner storeowner responds that, “Yes, we do have Prince Albert in a can,” the 
practical joker on the other end of the line delivers the punchline: “Well, you’d better let him 
out before he suffocates!”  Part of the thrill in making these traditional forms of prank phone 
calls is based on whether or not the practical joker can keep in character and keep herself 
from cracking up as she implements the prank.  The question to be answered is can the 
practical joker maintain herself as the stable center of the prank’s rhetorical situation long 
enough for the joke to succeed to its full potential?  The practical joker who gets too excited 
might laugh out loud before the punchline is delivered, effectively blowing her cover, or the 
shy prankster might get embarrassed and end the call prematurely.  In other words, these 
early forms of prank phone calls relied on a human prankster maintaining rational control 
over herself in order to successfully deliver the humorous appeal and produce her desired 
effects.  If laughter, or some other uncontrollable emotion such as embarrassment, were to 
well up inside the prankster and exceed her abilities to rationally control herself, she would 
lose control of the rhetorical situation, lose control of the joke, and the gag would be a bust.  
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Early forms of prank phone calls function just like any other persuasive rhetorical situation: a 
stable human subject attempts to control language to produce effects of her own design.  
Soundboarding, however, complicates this traditionally human-centric prank phone 
call model because it uses new-millennial technology to create a non-human prankster.  
Here’s how it works: a recording of someone’s voice is originally made. That recording is cut 
up into small clips, or citations.  Those clips are then loaded into a software program on a 
computer – the soundboard – where these individual audio clips are assigned to buttons.  
When the buttons are pressed, whatever audio clip has been assigned to that button is played.  
In this way, the person operating the soundboard can press the buttons in any order to create 
a voice that sounds like a real human interlocutor – but it’s not.  So the prank phone caller 
makes a call to the unsuspecting victim and places that person into dialogue with the 
soundboard-produced, non-human interlocutor.  The resulting exchange typically bewilders 
and exasperates the victim, because the victim becomes embroiled in a very frustrating 
conversation.  As such, these calls typically break down in unpredictable ways. For example, 
in the above transcript, the clips heard in the prank call were originally recorded for one of 
Richard Simmons’ audio books.  Richard Christy and Sal Governale, two producers from the 
“Howard Stern Radio Show,” took the original audio book recording and cut it into small 
clips that were loaded into a computer soundboard program.  The prank phone call was 
made, and the clips of Richard Simmons were played back to create a series of absurd and 
mystifying responses to questions that appeared to be coming from a human being.  The 
whole prank was then recorded by Richard and Sal, and, ultimately, broadcast on the radio as 
a comedy bit for Stern’s audience.  The breakdown of the conversation caused by the 
victim’s unflinchingly off-balance responses to the soundboard interlocutor creates the 
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prank’s humorous appeal: we laugh at the prank’s victim twisting in the wind, struggling to 
come to terms with the incomprehensible weirdo on the other end of the line.  The more 
profoundly that breakdown occurs, the more successful the prank, and, in theory, the harder 
we laugh at the appeal (that is, again, if you’re in to this sort of thing).   
In addition to being excellent sources of entertainment for the junior high student 
living inside (some) of us, these soundboard prank calls – because they dramatize an 
exchange between a human subject and an unapproachable other – also give us a way to 
think about the ethics of alterity, or the Otherness of Levinasian ethics.  Alterity is important 
to rhetoric because it offers a way to think about a poststructuralist ethics that is an 
alternative to the humanist or Enlightenment view of the subject.  As Diane Davis puts it in 
Breaking Up [at] Totality: A Rhetoric of Laughter, rhetoric has long imagined a very human 
subject occupying the center of the rhetorical situation manipulating language to create 
persuasive appeals of his own design: “‘man’ is at the center of language, the master of his 
own speech, and that speech is an expression of man’s consciousness” (69).  The problem 
with this humanist view of the subject, however, is that, in this model, the subject’s 
relationship with the other is always one of appropriation.  In other words, the humanist 
subject goes out into the world and contacts otherness, but those encounters are always in 
service of absorbing the other into the subject’s own horizon and enriching the self.  As 
Jeffrey T. Nealon writes:  
[To critique this humanist view of subjectivity is] to critique a subjectivity that 
inexorably goes about reducing the other to the categories of the self.  Any 
ethical system that understands the other as simply “like the self’ will be 
unable to respond adequately to the other’s uniqueness and singularity; 
indeed, such a reduction amounts to a kind of subjective colonialism, where 
all the other’s desires are reduced to the desires off the ‘home country,’ the 




In this instance, the humanist subject lives to seek out otherness everywhere and then kill it; 
it defeats otherness in the sense that the humanist subject always returns the other to its own 
horizon.  For example, consider the typical vacation scenario where one visits an exotic 
“other” culture: I go to Fiji, I take a lot of photos, and I buy a cannibal fork (the ones they 
sell especially to tourists).  I then return home with a lot of photos and a cannibal fork and a 
bunch of stories (“They had actual cannibals there not very long ago … can you believe it?”) 
that demonstrate how I have used this encounter with the other to enrich myself.  I am now 
myself plus this experience in Fiji.  This demonstrates a movement of the other toward the 
self in order to enrich the self for personal gain and profit.  Again, Nealon writes: 
So the Enlightenment subject, ‘in order to find himself,’ turns outward to the 
diversity of the other(s); such a subject ‘loses himself’ in order to secure the 
higher dynamism of an evolving, adventuring appropriation that can confront 
and conquer ever newer forms of otherness.  Such a subject has learned to 
make use of the other, and finds itself only by means of the other.  The 
bourgeois subject, one might say, profits from its investment in the other; it 
gets a return for its risk. (32) 
 
This desire to appropriate is dangerous precisely because this subject only puts itself in 
relation to the other to master it, to bring it back home to its own horizon.  Therefore, 
humanist ethics is a kind of black hole, always and only drawing otherness toward the self 
where otherness cannot escape.  It is an essentializing, appropriating, colonizing ethics that 
does not approach the other on its own terms, but seeks only to make the other a part of the 
self, to reduce the other’s difference to the self’s same.   
An ethics of alterity, however, offers a way to respond to the other not as something 
to be mastered and returned to the subject’s own horizon, but as a radically unapproachable 
and absolute “Other,” one toward which the subject is always moving, but can never reach.  
In this encounter with otherness that cannot be reached, the subject itself is interrupted.  In 
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Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, Emmanuel Levinas uses the concepts of 
totality and infinity to forward an approach to the other that is non-essentializing.  Levinas 
defines totality as the space of identification of the self; it is the ontological realm of “being” 
where human reason and meaning-making occur and subjectivity resides.  As he writes, “The 
meaning of individuals (invisible outside of this totality) is derived from the totality” 
(Totality 22).  According to Levinas, the “I,” the ego, takes place in the world of totality; it is 
the space where we reside when we are acting the parts of our identity.  In short, totality is 
the always-appropriating space of the rational human subject.  
But there exists a space beyond totality, a space where movement is always away 
from the self, always toward a radically other Other that is, itself, always effacing, always 
going away.  Soundboarding prank phone calls provide a glimpse of this space, the space of 
infinity, or the non-totalizable space beyond totality and beyond the self’s ego, where the 
ethics of alterity arises.  Levinas imagines this “Other ethics” as follows: 
A calling into question of the same – which cannot occur within the egoist 
spontaneity of the same – is brought about by the other.  We name this calling 
into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics.  The 
strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my 
possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my 
spontaneity, as ethics. (43) 
 
For Levinas, what it means to be in relation to the Other is to be subjected by the other, to 
have infinite debt to the other.  To say “I” is to admit my total dependency on an Other who 
has allowed me to have some kind of identity; “I” am not anything but this response to the 
Other.  Diane Davis describes this response by way of an appropriate metaphor for this 
chapter, the telephone call: 
[Y]ou pick up the phone, and your first word is ‘yes?’  Even if you say 
‘hello?’ it means ‘yes?’  Before you can say, ‘yes, I will take your call’ or ‘no, 
I won’t take your call,’ you have taken the call, in order to get the chance to 
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decide.  Already in picking up, you have responded, welcomed the other in.  
Indeed, even before you pick up, the ringing itself announces that the other is 
in, has already come in through the phone line or cable line or cell signal that 
runs into your home (or pocket) from the outside.  (Inessential 121) 
 
When the victim of a soundboard prank phone call hears the phone ring, she is already being 
welcomed by the Other, already being given a chance to say “yes.”  It is the Other who 
provides the victim with an opening; the Other is always calling us and allowing us an 
opportunity to say “yes,” to say “I.”  From this perspective, to be “I” is to have no attributes 
that come from an ego or a stable self.  We are not full of the characteristics collected under 
our name.  Instead, the things that make us unique come from our unique modes of 
subjection; we are constantly in a performative response when we are in a responsible 
relationship with the Other, and this performative response never ends.  Even though we do 
not stay in this space of infinity – we do hermeneutical things, for example, analyzing things 
and returning the other to the self all the time – there has to be this space of infinity before 
the space of totality can even be possible.  As Levinas writes, “Metaphysics, transcendence, 
the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by me, that is, as the ethics that 
accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge.  And as a critique precedes dogmatism, 
metaphysics precedes ontology” (43).  In other words, this space of infinity, this ethics of 
alterity, is a condition of possibility for having a sense of the self and living in totality.  In a 
soundboard prank, the call of the soundboard-created, non-human other provides the victim 
with the condition of possibility for having a sense of self and for living in totality.  But these 
calls also dramatize the interruption of both the victim of the prank and the audience of the 
prank occurring as a result of the victim’s encounter with an infinite Other.  When the butt of 
the joke is placed into conversation with the soundboard created Other, the performative 
response of the butt of the joke is to become frustrated and unglued, to become interrupted by 
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this encounter with infinite otherness.  And the audience listening to all this happen responds 
to the victim’s breakdown by laughing at the victim’s misery, a performative response that 
also interrupts the subjectivity of the audience members, since laughter’s asignifying force 
produces effects that exceed the rational control of the human.  In other words, the audience 
of soundboard prank phone calls encounter otherness as well; while the victim of the prank 
encounters otherness by means of an encounter with a wholly non-present, radical Other, the 
audience of the prank call encounters the otherness of laughter. 
But it doesn’t take a soundboard prank phone call to encounter otherness.  As Levinas 
suggests, this is what happens anytime anyone is addressed in a phone call (or addressed in 
any situation); the Other interlocutor is always an infinite Other, and the relationship remains 
an irrecoverable exteriority.  However, for Levinas, this relationship is always a 
fundamentally human relationship.  Davis writes: 
According to Levinas, the address that opens the space of the ethical relation 
takes place – first of all, if not exclusively – among human ‘brothers.’  […] 
Levinas himself declares that his notion of ethics arises precisely in the ‘gap 
between the animal and the human,’ and he stakes his ‘entire philosophy’ on 
the conviction that this gap is uncrossable. (144) 
 
Again, we encounter another front in the human-animal divide: the human is the animal who 
laughs, uses rhetoric, and remains exclusively capable of creating the address that opens the 
space of the ethical relation.  However, what these non-human, non-representational 
soundboard prank phone calls can help us imagine is not just a non-appropriating encounter 
with a non-present Other, but a non-appropriating encounter with a non-human Other.  In this 
instance, the address that opens the space of a soundboard prank phone call does not take 
place exclusively among human brothers.  Davis says of the address: 
When you address me, you both give a said to be interpreted and, 
simultaneously, withdraw from the interpretive context […] No matter what 
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you say to me, when you address me you present yourself as an interpretable 
phenomenon from which you are always already busting loose, as a theme or 
concept that nonetheless cannot contain you.  Sending me a greeting from the 
‘outside,’ you communicate more than I can comprehend, a ‘surplus’ of 
alterity that I can neither appropriate nor abdicate […] it’s the address that 
provokes the opening [toward the other], and […] the address itself is a 
rhetorical gesture. (“Addressing Alterity” 193)   
 
Put differently, when a human subject addresses someone else, what that subject offers in 
that address can never be fully contained by the person being addressed.  The addressor is 
“always already busting loose,” always, on some level, an “impenetrable phenomenon” to the 
addressee.  But in traditional conversational exchanges, the “said to be interpreted” still 
resides within language, still resides within meaning and within the realm of the humanist 
self because both the addressor and the addressee remain human.  However, what takes place 
in a soundboard prank call, in the rhetorical gesture of the prank itself, is not an essentially 
human address, but an address from a wholly non-present and non-human other.  Consider 
the following example of a soundboard prank call, also taken from “The Howard Stern Radio 
Show.”  This prank begins with a middle-aged man (interlocutor A) answering the phone at 
his place of business.  He begins a conversation with radio talk show host and self-
proclaimed alien abductee Riley Martin (interlocutor B), but interlocutor A does not 
recognize Martin: 
[Telephone rings …] 
A: Hello? 
B: Hello, Bobby? 
A: No, this is Thomas. 
B: Hello, Brian? 
A: No, this … what you want? 
B: Hello, Chris? 
A: No. 
B: Hello, Chris from Arizona? 
A: No. 




B: Hello, Louis? 
A: No. 
B: Hello, Michelle? 
 
A: Ah … look here.  All them names you calling me, they ain’t  
making no sense.   
B: Hello, Tony? 
A: No, this is Thomas. 
B: Hello, Tom? 
A: Yes. 
B: Hello, Steve? 
A: No. 
B: Hello, Thomas? 
A: Well, wait a minute now, I’m gonna hang up. 
B: Hello, Otis! 
A: … 
[A hangs up.] 
 
The setup of this prank is conceptually simplistic.  Riley Martin does a radio show where he 
takes calls from listeners.  Stern show producers Christy and Governale recorded one of his 
shows, cut out the audio clips where Mr. Martin addresses his callers by their different given 
names, and then put those audio clips into a soundboard program.  They then called an 
unsuspecting victim and used the soundboard to create an interlocutor who addressed the 
victim with a variety of names, occasionally landing on his actual name, but never staying in 
that place of understanding for very long.  The call continues: 
[Telephone rings again …] 
A: Hello? 
B: Hello, Stephanie! 
A: Hey, look here.  You, you’re talking to the wrong person.   
B: Hello, Thomas? 
A: Alright, then. 
B: Hello, Slim? 
A: No, I ain’t Slim. 
B: Hello, Curtis from New Orleans? 
A: I ain’t Curtis from New Orleans. 
B: How are you, Mike? 
A: I ain’t that.  My name is Thomas. 








B: Hello, Michelle? 
A: … 
[A hangs up.] 
 
The prank revolves around its manipulation of the rhetorical address, but in particular, it toys 
with a specific aspect of the address, the part that calls out, literally, to the victim’s source of 
self-identification: his name.  In this call, the humorous appeal is derived from a sort of 
amplified identity crisis on the part of the victim.  He hears someone on the other end of the 
phone, addressing him, giving him a chance to say “yes” to the Other, but this address 
becomes interruptive for him because the “him” that is being addressed is being toyed with 
by the pranksters.  The victim wants to be called out to by his own sense of “I,” but this call 
shows us how that sense of “I” is only possible after the other has already welcomed him in 
and given him a chance to say “I.”  In other words, the victim is given the chance to be his 
sense of “I,” to be “Thomas,” (which is who he wants to be) at the moment his phone rings.  
But Thomas becomes frustrated because he wants the Other on the other end of his phone to 
call out to him specifically, to acknowledge himself to himself as himself, to tell him, “Yes, 
you are Thomas!”  But this call shows us how identity is already interrupted by infinite 
otherness, because “Thomas” is no more stable, no more full of the qualities that make him 
“Thomas” before his phone rang than he is during this interruptive phone call.  It is just that 
the phone call explicitly brings an interruption that is always already happening and that 
continually gives him the chance to have the performative response that he calls “Thomas,” 
to light.  
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When people listen to a prank call like this, one typical response is to ask, “Why is 
the guy still on the phone?  Why doesn’t he just hang up on this weirdo?”  Perhaps, the 
victim seems to linger so long because he is trying to return some part of the call – the part 
that addresses his self-identity – back to the horizon of the same.  Or, perhaps he is trying to 
respond to the address, to answer the call and say, “yes” to the other.  In either case, the 
victim’s perseverance and patience with the soundboard interlocutor and his struggle to make 
meaning out of the call dramatizes how the subject is interrupted by way of an encounter 
with otherness that cannot be reached.  But it does so in such a way that the victim’s loss is 
the audience’s gain.  Listening to someone become interrupted, watching them twist in the 
wind and break down in frustration during an encounter with otherness, provides an 
opportunity to laugh, and, much to Plato’s chagrin, to take pleasure in the misfortune of 
others.  Frankly, it is hard not to laugh at someone who, when called both “Curtis from New 
Orleans” and “Stephanie” in the space of the same phone call, doesn’t immediately hang up. 
Yet while we laugh at the victim struggling with otherness, we are simultaneously 
encountering otherness ourselves: the otherness of laughter.  What these soundboard prank 
calls ultimately do – by way of humorous appeals constructed around encounters with 
otherness – is to bring the audience listening to the prank on the radio into an encounter with 
otherness in the form of the interruptive effects of laughter’s asignifying force.  
In addition to dramatizing how the victim’s rational sense of self is interrupted when 
he encounters a wholly non-present other, the next section of this prank call also highlights 
Derrida’s concept of language’s essential iterability.  As the call continues, it expands on the 
prank’s initial setup, as the soundboard interlocutor stops addressing the victim with random 
given names and, instead, turns to reciting a garbled “shout out” of people and places and 
 
 176 
dog names and general gibberish.24  Once the victim thinks that the person on the other end 
of the line is finally talking to “Thomas,” the message that is then transmitted remains 
incomprehensible to the victim as it continues to address things beyond the victim’s horizon 
of meaning: 
[Telephone rings again …] 
A: Hello? 
B: Hello, Tom? 
A: Yeah? 
B: Yeah, um, yeah, yeah, uh, shout out, uh, shout out here, uh … to uh  
… Andre, Tom Hoffman, and his little dog Ember in Gentilly, 
Virginia, uh … Jeff in Jefferson, Mississippi … Uh, he don’t 
hurt nobody [laughing] … And, Bill Nickin in Rosaries. 
A: Look here.  Uh, if you want to keep talking, you call somebody  
else.  But, don’t call me.  Cause I got, I, I’m on a business 
phone. 
[A hangs up.] 
 
When we get to the “shout out” section of this prank, we see a performance of how language 
– in order to function as a language – must be able to be lifted from one context and placed in 
another where it can still function in some capacity (even if that capacity is “non-meaning”).  
For Derrida, to be able to identify a mark we must be able to repeat it, and, conversely, we 
would be unable to read a writing that we could not repeat; it would not be legible to us as 
writing.  Therefore, citation is always possible in language; it has to be for language to be 
language.  We can always lift words from out of one written context and those words will 
still function.  For example, we can record a clip of Riley Martin saying “Hello, Tom!” on his 
radio show and put that clip on a soundboard and then hit the button and hear, “Hello, Tom!”  
Language has been cited from one context and placed in another where it can still function as 
                                                
24 At the end of every episode of the Riley Martin’s Show, Martin does a segment called 
“Shout Outs,” where he names fans from around the country, recognizing them, and sending 
them various well-wishes.  Often, by the time the shout out section of the show comes around, 
Martin has had a few too many Miller Lite’s; the shout out’s, therefore, are often difficult to 
interpret, even when spoken from the non-soundboard version of Riley Martin. 
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language.  However, we can also graft that chain of writing onto another chain where it can 
still function.  Grafted together in a new way, a series of shout outs from Riley Martin’s radio 
show now sounds like, “Yeah, um, yeah, yeah, uh, shout out, us shout out here uh … to uh … 
Andre, Tom Hoffman, and his little dog Enber in Gentilly, Virginia.”  Even if in this new 
context the grafts represent “non-meaning” or “agrammaticalness,” they still constitute one 
of the possible effects of language.  They can then always be cited again and grafted onto 
new chains where they have infinite future possibilities.  As Derrida explains in “Signature 
Event Context”: 
Certain utterances can have a meaning although they are deprived of objective 
signification.  ‘The circle is squared’ is a proposition endowed with meaning.  
It has sufficient meaning at least for me to judge it false or contradictory […] 
‘Squared circle’ marks the absence of a referent, certainly, as well as that of a 
certain signified, but not the absence of meaning. (11) 
 
In other words, writing’s essential iterability shows us that “One can perhaps come to 
recognize other possibilities in [writing] by inscribing it or grafting it onto other chains.  No 
context can entirely enclose it” (9).  Writing’s essential iterability, this repeatability-with-a-
difference, always necessitates repetition somewhere else, as iterability is a general condition 
of language’s possibility.  Without it, no signs would be recognizable, since any sign, spoken 
or written, has to be able to be removed from its context and placed in another in order for it 
to function as such.  These soundboard prank phone calls show us how encountering a 
limitless Other serves to disperse what we might think of as “I” into an infinite number of 
future possibilities, future instantiations or performative responses of the self.  Without them 
there can be no “I,” no sense of the self at all, since they also show us how language 
functions just like the self.  Language is always already interrupted by its future possibilities, 
just as the subject is always already interrupted by its infinite encounters with a limitless 
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otherness; without this interruption, nothing resembling a successful language, or a self-
identity, an “I,” could ever be possible. 
 The connection between being and language in soundboard prank calls can further 
explored by means of Levinas’ concept of language having two aspects: the said and the 
saying.  The said is that which can be thematized and returned to the realm of the self, to the 
“I.”  As Davis puts it, “The said indicates the constative production of conceptual forms, 
themes, ideas; it thus offers itself up to interpretation” (“Addressing Alterity” 192-3).  In a 
manner, then, the said relates to Austin’s constatives, in that the said embodies the content of 
the statement, and, therefore, reflects ontological closure and the assertion of the self.  The 
said demonstrates being as digestive; it is language going out and seeking out alterity only to 
incorporate it into the horizon of the self.  The saying, on the other hand, is an expressive 
position of one facing the other in an ethical relationship with alterity.  Davis again writes, 
“The saying, by contrast [to the said], indicates a performative, an address that necessarily 
unsettles what is congealed in the already-said […] it shatters the conceptual image that ‘I’ 
have interiorized of ‘you,’ which takes us both out, ‘essentially’” (193).  The saying, then, is 
ethical openness – an “otherwise than being” – as opposed to the said’s ontological closure 
(Otherwise 1).  Relating this to Austin’s performatives, the saying is never fully reducible to 
meaning, because it escapes comprehension and functions in a manner beyond signification.  
Rather than reflecting assertion, the saying interrupts notions of statement, content, and 
assertion.  Much in the same way infinity is the condition of possibility for totality, the 
saying is the “pre-original language” that allows for the statement, content, and assertion of 
the said to occur.  However, like the relationship of infinity to totality, language does not 
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reside within the saying; the saying is always betrayed by the said.  Levinas describes this 
paradoxical relationship as follows:  
The correlation of the saying and the said, that is, the subordination of the 
saying to the said, to the linguistic system and to ontology, is the price that 
manifestation demands.  In language quo said everything is conveyed before 
us, be it at the price of a betrayal. (6) 
 
In other words, there is no way to say what is unsayable, no way to use language and not be 
“betrayed” by the said, because to say anything is to return to the ontological realm of the 
self that “manifestation demands.”  This betrayal – the indiscretion with regards to the 
unsayable – becomes a labyrinth from which there appears to be no rational way out.  
Levinas’ circuitously apropos description of this maze, “The otherwise than being is stated in 
a saying that must also be unsaid in order to thus extract the otherwise than being from the 
said in which it already comes to signify but a being otherwise,” suggests that language is 
caught in a logical contradiction.  But Davis suggests that glimpses of a way out are possible 
if we can resist the temptation to always reduce everything to the realm of meaning and 
understanding: 
[T]he challenge is to refuse to reduce the saying to the said, to keep 
hermeneutic interpretation from absorbing the strictly rhetorical gesture of the 
approach, which interrupts the movement of appropriation and bursts any 
illusion of having understood. (208) 
 
This refusal to reduce the saying to the said, bursting the illusion of having understood, is 
precisely what soundboard prank phone calls do.  By functioning as practical jokes designed 
to thwart meaning and understanding at every turn, soundboard prank phone calls place their 
victim in a space where the saying briefly ascends the said.  These calls rarely mean 
anything; that’s what makes them funny.  Yet they still do many things that are irreducible to 
meaning and reason: they interrupt the subjectivity of the victim by placing her into an 
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encounter with infinite otherness; they dramatize the effects of a non-human rhetorical 
address providing the opening to the other; and (when successful) they produce the effect of 
laughter – a non-rational response – in the audience listening along on the radio. These 
moments where subjectivity is interrupted in both the victim of the prank and in the audience 
provide glimpses of the space where the saying briefly takes precedent over the said, 
reiterating what it means to use language and reminding us that meaning is just one possible 
effect of language. 
 Consider another example that dramatizes what else soundboard prank phone calls 
can do.  The following prank is more technically involved than the two examples previously 
addressed, and, therefore, requires a more detailed introduction. In this skit, Stern producers 
Christy and Governale host a fictitious call-in radio show called “The Jack and Rod Show.”  
The premise of this recurring skit is that actual guests call into “The Jack and Rod Show” 
with something real to promote.  The guests believe they are on a real radio program, but the 
interviews always take a turn for the strange.  In one episode, fire alarms repeatedly go off 
inside Jack and Rod’s studio during the interview; the prank culminates with the studio being 
consumed by fire and the unwitting call-in guest screaming “Get out of there!” to her 
pranksters.  Other examples, however, employ the use of soundboard prank phone calls to 
create humorous appeals for Stern’s audience.  The following prank is particularly germane 
to the question of how to refuse reducing the saying to the said because it troubles the very 
horizon of meaning by interrupting the victim’s sense of identity in an unsettling way.  
Here’s how it works: the prank begins with what seems to be a normal setup for a call-in 
radio talk show.  The show’s hosts introduce the show’s guest: 
  [Theme Music Plays …] 
Host #1 (Jack): And we’re back with the Jack and Rod Show, and  
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today we have author of Who Do You See in the Mirror? Dr. 
Joseph A. Williams.  
[Applause …] 
Host #2 (Rod): How you doing, doctor? 
Dr. Williams: Ok, how ‘bout you? 
Rod: Tell us a little bit about what makes your book so unique? 
Dr. Williams: Well, I, what I did was design a system called the  
Human CABLE System, which stands for Consequence, 
Attitude, Behavior, Learning, and Environment. 
Jack:  Hmm.  Interesting.  Let’s take a call, Rod. 
Rod: Good idea, Jack.  Caller, you’re on the air with Dr. Joseph A.  
Williams. 
 
At this point, the show’s guest, the victim of the prank, is placed into contact with the 
soundboard created caller.  The curious aspect of this particular soundboard created caller, 
however, is that it is actually created from a previous audio recording of the victim’s own 
voice.  In other words, the victim of this prank is tricked into getting into a heated argument 
with himself.  Because the logistics of this prank are so confusing (how does someone get 
into a situation where they get into an argument with their own voice?), I actually contacted 
Dr. Joseph A. Williams, and, in my own attempt to return the other to my own horizon, 
conducted a brief interview with him about this encounter.  While the question of “How 
could you possibly not recognize your own voice?” was danced around and never confronted 
directly, Dr. Williams graciously explained how the prank came into being.  Sometime 
before the prank, members of the Stern show conducted an original interview with him.  The 
conditions of this first interview, at the time, never revealed any connection to the later prank 
phone call; Dr. Williams never had any reason to believe that these two interviews, 
conducted some time apart, were related in any way.  They just seemed like two different 
interviews about his book (“Williams Interview”).  So this “Jack and Rod Show” prank 
unfolded over time, because a preliminary fake interview had to occur with Dr. Williams so 
that a recording of his own voice could be used in the later prank, and enough time had to 
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pass so Dr. Williams would not be given reason to suspect any kind of connection between 
the two interviews.  In the preliminary fake interview, Dr. Williams mentioned that another 
caller was used to “accuse me of plagiarism” (“Williams Interview”).  Because the Stern 
show producers employed this accusatory angle in the prank’s setup, they had recordings of 
Dr. Williams making statements defending his own work that they ultimately used in the 
later prank to confuse Dr. Williams.  Those earlier recordings were then cited and assigned to 
the soundboard software, where they were then grafted together in a new context and turned 
back on Dr. Williams in the prank transcribed here: 
Caller: Hello? 
Dr. Williams: Good morning. 
Caller: You actually stole my idea. 
Dr. Williams: Oh, I stole your idea?  Ok, well that’s funny.  That’s a  
… I took the Human CABLE System and, cause I own the 
trademark on it. 
Caller: I have the trademark on the Human CABLE System. 
Dr. Williams: Oh, really?  Hmm, now, you know, you, that’s a, that’s a  
pretty big accusation there.  And, I, I don’t understand where  
you’re coming from.  
Caller: I clearly own the trademark and it will be registered in about  
another month. 
Dr. Williams: Hmm, that’s gonna be, this is gonna be really  
interesting, because, guess what?  Mine will be registered in a  
month. 
Caller: There was two characters in the book.  Can you give me the  
name of the female character? 
Dr. Williams: Oh!  Ok, I have, ah, Donna, who’s the female character.   
Caller: No, it, it was Donna.  He’s wrong on, on the character, the  
female character. 
Dr. Williams: I was wrong, from, from my own book?  You, you asked  
me to name the character from my book.   
Caller: Yes. 
Dr. Williams: Not your book.  My book!  My book, is, it’s Donna. 
Caller: No, it, it was Donna. 
Dr. Williams.  That’s what I said!  It’s in my book!  It was Donna.  
That’s correct! 
Caller: He’s wrong again!  He gave me the wrong name. 
Dr. Williams: What do you mean?  How can I be wrong on my own  
book?  I have a copy of it!  It’s in front of me!  I have the copy 
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of the book now, [laughing] as I speak to you! 
Caller: You are wrong again. 
Dr. Williams:  I’m wrong, and, and, it’s Donna?  And I’m looking at  
it?  How could you come up with that kind of, kind of uh … 
vision.  I mean that is blatant, it’s just don’t, uh, It doesn’t 
prove, uh, it doesn’t make sense! 
Caller: My name is Dr. Joseph A. Williams.   
Dr. Williams:  Hey, what is, what is going on here?  Hey, look here  
[laughing] My name is Dr. Joseph Williams, come on! 
Caller: My full name, is, you know, Joseph A. Williams.   
Dr. Williams:  Well, that’s exactly, uh, my name. 
Caller: You are wrong again! 
Dr. Williams:  I’m, I’m wrong … oh, so I don’t even know my own  
name? 
Caller: No.  My full name is Joseph A. Williams. 
Dr. Williams: You, you’re Dr., well, OK, maybe there’s two, so, uh,  
I’m not going to ... 
Caller: Hello, Leroy. 
Dr. Williams: Hello? What do you mean, Leroy? 
Caller: Hello, Leroy. 
Dr. Williams: Oh, I’m Leroy, huh?   
Caller: No, it, it was, Donna. 
Dr. Williams: Gee whiz, what is going on here?  I am now being, I  
haven’t gotta … then he comes up with Leroy? 
Caller: Hello, Leroy? 
Dr. Williams: Wow.  This is quite a, uh, situation here.  I tell ya.   
[Dr. Williams hangs up.] 
 
Again, the first question one typically has when hearing a prank like this for the first time is, 
“How is this possible? How can someone actually not recognize their own voice?” While 
there are many possible logical answers to this question – nervousness associated with being 
interviewed, a prideful, instinctive defensiveness of one’s own intellectual property, a general 
confusion and uncomfortableness stemming from the (misguided) belief that all this 
abundant weirdness happening to you is unfolding live on the air – the most significant 
answer is not one that can be derived from logic: one would likely not recognize their own 
voice on the other end of a phone call because being in a telephone conversation with 
yourself is a logical impossibility.  However, what this prank shows us – in its logically 
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impossible way of exceeding essence and refusing the said – is how the “I” that we think we 
are, the “I” with whom Dr. Joseph A. Williams self-identifies, is the result of a constant 
performative response before a limitless Other that disperses what we think of as “I” into an 
infinite number of future possibilities.  In this prank call, the limitless Other on the phone 
with Dr. Williams is so unapproachable, so beyond reason, that Dr. Williams cannot return 
the Other to his own horizon of the same, even though the voice on the other end of the line 
is his own.  Dr. Williams cannot even return himself to his own horizon of the same because 
he, in this moment, is a self so completely interrupted by his encounter with infinite 
otherness.   
In providing us with these glimpses of infinity and the saying, the exchanges captured 
in these soundboard prank calls ultimately lead us to a rhetoric beyond the human.  In the 
case of the Dr. Williams prank, they show us Dr. Williams is really not so different than his 
soundboard created self: the only way the real Dr. Williams ever gets to think about “being,” 
is after he enters this ethical relationship with a wholly unapproachable Other.  In this case, 
there is no stable, complete Dr. Williams.  Dr. Williams gets to think of himself as “I” only 
after a limitless other disperses what he thinks of as “I” into an infinite number of future 
instantiations or performative responses of the self.  An ethics of alterity relies on the kinds 
of performative responses these pranks capture because, as Nealon notes, they are forms of 
“nonphilosophical experience” that exceed the totality of the said: 
[I]t is not abstract systems of obligation that give a thickness to human ethical 
like; rather, ethics is born and maintained through the necessity of 
performative response to the other person, and such a responsiveness (which 
he calls ‘responsibility’) comes necessarily before the solidification of any 
theoretical rules or political norms of ethical conduct.  In this way, Levinas 
asks us to consider the primacy of ‘nonphilosophical’ experience; that is, he 
continually calls attention to the primacy of an experience of sociality or 
 
 185 
otherness that comes before any philosophical understanding or reification of 
our respective subject positions. (34) 
 
These soundboard pranks offer a way to respond to the other as something not to be mastered 
and returned to the subject’s own horizon.  And because the initiator of the address in a 
soundboard prank call, the originator of the rhetorical gesture, is not human, these calls also 
challenge the traditional model of the rhetorical situation as having a stable, human subject at 
its center who consciously manipulates language to produce effects of her own designs.  In 
this way, these calls dramatize the rhetoric beyond hermeneutics that Davis argues for in 
“Addressing Alterity”: 
I want to suggest that there is also a non-hermeneutical dimension of rhetoric 
that has nothing to do with meaning making, with offering up significations to 
comprehension.  This dimension is reducible neither to figuration nor to what 
typically goes by the name persuasion; it is devoted to a certain reception, but 
not to the appropriation of meaning.  Preceding and exceeding all hermeneutic 
interpretation, it deals not in signified meaning but in the address itself, in the 
exposure to the other; it deals not in the ‘said’ (le dit) but in the ‘saying’ (le 
dire). (192) 
 
What these soundboard prank phone calls provide us with a glimpse of is what Davis calls “a 
rhetoric of the saying” (194).  As rhetorical gestures that address the other as Other, these 
prank calls precede and exceed interpretation, operating with an asignifying force that deals 
not in signified meaning, but in the address itself.  
 As rhetorical gestures initiated by a non-human Other, these prank calls demonstrate 
– as much as is theoretically possible – an ethics of alterity, or what happens when a human 
residing within totality encounters an other as Other.  This glimpse becomes all the more 
tangible – not in a rational manner, but in an emotional manner – by means of the 
interruptive force of asignifying laughter.  When we watch someone get pranked by a 
soundboard call, we witness how her subjectivity is interrupted by an encounter with alterity.  
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The effect of this encounter for the audience watching it is that we laugh ourselves, 
expressing an emotion that interrupts our own subjectivity because it operates in excess of 
reason.  Because these prank calls dramatize the uncomfortable, interruptive exposedness of 
this encounter in a way that produces laughter, they help us feel this non-rational encounter 
with alterity in a more explicit way because we really feel the effects of laughter.  As such, 
these calls help show us the interruptive effects of a radical encounter with alterity because 
they make us laugh, and the effects of laughter’s asignifying force are interruptive as well 
because they exceed our rational control; laughing uncontrollably is not something reason 
can bring under control.  Laughter laughs us as much as we produce laughter in ourselves 
and in each other.  Therefore, these soundboard prank calls show how rhetoric can be about 
more than signification and the appropriation of meaning by a human subject, as they provide 
an opening in which to imagine a different way to respond to the Other, a new way to think 














I heard the billionth voice, the voice of endless complexity 
There were no bearings, I heard them, they were me. 
 
- Wayne Coyne of The Flaming Lips 
 
“We Don’t Control the Controls,” the droning, fourteen-minute, gloriously disturbing 
closing track on The Flaming Lips’ post-punk, psychedelic masterpiece The Terror, 
concludes a dark, troubling album on a poignantly enigmatic note.  With songs like 
“Butterfly, How Long it Takes to Die,” (“You can see the universe is ending/Making love 
darker than the night”), “Be Free, A Way,” (“The sun shines now but we’re so alone/It’s not, 
this not, the light that shines”), and the album’s title track, “The Terror,” (“The terror’s in our 
heads, they don’t control the controls/I turn to face the sun, we are still standing alone/At last 
we’ll stand by the terror,”) The Terror is a tortuous meditation on how the emotion of human 
love forces us to confront the limitations of human agency and the fallibility of rational 
control.  On the one hand, “We Don’t Control the Controls” – with it’s moments of 
dissonant, atonal pugnacity - sublimely crystalizes the fractured narrative of loss, alienation, 
and the inevitable march toward entropy that the album, as if caught in the gravitational pull 
of an irrepressibly immense celestial body, struggles to escape from.  On the other hand, 
however, because “We Don’t Control the Controls” is an instrumental composition, its 
effects are produced by means of non-linguistic, asignifying forces that are not completely 
reducible to reason.  Not being driven by semantic themes, “We Don’t Control the Controls” 
– with its chorus of unintelligible human voices mixed opaquely in the background and its 
structureless rhythmic and harmonic monotony – responds to the limitations of human reason 
and control in a different way, by means of non-representation sonic forces like dynamics, 
density, and dearth, forces that lie beyond the limits of rational understanding.  In other 
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words, to encounter “We Don’t Control the Controls” is, poetically, to encounter that which 
cannot be completely controlled, cannot be entirely returned to the domain of meaning and 
rational representation, and cannot be contained by the limits of the human subject.  It is to 
confront the limitations of the self by encountering that which exceeds the self, and to accept 
that, in fact, we don’t control the controls.  In this way, The Terror’s terminal track performs 
the album’s narrative of an exposed and vulnerable self struggling to come to terms with its 
own limitations.  But because its response is non-linguistic and asignifying, the song ends the 
album with a different way to see the struggling self, not as lacking totality and control, but 
as always already overflowing, always already exceeded by its limitless future possibilities.  
In other words, “We Don’t Control the Controls” offers an ending that is also, 
simultaneously, a new way of beginning. 
 It is upon a horizon of new beginnings that I would suggest we have found ourselves 
at the end of this project.  A horizon where our conceptions of rhetoric and laughter are no 
longer contained within a rational human subject.  A horizon where what it means to use 
language, to appeal to humor, and to experience the asignifying force of laughter is to 
experience a glimpse of what is beyond reason, beyond signification, and beyond the human.  
It is a horizon where to appeal to laughter is to appeal to what is uncontrollable, to a force 
capable of overwhelming the subject, interrupting her sense of self, and laughing her as much 
as she laughs it.  In other words, it is a posthuman horizon for rhetoric, where the subject at 
the controls of the rhetorical situation is no longer completely in control.    
 The path to this new horizon has taken us in two different directions vis-à-vis the 
project’s two different parts.  Part One began by encountering the traditional view of both 
laughter and rhetoric as being essentially human phenomena.  In the case of laughter, this 
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powerful emotion has long been perceived as a unique aspect of the human experience.  
Humans have famously been seen as “the only animal who laughs,” suggesting that the 
emotion of laughter requires a certain ontological level of experience that is definitionally 
unavailable to other animals (Hazlitt 2).  In a sense, then, laughter has served as the keystone 
of the human, the one piece that holds the human together and keeps it divisible from what is 
non-human, or animal. A similar human-centric tradition has also held in the case of rhetoric.  
The ability to not only use language, but to use it persuasively has long been viewed as an 
essential part of what separates humans from other animals.  Whereas animals have been 
seen as only being able to enact change and produce effects by means of force or violence, 
humans can enact change and produce effects by other means, including using language 
toward persuasive ends.  Rhetoric, therefore, is seen as the art that civilizes the human. By 
using rhetoric, we can get other people to do what we want them to do without having to 
resort to force or violence.  In other words, laughter and rhetoric have long been connected 
vis-à-vis the human: humans are the only animals that both possess rhetoric and laugh.  
 However, Part One demonstrates how the asignifying force of laughter and non-
human rhetorics challenge this traditional view of the innate humanness of laughter and 
rhetoric.  In the case of laughter, recent studies in the field of animal science have indicated 
that chimps exhibit laugh-elicited laughter much in the same manner as the contagious, 
conversational laughter exchanged between humans.  Some studies have even indicated that 
rats produce a frequency of chirping that reflects positive emotional feelings, and rats prefer 
spending time with other rats who frequently produce these joyous chirps.  What these 
studies suggest is that man’s belief that he is the only animal that laughs can no longer be 
definitively assumed.  As such, the boundary between rational “human” discourse and non-
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rational “animal” discourse is not as firm as we might like to believe, either.  When we are in 
the throes of uncontrollable laughter and are unable to maintain control of our rational selves, 
we are not demonstrating some kind of essential humanness.  Rather, when we are in the 
throes of uncontrollable laughter, we are being interrupted by an asignifying operation that 
we cannot interpret or control, one that shows us the limits of our humanness.  No matter 
how much we might wish it were the case, we can’t always rationally stop laughter: 
sometimes laughter is in control.   
Just as laughter challenges what it means to be human, laughter also challenges 
rhetoric’s ability to define itself as a uniquely human, rational art.  Rhetoric has always 
proceeded from the position that a human orator residing at the center of the rhetorical 
situation can rationally use language to produce persuasive effects of her own design.  But 
because laughter is not a signifying language, laughter is not language operating in this 
traditional, human sense. Even though, as traditional rhetorical theories seek to theorize, 
laughter can often be conjured by means of constructing language in such a way that the right 
humorous appeal is produced for the right audience at the right time, this does not constitute 
the limits of laughter’s rhetorical effects.  Rather, laughter functions by means of an 
asignifying force that is not entirely reducible to reason and signification, yet it can still 
produce effects.  For example, laughter can become contagious and cause others to laugh 
when they have no idea why they are laughing, or it can overwhelm a human subject at an 
inopportune time, laughing them no matter how desperately they might wish it weren’t the 
case.  In other words, these interruptive effects of laughter’s asignifying force function 
beyond signification and exceed the rational control of the subject.  Therefore, laughter can 
never fully be contained within what has traditionally been conceived of as the human 
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rhetorical situation.  In other words, using rhetoric and laughing are not what make us 
essentially human; using rhetoric and laughing show us the limits of the human.   As such, 
laughter can lead us to a new horizon for rhetoric, one that is beyond reason, beyond 
signification, and beyond the human. 
 It is from this posthuman horizon of a rhetoric beyond reason and signification, then, 
that Part One departs from to revisit the history of rhetoric’s traditional approaches to humor 
and laughter.  Because there is, perhaps, no appeal with more persuasive potential than a 
good joke told at just the right moment, humor and laughter have garnered particular interest 
and attention across the history of the rhetorical tradition.  Since rhetoric is an art interested 
in teaching humans how to use language to get other humans to do things, an orator who can 
appeal successfully to what is traditionally seen as the uniquely human emotion of laughter 
would seem to increase her chances at successful persuasion.  Such an appropriately told 
joke, for example, can refresh a judge who has grown weary from a long day at court, or 
disarm the animosity surrounding a negatively charged issue, or can even be used as a 
weapon, as a way of attacking an adversary by ridiculing her shortcomings to take that 
person down a few pegs in the eyes of the audience.  Ultimately, when used appropriately, 
appeals to humor are a powerful way for an orator to bolster her ethos by creating an intimate 
connection – Aristotle’s “friendly feeling” – between the orator and her audience.  When 
appeals to humor are used appropriately so the desired effect, laughter, is produced in an 
appropriate manner, everyone is likely to be feeling friendly.  And since we generally like to 
laugh, and we like people who can make us laugh, an orator who is interested in persuasion 
would likely find the ability to make an audience laugh a very, very good thing.    
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 But because this desired effect – laughter – functions with an asignifying force that 
exceeds human reason, appealing to this force is risky.  Therefore, traditional rhetorical 
approaches to humor and laughter have tried to advise orators on how to construct humorous 
appeals in a way that maximizes their chances for success and minimizes their chances for 
failure.  From Plato to Castiglione, theorists across the tradition have encountered humor and 
laughter from different angles, always with an eye on the odds.  In other words, which 
appeals, at which time, for which audiences are most likely to be appropriate, and which 
appeals should be used with caution or even avoided entirely.  Some thinkers, like Plato, take 
a much more hard line approach to controlling laughter.  Because laughter functions like a 
drug or like the persuasive arts in general, leading the soul away from its rational part and 
toward the part ruled by appetites and desires, Plato sees the effects of laughter as a threat to 
the soul’s efforts to follow the good, rational life.  As such, Plato calls for the censorship of 
literature that depicted gods or worthwhile people in the throes of uncontrollable laughter.   
Other theorists like Quintilian, however, take exhaustive measures to try to account for as 
many possible effects of humorous appeals as possible.  Quintilian sees the ability to appeal 
to laughter as an “absolutely indispensible” skill for an orator to possess and, as such, he 
labors tirelessly toward a sort of method, or a series of focused suggestions at least, that an 
orator can follow to construct appropriate forms of humorous appeals at the appropriate times 
to produce appropriate effects.  Ultimately, because rhetoric is an art traditionally centered on 
the idea that a rational human subject can control the rhetorical situation to produce desired 
effects, all these approaches demonstrate a desire to articulate the means by which an orator 
can construct the right humorous appeals at the right time to rationally control the many 
possible effects of laughter.  
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 However, what the act of bringing the asignifying force of laughter to bear on the 
rhetorical tradition’s historic approaches to humor and laughter shows us is that, while these 
traditional approaches might appear to be concentrating on how to rationally control laughter, 
they simultaneously all demonstrate an awareness – on some level – that the asignifying 
force of laughter exceeds the rational control of the orator.  When Plato, for example, says in 
the Republic, “Whenever anyone says such things about a god, we’ll be angry with him, 
refuse him a chorus, and not allow his poetry to be used in the education of the young,” what 
he fears is precisely laughter’s ability to interrupt rational control (383b9-c1).  Therefore, his 
approach to controlling laughter’s asignifying force and its interruptive ability to exceed 
rational control in humans (and even gods) is to ban outright certain forms of humorous 
appeals and the depictions of laughter they produce.  And when Quintilian, for example, 
writes in the midst of his wide-ranging chapter advising orators on how to best construct 
humorous appeals, “I do not think that anybody can give an adequate explanation, though 
many have attempted to do so, of the cause of laughter,” he is admitting that the goal of his 
pursuits is beyond comprehension by the human subject (Institutio 6.3.7-8).  He is 
acknowledging that even though appealing to humor is an absolutely indispensible skill for 
an orator, appealing to an uncontrollable force like laughter is always a risky endeavor.  And 
when Castiglione, rather than presenting his advice on how to construct humorous appeals in 
a theoretical manner, actually performs these appeals by means of jokes told by interlocutors 
in his dialogues, he actually dramatizes laughter asignifying force rather than suggesting how 
it can be controlled.  For example, when Bernardo tells an inappropriate joke of the sort he 
claims should not be told in the presence of a lady in the presence of Emilia Pia, the lady’s 
response upends his theory.  First off, she laughs.  Then, she responds with a joke of her own, 
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retorting that Bernardo’s boorish perspective on women “is caused more by the fact that he 
has never found a woman to look at him than by any frailty that exists in women themselves” 
(Courtier 175).  Lady Pia’s response to the joke actually performs the uncontrollability that 
lies within all appeals to humor, that makes any attempt at conjuring laughter in an audience 
a risky endeavor.  In other words, these approaches are actually doing more than they are 
saying – both on a theoretical and on a practical level – when it comes to their engagement 
with humor and laughter.  They are performing the paradox that surrounds efforts to control 
what is uncontrollable.  As such these approaches to humor and laughter foreshadow the 
posthuman notions that the subject at the center of the rhetorical situation can no longer be 
relied upon to be in rational control of language.  Laughter, as an asignifying force that 
exceeds rational control, is important to rethinking the rhetorical situation because we really 
feel the effects of laughter.  In other words, when a subject is laughing uncontrollably, unable 
to rationally stop laughter from laughing her, the interruption of the subject is explicitly 
dramatized: she really feels it.  But this interruption is not limited to asignifying operations; 
signifying operations operate in the same way, it’s just that their interruptive effects are not 
always as easy to feel.  As such, laughter gives us a way, an opening from which to approach 
the idea of a posthuman subject at the center of all rhetorical situations – not just those 
constructed around creating humorous appeals – who is not rationally in control of language.  
A final note on Part One: this new horizon we have arrived at should not be seen as 
an ending.  This path has not led us to a termination; this is not the point where a discrete 
break from tradition happens and an entirely new direction is born.  Rather, this project’s 
approach to rhetoric’s historic treatment of humor and laughter in Part One is not a 
conclusion to somewhere we already been, but the beginning of a new way of imagining 
 
 195 
humor and laughter within the tradition, as seeing this tradition as already having done more 
than we have historically given it credit.  Rhetoric has historically been defined as a rational 
art, and in these traditional approaches to humor and laughter we clearly see attempts to 
control laughter by means of rationally constructed humorous appeals.  So on one hand, 
rhetoric has attempted to control the object of humor, to construct the catalyst that is used to 
conjure up laughter in a rational way so that the appropriate effects will be produced.  On the 
other hand, however, the object in this model is always already haunted by the excess of its 
effects.  In other words, appeals to humor, no matter how rationally constructed, are always 
already interrupted, always already exceeded by the asignifying force of laughter.  Yet the 
new beginning we have arrived at with regard to rhetoric’s traditional approaches to humor 
and laughter is that all of these approaches – on some level – reveal an awareness of 
laughter’s asignifying force.  As such, they are more fluid, more dynamic, and offer us a 
more generous encounter with humor and laughter than they have generally been given 
credit.  In other words, this new horizon Part One concludes upon should not be seen as an 
ending, but instead, as a way to begin at the beginning again, for the first time.  
While perhaps spatially and numerically coming after Part One in this project, Part 
Two is not to be taken as conceptually following the issues discussed in Part One.  What this 
project seeks to perform by means of its two parts is that at the very moment Part One 
departs on its path back through the rhetorical tradition’s approaches to humor and laughter, 
revisiting this history again for the first time, Part Two simultaneously departs on its path 
through contemporary, postmodern humorous locations where the effects of laughter’s 
asignifying force can be observed.  In other words, what these two parts are attempting to 
dramatize is the discrete yet fluid relationship between the two concepts of humor and 
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laughter.  With its engagement with rhetoric’s history of trying to rationally control rhetorical 
appeals, Part One is conceptually more geared toward humor.  After all, how these 
rhetoricians attempt to advise orators when dealing with appeals to humor is to provide them 
with ways to construct appeals, to make appropriate objects of humor that will successfully 
conjure up the humorous effects the orator desires.  Part Two, however, is more interested in 
the effects of these humorous objects – laughter.  As such, it engages the question, “What 
happens when we are already laughing?” or, to put it differently, “How does laughter do 
what it does?”  Observing the uncontrollable effects of laughter in action, performing its own 
interruptive power in a variety of humorous locations retroactively allows us to revisit 
rhetoric’s traditional approaches to humor from a new perspective.  In other words, the 
effects of the asignifying force of laughter dramatized in Part Two – how it interrupts the 
self, functions beyond signification, and exceeds control and reason – are the conditions of 
possibility for any kind of rational approach to humor – such as those explored in Part One – 
to ever be possible in the first place.  Because even though laughter is ultimately 
uncontrollable, jokes are told everyday that go off just as they were supposed to.  Sometimes, 
a rhetor can be just the right amount of funny at just the right time.  But this desired effect, 
this outcome of appropriate laughter, is just one possible effect of many.  Meaning is always 
only one possible effect. Sometime laughter follows humor just the way we want it to, but 
sometimes it doesn’t.  In other words, the effects of laughter’s asignifying force show us that 
appeals to humor are always already interrupted by their infinite future instantiations.  Jokes 
that succeed are only ever possible because the infinite future possible effects of laughter’s 
asignifying force always already interrupt any joke. 
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So when Part Two moves through different performances that appeal to laughter’s 
asignifying force, it does so with an eye toward observing what the effects of this force 
actually do.  For example, the effects of Lenny Bruce’s stand up comedy performance 
dramatize the positive productive potentials of laughter’s asignifying force.  In this 
performance Bruce’s comedy act gets reinscribed and reinvented in multiple contexts – the 
“nonserious” realm of the comedy club and the “serious” realm of the courts – that produce a 
wide array of effects, some of the most significant of which are clearly unintentional and 
uncontrollable by Bruce himself.  Because of this, this performance shows us how humorous 
appeals are always already interrupted by their future instantiations and can never fully be 
contained in a given context, not even by the context of the human subject’s conscious 
intentions.  In the case of Jackass 3D, the effects of postmodern slapstick upend the 
traditional notion of the image as a copy that follows the original.  Forms of postmodern 
slapstick don’t produce the appearance of pain and suffering such as is produced by 
traditional forms of slapstick found in Tom and Jerry or The Three Stooges, but produce 
actual pain and suffering in the film’s actors.  However, rather than presenting postmodern 
slapstick as a new, more “authentic” form of slapstick comedy, Jackass 3D actually creates a 
sense of the real by means of enhanced images created by cinematic techniques like 3D 
technology and high-definition film resolution.  As such, this film functions as its own 
simulacrum, as an image without any relation to reality or a referent and shows us how the 
traditional distinction between an authentic original and a denigrated copy is upended in the 
era of simulation when images are only exchanged for each other.   And finally, in the case of 
prank phone call created using the technique of soundboarding, the subjective interruption 
these calls produce in the prank’s victim are the effect of that victim being placed into an 
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encounter with a wholly non-present, radically other Other.  Because the subject at the center 
of a soundboard created prank phone call is not human, these pranks offer a glimpse at an 
alternative to the traditional humanist view of the subject as one who goes out into the world 
and contacts otherness only to return to other into the subject’s own horizon and enrich the 
self.   As such, these prank calls dramatize an ethics of alterity, or a way to respond to the 
other not as something to be mastered and returned to the subject’s own horizon, but rather as 
a radically unapproachable, absolute “Other,” one that the subject is always moving towards 
and can never reach.  In a sense, then, these calls offer a glimpse at a new way to respond to 
the other and a new way to think about an ethics of alterity.  But because the Other that 
initiates the rhetorical address in a soundboard prank phone call is a non-human Other, these 
calls also offer us a new way to conceive of a rhetoric that is beyond the human, beyond the 
traditional notion of a humanist subject at the center of the rhetorical situation rationally 
controlling language to produce effects of her own design. 
Which brings us back to where we started.  Back to the beginning of the end.  
Because the two parts of this project are recursive, Part Two’s dramatization of laughter’s 
asignifying force lets us reimagine traditional rhetoric’s approaches toward humor and 
laughter in a new way, from a perspective that doesn’t find their inability to completely 
account for all of laughter’s possible effects as a failure, but instead sees their attempts to 
control the uncontrollable as foreshadowing a rhetoric where the human is not in complete 
control.  Conversely, the risks that these traditional approaches advise orators about when 
attempting to appeal to humor are exposed in the dramatizations of the uncontrollable effects 
produced by laughter’s asignifying force in Part Two, revealing just how little control is 
possible when appealing to laughter.  Ultimately, because laughter is not a signifying 
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language, yet it still produces rhetorical effects, taking up laughter’s asignifying force 
provides a chance to expand the field of rhetoric in ways beyond the reason, beyond 
signification, and beyond the human.  Taken collectively, then, the interruptive effects 
dramatized by both Part Two’s examples of laughter’s asignifying force and the efforts to 
contain this force in Part One ultimately give us ample reason to question who or what is at 
the center of the rhetorical situation if, as the song suggests, we don’t control the controls. 
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